tls13_enc.c@ 102797

Last change on this file since 102797 was 101211, checked in by vboxsync, 15 months ago
openssl-3.1.3: Applied and adjusted our OpenSSL changes to 3.1.2. bugref:10527
File size: 33.4 KB

Line
1	/*
2	* Copyright 2016-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3	*
4	* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5	* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6	* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7	* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8	*/
9
10	#include <stdlib.h>
11	#include "ssl_local.h"
12	#include "internal/ktls.h"
13	#include "record/record_local.h"
14	#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15	#include <openssl/evp.h>
16	#include <openssl/kdf.h>
17	#include <openssl/core_names.h>
18
19	#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
20
21	/* ASCII: "tls13 ", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
22	static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "\x74\x6C\x73\x31\x33\x20";
23
24	/*
25	* Given a \|secret\|; a \|label\| of length \|labellen\|; and \|data\| of length
26	* \|datalen\| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
27	* secret \|outlen\| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be \|out\|.
28	* The \|data\| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
29	* \|fatal\| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
30	*/
31	int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL s, const EVP_MD md, const unsigned char *secret,
32	const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
33	const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
34	unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
35	{
36	EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF,
37	s->ctx->propq);
38	EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
39	OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
40	int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
41	const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
42	int ret;
43	size_t hashlen;
44
45	kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
46	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
47	if (kctx == NULL)
48	return 0;
49
50	if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
51	if (fatal) {
52	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
53	} else {
54	/*
55	* Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
56	* or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
57	*/
58	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
59	}
60	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
61	return 0;
62	}
63
64	if ((ret = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
65	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
66	if (fatal)
67	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
68	else
69	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
70	return 0;
71	}
72	hashlen = (size_t)ret;
73
74	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
75	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
76	(char *)mdname, 0);
77	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
78	(unsigned char *)secret, hashlen);
79	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
80	(unsigned char *)label_prefix,
81	sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
82	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
83	(unsigned char *)label, labellen);
84	if (data != NULL)
85	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DATA,
86	(unsigned char *)data,
87	datalen);
88	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
89
90	ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen, params) <= 0;
91	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
92
93	if (ret != 0) {
94	if (fatal)
95	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
96	else
97	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
98	}
99
100	return ret == 0;
101	}
102
103	/*
104	* Given a \|secret\| generate a \|key\| of length \|keylen\| bytes. Returns 1 on
105	* success 0 on failure.
106	*/
107	int tls13_derive_key(SSL s, const EVP_MD md, const unsigned char *secret,
108	unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
109	{
110	/* ASCII: "key", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
111	static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "\x6B\x65\x79";
112
113	return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
114	NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
115	}
116
117	/*
118	* Given a \|secret\| generate an \|iv\| of length \|ivlen\| bytes. Returns 1 on
119	* success 0 on failure.
120	*/
121	int tls13_derive_iv(SSL s, const EVP_MD md, const unsigned char *secret,
122	unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
123	{
124	/* ASCII: "iv", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
125	static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "\x69\x76";
126
127	return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
128	NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
129	}
130
131	int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL s, const EVP_MD md,
132	const unsigned char *secret,
133	unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
134	{
135	/* ASCII: "finished", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
136	static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "\x66\x69\x6E\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64";
137
138	return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
139	sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
140	}
141
142	/*
143	* Given the previous secret \|prevsecret\| and a new input secret \|insecret\| of
144	* length \|insecretlen\|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
145	* pointed to by \|outsecret\|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
146	*/
147	int tls13_generate_secret(SSL s, const EVP_MD md,
148	const unsigned char *prevsecret,
149	const unsigned char *insecret,
150	size_t insecretlen,
151	unsigned char *outsecret)
152	{
153	size_t mdlen;
154	int mdleni;
155	int ret;
156	EVP_KDF *kdf;
157	EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
158	OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
159	int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
160	const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
161	/* ASCII: "derived", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
162	static const char derived_secret_label[] = "\x64\x65\x72\x69\x76\x65\x64";
163
164	kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, s->ctx->propq);
165	kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
166	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
167	if (kctx == NULL) {
168	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
169	return 0;
170	}
171
172	mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
173	/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
174	if (!ossl_assert(mdleni >= 0)) {
175	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
176	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
177	return 0;
178	}
179	mdlen = (size_t)mdleni;
180
181	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
182	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
183	(char *)mdname, 0);
184	if (insecret != NULL)
185	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
186	(unsigned char *)insecret,
187	insecretlen);
188	if (prevsecret != NULL)
189	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT,
190	(unsigned char *)prevsecret, mdlen);
191	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
192	(unsigned char *)label_prefix,
193	sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
194	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
195	(unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
196	sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1);
197	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
198
199	ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, outsecret, mdlen, params) <= 0;
200
201	if (ret != 0)
202	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
203
204	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
205	return ret == 0;
206	}
207
208	/*
209	* Given an input secret \|insecret\| of length \|insecretlen\| generate the
210	* handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
211	* generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
212	*/
213	int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL s, const unsigned char insecret,
214	size_t insecretlen)
215	{
216	/* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
217	return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
218	insecret, insecretlen,
219	(unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
220	}
221
222	/*
223	* Given the handshake secret \|prev\| of length \|prevlen\| generate the master
224	* secret and store its length in \|*secret_size\|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
225	* failure.
226	*/
227	int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL s, unsigned char out,
228	unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
229	size_t *secret_size)
230	{
231	const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
232
233	*secret_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
234	/* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
235	return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
236	}
237
238	/*
239	* Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
240	* 0 on error.
241	*/
242	size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL s, const char str, size_t slen,
243	unsigned char *out)
244	{
245	const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
246	const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
247	unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
248	unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
249	unsigned char *key = NULL;
250	size_t len = 0, hashlen;
251	OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
252
253	if (md == NULL)
254	return 0;
255
256	/* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */
257	if (s->ctx->propq != NULL)
258	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
259	(char *)s->ctx->propq,
260	0);
261	*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
262
263	if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
264	/* SSLfatal() already called */
265	goto err;
266	}
267
268	if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
269	key = s->server_finished_secret;
270	} else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
271	key = s->client_finished_secret;
272	} else {
273	if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md,
274	s->client_app_traffic_secret,
275	finsecret, hashlen))
276	goto err;
277	key = finsecret;
278	}
279
280	if (!EVP_Q_mac(s->ctx->libctx, "HMAC", s->ctx->propq, mdname,
281	params, key, hashlen, hash, hashlen,
282	/* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */
283	out, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2, &len)) {
284	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
285	goto err;
286	}
287
288	err:
289	OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret));
290	return len;
291	}
292
293	/*
294	* There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
295	* for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
296	*/
297	int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
298	{
299	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
300	const EVP_MD *hash;
301
302	s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
303	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->ctx, s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, NULL,
304	0)) {
305	/* Error is already recorded */
306	SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
307	return 0;
308	}
309
310	ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc);
311	s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
312	ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);
313	s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
314
315	return 1;
316	}
317
318	static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL s, int sending, const EVP_MD md,
319	const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
320	const unsigned char *insecret,
321	const unsigned char *hash,
322	const unsigned char *label,
323	size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
324	unsigned char key, unsigned char iv,
325	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx)
326	{
327	size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen;
328	int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
329	size_t hashlen;
330
331	/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
332	if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
333	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
334	return 0;
335	}
336	hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
337
338	if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
339	secret, hashlen, 1)) {
340	/* SSLfatal() already called */
341	return 0;
342	}
343
344	keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph);
345	if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
346	uint32_t algenc;
347
348	ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
349	if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
350	algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
351	} else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
352	/* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
353	algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
354	} else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) {
355	/* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */
356	algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
357	} else {
358	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
359	return 0;
360	}
361	if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 \| SSL_AES256CCM8))
362	taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
363	else
364	taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
365	} else {
366	ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph);
367	taglen = 0;
368	}
369
370	if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, keylen)
371	\|\| !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, ivlen)) {
372	/* SSLfatal() already called */
373	return 0;
374	}
375
376	if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0
377	\|\| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL) <= 0
378	\|\| (taglen != 0 && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
379	taglen, NULL) <= 0)
380	\|\| EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) {
381	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
382	return 0;
383	}
384
385	return 1;
386	}
387
388	int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
389	{
390	/* ASCII: "c e traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
391	static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x65\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
392	/* ASCII: "c hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
393	static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
394	/* ASCII: "c ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
395	static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
396	/* ASCII: "s hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
397	static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
398	/* ASCII: "s ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
399	static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
400	/* ASCII: "exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
401	static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
402	/* ASCII: "res master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
403	static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "\x72\x65\x73\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
404	/* ASCII: "e exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
405	static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x20\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
406	unsigned char *iv;
407	unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
408	unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
409	unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
410	unsigned char *hash = hashval;
411	unsigned char *insecret;
412	unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
413	const char *log_label = NULL;
414	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
415	size_t finsecretlen = 0;
416	const unsigned char *label;
417	size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
418	int ret = 0;
419	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
420	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
421	#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
422	ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info;
423	BIO *bio;
424	#endif
425
426	if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
427	if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
428	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
429	} else {
430	s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
431	if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
432	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
433	goto err;
434	}
435	}
436	ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
437	iv = s->read_iv;
438
439	RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
440	} else {
441	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
442	if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
443	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
444	} else {
445	s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
446	if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) {
447	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
448	goto err;
449	}
450	}
451	ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
452	iv = s->write_iv;
453
454	RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
455	}
456
457	if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
458	\|\| ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
459	if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
460	EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
461	long handlen;
462	void *hdata;
463	unsigned int hashlenui;
464	const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
465
466	insecret = s->early_secret;
467	label = client_early_traffic;
468	labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
469	log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;
470
471	handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata);
472	if (handlen <= 0) {
473	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
474	goto err;
475	}
476
477	if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
478	&& s->max_early_data > 0
479	&& s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
480	/*
481	* If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to
482	* actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we
483	* must be using an external PSK.
484	*/
485	if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
486	&& s->max_early_data ==
487	s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) {
488	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
489	goto err;
490	}
491	sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
492	}
493	if (sslcipher == NULL) {
494	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
495	goto err;
496	}
497
498	/*
499	* We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
500	* the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
501	* use ssl_handshake_md().
502	*/
503	mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
504	if (mdctx == NULL) {
505	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
506	goto err;
507	}
508
509	/*
510	* This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free
511	* it again
512	*/
513	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(s->ctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) {
514	/* Error is already recorded */
515	SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
516	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
517	goto err;
518	}
519
520	md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
521	if (md == NULL \|\| !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
522	\|\| !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
523	\|\| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
524	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
525	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
526	goto err;
527	}
528	hashlen = hashlenui;
529	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
530
531	if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret,
532	early_exporter_master_secret,
533	sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
534	hashval, hashlen,
535	s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
536	1)) {
537	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
538	goto err;
539	}
540
541	if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL,
542	s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
543	/* SSLfatal() already called */
544	goto err;
545	}
546	} else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
547	insecret = s->handshake_secret;
548	finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
549	finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
550	label = client_handshake_traffic;
551	labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
552	log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
553	/*
554	* The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
555	* traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
556	* write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
557	* processed early data then we delay changing the server
558	* read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
559	* hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
560	* when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
561	*/
562	hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
563	} else {
564	insecret = s->master_secret;
565	label = client_application_traffic;
566	labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1;
567	log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL;
568	/*
569	* For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server
570	* Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is
571	* what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the
572	* previously saved value.
573	*/
574	hash = s->server_finished_hash;
575	}
576	} else {
577	/* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
578	if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
579	insecret = s->handshake_secret;
580	finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
581	finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
582	label = server_handshake_traffic;
583	labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
584	log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
585	} else {
586	insecret = s->master_secret;
587	label = server_application_traffic;
588	labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1;
589	log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL;
590	}
591	}
592
593	if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
594	md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
595	cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
596	if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
597	\|\| !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
598	/* SSLfatal() already called */;
599	goto err;
600	}
601	}
602
603	/*
604	* Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the
605	* client application traffic secret
606	*/
607	if (label == server_application_traffic)
608	memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);
609
610	if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
611	memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);
612
613	if (label == client_application_traffic) {
614	/*
615	* We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
616	* hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished
617	*/
618	if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
619	resumption_master_secret,
620	sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
621	hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
622	hashlen, 1)) {
623	/* SSLfatal() already called */
624	goto err;
625	}
626	}
627
628	/* check whether cipher is known */
629	if(!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL))
630	goto err;
631
632	if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher,
633	insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, key,
634	iv, ciph_ctx)) {
635	/* SSLfatal() already called */
636	goto err;
637	}
638
639	if (label == server_application_traffic) {
640	memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
641	/* Now we create the exporter master secret */
642	if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
643	exporter_master_secret,
644	sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
645	hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
646	hashlen, 1)) {
647	/* SSLfatal() already called */
648	goto err;
649	}
650
651	if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->exporter_master_secret,
652	hashlen)) {
653	/* SSLfatal() already called */
654	goto err;
655	}
656	} else if (label == client_application_traffic)
657	memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
658
659	if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
660	/* SSLfatal() already called */
661	goto err;
662	}
663
664	if (finsecret != NULL
665	&& !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
666	finsecret, finsecretlen)) {
667	/* SSLfatal() already called */
668	goto err;
669	}
670
671	if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
672	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS;
673	else
674	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
675	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
676	# if defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
677	if (!(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
678	\|\| !(which & SSL3_CC_APPLICATION)
679	\|\| (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) == 0)
680	goto skip_ktls;
681
682	/* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */
683	if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
684	goto skip_ktls;
685
686	/* ktls does not support record padding */
687	if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL)
688	goto skip_ktls;
689
690	/* check that cipher is supported */
691	if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(s, cipher, ciph_ctx))
692	goto skip_ktls;
693
694	bio = s->wbio;
695
696	if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
697	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
698	goto err;
699	}
700
701	/* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
702	if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
703	goto skip_ktls;
704
705	/* configure kernel crypto structure */
706	if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, cipher, ciph_ctx,
707	RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer),
708	&crypto_info, NULL, iv, key, NULL, 0))
709	goto skip_ktls;
710
711	/* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
712	if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
713	ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
714	skip_ktls:
715	# endif
716	#endif
717	ret = 1;
718	err:
719	if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
720	/* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */
721	ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher);
722	}
723	OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
724	OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
725	return ret;
726	}
727
728	int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending)
729	{
730	/* ASCII: "traffic upd", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
731	static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63\x20\x75\x70\x64";
732	const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
733	size_t hashlen;
734	unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
735	unsigned char insecret, iv;
736	unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
737	char *log_label;
738	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
739	int ret = 0, l;
740
741	if ((l = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
742	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
743	return 0;
744	}
745	hashlen = (size_t)l;
746
747	if (s->server == sending)
748	insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
749	else
750	insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
751
752	if (sending) {
753	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
754	iv = s->write_iv;
755	ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
756	RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
757	} else {
758	iv = s->read_iv;
759	ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
760	RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
761	}
762
763	if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, md,
764	s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
765	application_traffic,
766	sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, key,
767	iv, ciph_ctx)) {
768	/* SSLfatal() already called */
769	goto err;
770	}
771
772	memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
773
774	/* Call Key log on successful traffic secret update */
775	log_label = s->server == sending ? SERVER_APPLICATION_N_LABEL : CLIENT_APPLICATION_N_LABEL;
776	if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
777	/* SSLfatal() already called */
778	goto err;
779	}
780
781	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
782	ret = 1;
783	err:
784	OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
785	OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
786	return ret;
787	}
788
789	int tls13_alert_code(int code)
790	{
791	/* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */
792	if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION \|\| code == SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)
793	return code;
794
795	return tls1_alert_code(code);
796	}
797
798	int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL s, unsigned char out, size_t olen,
799	const char *label, size_t llen,
800	const unsigned char *context,
801	size_t contextlen, int use_context)
802	{
803	unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
804	/* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
805	static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72";
806	unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
807	const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
808	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
809	unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
810	int ret = 0;
811
812	if (ctx == NULL \|\| md == NULL \|\| !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
813	goto err;
814
815	if (!use_context)
816	contextlen = 0;
817
818	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
819	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
820	\|\| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
821	\|\| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
822	\|\| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
823	\|\| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
824	(const unsigned char *)label, llen,
825	data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
826	\|\| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
827	sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
828	out, olen, 0))
829	goto err;
830
831	ret = 1;
832	err:
833	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
834	return ret;
835	}
836
837	int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL s, unsigned char out, size_t olen,
838	const char *label, size_t llen,
839	const unsigned char *context,
840	size_t contextlen)
841	{
842	/* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
843	static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72";
844	unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
845	unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
846	const EVP_MD *md;
847	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
848	unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
849	int ret = 0;
850	const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher;
851
852	if (ctx == NULL \|\| !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s))
853	goto err;
854
855	if (!s->server && s->max_early_data > 0
856	&& s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
857	sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
858	else
859	sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
860
861	md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
862
863	/*
864	* Calculate the hash value and store it in \|data\|. The reason why
865	* the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter
866	* is like so:
867	*
868	* TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
869	* HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
870	* "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
871	*
872	* Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
873	* HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
874	* Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
875	*
876	* Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
877	*/
878	if (md == NULL
879	\|\| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
880	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
881	\|\| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
882	\|\| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
883	\|\| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
884	\|\| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
885	(const unsigned char *)label, llen,
886	data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
887	\|\| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
888	sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
889	out, olen, 0))
890	goto err;
891
892	ret = 1;
893	err:
894	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
895	return ret;
896	}

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source: vbox/trunk/src/libs/openssl-3.1.3/ssl/tls13_enc.c@ 102797

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