tls13_enc.c@ 97280

Last change on this file since 97280 was 94082, checked in by vboxsync, 3 years ago
libs/openssl-3.0.1: started applying and adjusting our OpenSSL changes to 3.0.1. bugref:10128
File size: 33.7 KB

Line
1	/*
2	* Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3	*
4	* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5	* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6	* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7	* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8	*/
9
10	#include <stdlib.h>
11	#include "ssl_local.h"
12	#include "internal/ktls.h"
13	#include "record/record_local.h"
14	#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15	#include <openssl/evp.h>
16	#include <openssl/kdf.h>
17	#include <openssl/core_names.h>
18
19	#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
20
21	#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
22	static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = { 0x74, 0x6C, 0x73, 0x31, 0x33, 0x20, 0x00 };
23	#else
24	static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
25	#endif
26
27	/*
28	* Given a \|secret\|; a \|label\| of length \|labellen\|; and \|data\| of length
29	* \|datalen\| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
30	* secret \|outlen\| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be \|out\|.
31	* The \|data\| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
32	* \|fatal\| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
33	*/
34	int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL s, const EVP_MD md, const unsigned char *secret,
35	const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
36	const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
37	unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
38	{
39	EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF,
40	s->ctx->propq);
41	EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
42	OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
43	int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
44	const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
45	int ret;
46	size_t hashlen;
47
48	kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
49	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
50	if (kctx == NULL)
51	return 0;
52
53	if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
54	if (fatal) {
55	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
56	} else {
57	/*
58	* Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
59	* or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
60	*/
61	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
62	}
63	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
64	return 0;
65	}
66
67	if ((ret = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
68	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
69	if (fatal)
70	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
71	else
72	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
73	return 0;
74	}
75	hashlen = (size_t)ret;
76
77	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
78	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
79	(char *)mdname, 0);
80	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
81	(unsigned char *)secret, hashlen);
82	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
83	(unsigned char *)label_prefix,
84	sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
85	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
86	(unsigned char *)label, labellen);
87	if (data != NULL)
88	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DATA,
89	(unsigned char *)data,
90	datalen);
91	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
92
93	ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen, params) <= 0;
94	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
95
96	if (ret != 0) {
97	if (fatal)
98	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
99	else
100	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
101	}
102
103	return ret == 0;
104	}
105
106	/*
107	* Given a \|secret\| generate a \|key\| of length \|keylen\| bytes. Returns 1 on
108	* success 0 on failure.
109	*/
110	int tls13_derive_key(SSL s, const EVP_MD md, const unsigned char *secret,
111	unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
112	{
113	#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
114	static const unsigned char keylabel[] ={ 0x6B, 0x65, 0x79, 0x00 };
115	#else
116	static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
117	#endif
118
119	return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
120	NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
121	}
122
123	/*
124	* Given a \|secret\| generate an \|iv\| of length \|ivlen\| bytes. Returns 1 on
125	* success 0 on failure.
126	*/
127	int tls13_derive_iv(SSL s, const EVP_MD md, const unsigned char *secret,
128	unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
129	{
130	#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
131	static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = { 0x69, 0x76, 0x00 };
132	#else
133	static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
134	#endif
135
136	return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
137	NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
138	}
139
140	int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL s, const EVP_MD md,
141	const unsigned char *secret,
142	unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
143	{
144	#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
145	static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = { 0x66, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
146	#else
147	static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
148	#endif
149
150	return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
151	sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
152	}
153
154	/*
155	* Given the previous secret \|prevsecret\| and a new input secret \|insecret\| of
156	* length \|insecretlen\|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
157	* pointed to by \|outsecret\|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
158	*/
159	int tls13_generate_secret(SSL s, const EVP_MD md,
160	const unsigned char *prevsecret,
161	const unsigned char *insecret,
162	size_t insecretlen,
163	unsigned char *outsecret)
164	{
165	size_t mdlen;
166	int mdleni;
167	int ret;
168	EVP_KDF *kdf;
169	EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
170	OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
171	int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
172	const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
173	#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
174	static const char derived_secret_label[] = { 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
175	#else
176	static const char derived_secret_label[] = "derived";
177	#endif
178
179	kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, s->ctx->propq);
180	kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
181	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
182	if (kctx == NULL) {
183	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
184	return 0;
185	}
186
187	mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
188	/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
189	if (!ossl_assert(mdleni >= 0)) {
190	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
191	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
192	return 0;
193	}
194	mdlen = (size_t)mdleni;
195
196	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
197	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
198	(char *)mdname, 0);
199	if (insecret != NULL)
200	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
201	(unsigned char *)insecret,
202	insecretlen);
203	if (prevsecret != NULL)
204	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT,
205	(unsigned char *)prevsecret, mdlen);
206	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
207	(unsigned char *)label_prefix,
208	sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
209	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
210	(unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
211	sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1);
212	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
213
214	ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, outsecret, mdlen, params) <= 0;
215
216	if (ret != 0)
217	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
218
219	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
220	return ret == 0;
221	}
222
223	/*
224	* Given an input secret \|insecret\| of length \|insecretlen\| generate the
225	* handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
226	* generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
227	*/
228	int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL s, const unsigned char insecret,
229	size_t insecretlen)
230	{
231	/* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
232	return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
233	insecret, insecretlen,
234	(unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
235	}
236
237	/*
238	* Given the handshake secret \|prev\| of length \|prevlen\| generate the master
239	* secret and store its length in \|*secret_size\|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
240	* failure.
241	*/
242	int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL s, unsigned char out,
243	unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
244	size_t *secret_size)
245	{
246	const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
247
248	*secret_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
249	/* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
250	return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
251	}
252
253	/*
254	* Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
255	* 0 on error.
256	*/
257	size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL s, const char str, size_t slen,
258	unsigned char *out)
259	{
260	const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(ssl_handshake_md(s));
261	unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
262	unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
263	unsigned char *key = NULL;
264	size_t len = 0, hashlen;
265	OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
266
267	/* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */
268	if (s->ctx->propq != NULL)
269	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
270	(char *)s->ctx->propq,
271	0);
272	*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
273
274	if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
275	/* SSLfatal() already called */
276	goto err;
277	}
278
279	if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
280	key = s->server_finished_secret;
281	} else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
282	key = s->client_finished_secret;
283	} else {
284	if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s),
285	s->client_app_traffic_secret,
286	finsecret, hashlen))
287	goto err;
288	key = finsecret;
289	}
290
291	if (!EVP_Q_mac(s->ctx->libctx, "HMAC", s->ctx->propq, mdname,
292	params, key, hashlen, hash, hashlen,
293	/* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */
294	out, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2, &len)) {
295	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
296	goto err;
297	}
298
299	err:
300	OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret));
301	return len;
302	}
303
304	/*
305	* There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
306	* for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
307	*/
308	int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
309	{
310	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
311	const EVP_MD *hash;
312
313	s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
314	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->ctx, s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, NULL,
315	0)) {
316	/* Error is already recorded */
317	SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
318	return 0;
319	}
320
321	ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc);
322	s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
323	ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);
324	s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
325
326	return 1;
327	}
328
329	static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL s, int sending, const EVP_MD md,
330	const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
331	const unsigned char *insecret,
332	const unsigned char *hash,
333	const unsigned char *label,
334	size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
335	unsigned char key, unsigned char iv,
336	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx)
337	{
338	size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen;
339	int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
340	size_t hashlen;
341
342	/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
343	if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
344	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
345	return 0;
346	}
347	hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
348
349	if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
350	secret, hashlen, 1)) {
351	/* SSLfatal() already called */
352	return 0;
353	}
354
355	keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph);
356	if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
357	uint32_t algenc;
358
359	ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
360	if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
361	algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
362	} else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
363	/* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
364	algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
365	} else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) {
366	/* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */
367	algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
368	} else {
369	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
370	return 0;
371	}
372	if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 \| SSL_AES256CCM8))
373	taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
374	else
375	taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
376	} else {
377	ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph);
378	taglen = 0;
379	}
380
381	if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, keylen)
382	\|\| !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, ivlen)) {
383	/* SSLfatal() already called */
384	return 0;
385	}
386
387	if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0
388	\|\| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL)
389	\|\| (taglen != 0 && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
390	taglen, NULL))
391	\|\| EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) {
392	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
393	return 0;
394	}
395
396	return 1;
397	}
398
399	int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
400	{
401	#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
402	static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x65, 0x20, /traffic/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
403	static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /traffic/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
404	static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /traffic/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
405	static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /traffic/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
406	static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /traffic/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
407	static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
408	static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = {0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
409	static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
410	#else
411	static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "c e traffic";
412	static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "c hs traffic";
413	static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "c ap traffic";
414	static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "s hs traffic";
415	static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "s ap traffic";
416	static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "exp master";
417	static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "res master";
418	static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "e exp master";
419	#endif
420	unsigned char *iv;
421	unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
422	unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
423	unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
424	unsigned char *hash = hashval;
425	unsigned char *insecret;
426	unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
427	const char *log_label = NULL;
428	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
429	size_t finsecretlen = 0;
430	const unsigned char *label;
431	size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
432	int ret = 0;
433	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
434	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
435	#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
436	ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info;
437	BIO *bio;
438	#endif
439
440	if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
441	if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
442	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
443	} else {
444	s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
445	if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
446	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
447	goto err;
448	}
449	}
450	ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
451	iv = s->read_iv;
452
453	RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
454	} else {
455	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
456	if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
457	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
458	} else {
459	s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
460	if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) {
461	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
462	goto err;
463	}
464	}
465	ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
466	iv = s->write_iv;
467
468	RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
469	}
470
471	if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
472	\|\| ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
473	if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
474	EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
475	long handlen;
476	void *hdata;
477	unsigned int hashlenui;
478	const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
479
480	insecret = s->early_secret;
481	label = client_early_traffic;
482	labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
483	log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;
484
485	handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata);
486	if (handlen <= 0) {
487	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
488	goto err;
489	}
490
491	if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
492	&& s->max_early_data > 0
493	&& s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
494	/*
495	* If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to
496	* actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we
497	* must be using an external PSK.
498	*/
499	if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
500	&& s->max_early_data ==
501	s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) {
502	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
503	goto err;
504	}
505	sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
506	}
507	if (sslcipher == NULL) {
508	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
509	goto err;
510	}
511
512	/*
513	* We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
514	* the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
515	* use ssl_handshake_md().
516	*/
517	mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
518	if (mdctx == NULL) {
519	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
520	goto err;
521	}
522
523	/*
524	* This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free
525	* it again
526	*/
527	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(s->ctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) {
528	/* Error is already recorded */
529	SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
530	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
531	goto err;
532	}
533
534	md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
535	if (md == NULL \|\| !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
536	\|\| !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
537	\|\| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
538	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
539	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
540	goto err;
541	}
542	hashlen = hashlenui;
543	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
544
545	if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret,
546	early_exporter_master_secret,
547	sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
548	hashval, hashlen,
549	s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
550	1)) {
551	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
552	goto err;
553	}
554
555	if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL,
556	s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
557	/* SSLfatal() already called */
558	goto err;
559	}
560	} else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
561	insecret = s->handshake_secret;
562	finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
563	finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
564	label = client_handshake_traffic;
565	labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
566	log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
567	/*
568	* The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
569	* traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
570	* write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
571	* processed early data then we delay changing the server
572	* read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
573	* hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
574	* when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
575	*/
576	hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
577	} else {
578	insecret = s->master_secret;
579	label = client_application_traffic;
580	labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1;
581	log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL;
582	/*
583	* For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server
584	* Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is
585	* what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the
586	* previously saved value.
587	*/
588	hash = s->server_finished_hash;
589	}
590	} else {
591	/* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
592	if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
593	insecret = s->handshake_secret;
594	finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
595	finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
596	label = server_handshake_traffic;
597	labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
598	log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
599	} else {
600	insecret = s->master_secret;
601	label = server_application_traffic;
602	labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1;
603	log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL;
604	}
605	}
606
607	if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
608	md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
609	cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
610	if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
611	\|\| !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
612	/* SSLfatal() already called */;
613	goto err;
614	}
615	}
616
617	/*
618	* Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the
619	* client application traffic secret
620	*/
621	if (label == server_application_traffic)
622	memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);
623
624	if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
625	memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);
626
627	if (label == client_application_traffic) {
628	/*
629	* We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
630	* hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished
631	*/
632	if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
633	resumption_master_secret,
634	sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
635	hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
636	hashlen, 1)) {
637	/* SSLfatal() already called */
638	goto err;
639	}
640	}
641
642	/* check whether cipher is known */
643	if(!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL))
644	goto err;
645
646	if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher,
647	insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, key,
648	iv, ciph_ctx)) {
649	/* SSLfatal() already called */
650	goto err;
651	}
652
653	if (label == server_application_traffic) {
654	memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
655	/* Now we create the exporter master secret */
656	if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
657	exporter_master_secret,
658	sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
659	hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
660	hashlen, 1)) {
661	/* SSLfatal() already called */
662	goto err;
663	}
664
665	if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->exporter_master_secret,
666	hashlen)) {
667	/* SSLfatal() already called */
668	goto err;
669	}
670	} else if (label == client_application_traffic)
671	memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
672
673	if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
674	/* SSLfatal() already called */
675	goto err;
676	}
677
678	if (finsecret != NULL
679	&& !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
680	finsecret, finsecretlen)) {
681	/* SSLfatal() already called */
682	goto err;
683	}
684
685	if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
686	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS;
687	else
688	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
689	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
690	# if defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
691	if (!(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
692	\|\| !(which & SSL3_CC_APPLICATION)
693	\|\| (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) == 0)
694	goto skip_ktls;
695
696	/* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */
697	if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
698	goto skip_ktls;
699
700	/* ktls does not support record padding */
701	if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL)
702	goto skip_ktls;
703
704	/* check that cipher is supported */
705	if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(s, cipher, ciph_ctx))
706	goto skip_ktls;
707
708	bio = s->wbio;
709
710	if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
711	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
712	goto err;
713	}
714
715	/* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
716	if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
717	goto skip_ktls;
718
719	/* configure kernel crypto structure */
720	if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, cipher, ciph_ctx,
721	RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer),
722	&crypto_info, NULL, iv, key, NULL, 0))
723	goto skip_ktls;
724
725	/* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
726	if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
727	ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
728	skip_ktls:
729	# endif
730	#endif
731	ret = 1;
732	err:
733	if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
734	/* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */
735	ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher);
736	}
737	OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
738	OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
739	return ret;
740	}
741
742	int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending)
743	{
744	#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
745	static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = { 0x74, 0x72 ,0x61 ,0x66 ,0x66 ,0x69 ,0x63 ,0x20 ,0x75 ,0x70 ,0x64, 0x00};
746	#else
747	static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "traffic upd";
748	#endif
749	const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
750	size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
751	unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
752	unsigned char insecret, iv;
753	unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
754	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
755	int ret = 0;
756
757	if (s->server == sending)
758	insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
759	else
760	insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
761
762	if (sending) {
763	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
764	iv = s->write_iv;
765	ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
766	RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
767	} else {
768	iv = s->read_iv;
769	ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
770	RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
771	}
772
773	if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, ssl_handshake_md(s),
774	s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
775	application_traffic,
776	sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, key,
777	iv, ciph_ctx)) {
778	/* SSLfatal() already called */
779	goto err;
780	}
781
782	memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
783
784	s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
785	ret = 1;
786	err:
787	OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
788	OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
789	return ret;
790	}
791
792	int tls13_alert_code(int code)
793	{
794	/* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */
795	if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION \|\| code == SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)
796	return code;
797
798	return tls1_alert_code(code);
799	}
800
801	int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL s, unsigned char out, size_t olen,
802	const char *label, size_t llen,
803	const unsigned char *context,
804	size_t contextlen, int use_context)
805	{
806	unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
807	#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
808	static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
809	#else
810	static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
811	#endif
812	unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
813	const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
814	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
815	unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
816	int ret = 0;
817
818	if (ctx == NULL \|\| !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
819	goto err;
820
821	if (!use_context)
822	contextlen = 0;
823
824	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
825	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
826	\|\| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
827	\|\| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
828	\|\| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
829	\|\| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
830	(const unsigned char *)label, llen,
831	data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
832	\|\| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
833	sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
834	out, olen, 0))
835	goto err;
836
837	ret = 1;
838	err:
839	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
840	return ret;
841	}
842
843	int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL s, unsigned char out, size_t olen,
844	const char *label, size_t llen,
845	const unsigned char *context,
846	size_t contextlen)
847	{
848	#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
849	static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
850	#else
851	static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
852	#endif
853	unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
854	unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
855	const EVP_MD *md;
856	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
857	unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
858	int ret = 0;
859	const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher;
860
861	if (ctx == NULL \|\| !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s))
862	goto err;
863
864	if (!s->server && s->max_early_data > 0
865	&& s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
866	sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
867	else
868	sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
869
870	md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
871
872	/*
873	* Calculate the hash value and store it in \|data\|. The reason why
874	* the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter
875	* is like so:
876	*
877	* TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
878	* HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
879	* "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
880	*
881	* Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
882	* HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
883	* Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
884	*
885	* Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
886	*/
887	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
888	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
889	\|\| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
890	\|\| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
891	\|\| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
892	\|\| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
893	(const unsigned char *)label, llen,
894	data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
895	\|\| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
896	sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
897	out, olen, 0))
898	goto err;
899
900	ret = 1;
901	err:
902	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
903	return ret;
904	}

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source: vbox/trunk/src/libs/openssl-3.0.3/ssl/tls13_enc.c@ 97280

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