t1_lib.c@ 94081

Last change on this file since 94081 was 91772, checked in by vboxsync, 3 years ago
openssl-1.1.1l: Applied and adjusted our OpenSSL changes to 1.1.1l. bugref:10126
File size: 91.6 KB

Line
1	/*
2	* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3	*
4	* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5	* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6	* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7	* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8	*/
9
10	#include <stdio.h>
11	#include "e_os.h"
12	#include <stdlib.h>
13	#include <openssl/objects.h>
14	#include <openssl/evp.h>
15	#include <openssl/hmac.h>
16	#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17	#include <openssl/conf.h>
18	#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19	#include <openssl/dh.h>
20	#include <openssl/bn.h>
21	#include "internal/nelem.h"
22	#include "ssl_local.h"
23	#include <openssl/ct.h>
24
25	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP find_sig_alg(SSL s, X509 x, EVP_PKEY pkey);
26	static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu);
27
28	SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
29	tls1_enc,
30	tls1_mac,
31	tls1_setup_key_block,
32	tls1_generate_master_secret,
33	tls1_change_cipher_state,
34	tls1_final_finish_mac,
35	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
36	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37	tls1_alert_code,
38	tls1_export_keying_material,
39	0,
40	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
41	tls_close_construct_packet,
42	ssl3_handshake_write
43	};
44
45	SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
46	tls1_enc,
47	tls1_mac,
48	tls1_setup_key_block,
49	tls1_generate_master_secret,
50	tls1_change_cipher_state,
51	tls1_final_finish_mac,
52	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
53	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54	tls1_alert_code,
55	tls1_export_keying_material,
56	SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
57	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
58	tls_close_construct_packet,
59	ssl3_handshake_write
60	};
61
62	SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
63	tls1_enc,
64	tls1_mac,
65	tls1_setup_key_block,
66	tls1_generate_master_secret,
67	tls1_change_cipher_state,
68	tls1_final_finish_mac,
69	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
70	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71	tls1_alert_code,
72	tls1_export_keying_material,
73	SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV \| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS \| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
74	\| SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
75	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
76	tls_close_construct_packet,
77	ssl3_handshake_write
78	};
79
80	SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
81	tls13_enc,
82	tls1_mac,
83	tls13_setup_key_block,
84	tls13_generate_master_secret,
85	tls13_change_cipher_state,
86	tls13_final_finish_mac,
87	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
88	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89	tls13_alert_code,
90	tls13_export_keying_material,
91	SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS \| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
92	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
93	tls_close_construct_packet,
94	ssl3_handshake_write
95	};
96
97	long tls1_default_timeout(void)
98	{
99	/*
100	* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
101	* http, the cache would over fill
102	*/
103	return (60 * 60 * 2);
104	}
105
106	int tls1_new(SSL *s)
107	{
108	if (!ssl3_new(s))
109	return 0;
110	if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
111	return 0;
112
113	return 1;
114	}
115
116	void tls1_free(SSL *s)
117	{
118	OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
119	ssl3_free(s);
120	}
121
122	int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123	{
124	if (!ssl3_clear(s))
125	return 0;
126
127	if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
128	s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
129	else
130	s->version = s->method->version;
131
132	return 1;
133	}
134
135	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
136
137	/*
138	* Table of curve information.
139	* Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
140	* table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
141	*/
142	static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
143	{NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
144	{NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
145	{NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
146	{NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
147	{NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
148	{NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
149	{NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
150	{NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
151	{NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
152	{NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
153	{NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
154	{NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
155	{NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
156	{NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
157	{NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
158	{NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
159	{NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
160	{NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
161	{NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
162	{NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
163	{NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
164	{NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
165	{NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
166	{NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
167	{NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
168	{NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
169	{NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
170	{NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
171	{EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
172	{EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X448 (30) */
173	};
174
175	static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
176	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
177	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
178	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
179	};
180
181	/* The default curves */
182	static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
183	29, /* X25519 (29) */
184	23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
185	30, /* X448 (30) */
186	25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187	24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
188	};
189
190	static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
191	TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
192	TLSEXT_curve_P_384
193	};
194
195	const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
196	{
197	/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
198	if (group_id < 1 \|\| group_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
199	return NULL;
200	return &nid_list[group_id - 1];
201	}
202
203	static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
204	{
205	size_t i;
206	for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
207	if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
208	return (uint16_t)(i + 1);
209	}
210	return 0;
211	}
212
213	/*
214	* Set pgroups to the supported groups list and pgroupslen to
215	* the number of groups supported.
216	*/
217	void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL s, const uint16_t *pgroups,
218	size_t *pgroupslen)
219	{
220
221	/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
222	switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
223	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
224	*pgroups = suiteb_curves;
225	*pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
226	break;
227
228	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
229	*pgroups = suiteb_curves;
230	*pgroupslen = 1;
231	break;
232
233	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
234	*pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
235	*pgroupslen = 1;
236	break;
237
238	default:
239	if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
240	*pgroups = eccurves_default;
241	*pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
242	} else {
243	*pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
244	*pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
245	}
246	break;
247	}
248	}
249
250	/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
251	int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
252	{
253	const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve);
254	unsigned char ctmp[2];
255
256	if (cinfo == NULL)
257	return 0;
258	# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
259	if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
260	return 0;
261	# endif
262	ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
263	ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
264	return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
265	}
266
267	/* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
268	static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
269	{
270	size_t i;
271	for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
272	if (list[i] == id)
273	return 1;
274	return 0;
275	}
276
277	/*-
278	* For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the \|nmatch\|th shared group or 0
279	* if there is no match.
280	* For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
281	* For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
282	* a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
283	*/
284	uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
285	{
286	const uint16_t pref, supp;
287	size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
288	int k;
289
290	/* Can't do anything on client side */
291	if (s->server == 0)
292	return 0;
293	if (nmatch == -2) {
294	if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
295	/*
296	* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
297	* these are acceptable due to previous checks.
298	*/
299	unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
300
301	if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
302	return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
303	if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
304	return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
305	/* Should never happen */
306	return 0;
307	}
308	/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
309	nmatch = 0;
310	}
311	/*
312	* If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
313	* otherwise peer decides.
314	*/
315	if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
316	tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
317	tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
318	} else {
319	tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
320	tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
321	}
322
323	for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
324	uint16_t id = pref[i];
325
326	if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
327	\|\| !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
328	continue;
329	if (nmatch == k)
330	return id;
331	k++;
332	}
333	if (nmatch == -1)
334	return k;
335	/* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
336	return 0;
337	}
338
339	int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t *pext, size_t pextlen,
340	int *groups, size_t ngroups)
341	{
342	uint16_t *glist;
343	size_t i;
344	/*
345	* Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
346	* ids < 32
347	*/
348	unsigned long dup_list = 0;
349
350	if (ngroups == 0) {
351	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
352	return 0;
353	}
354	if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
355	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
356	return 0;
357	}
358	for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
359	unsigned long idmask;
360	uint16_t id;
361	/* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
362	id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
363	idmask = 1L << id;
364	if (!id \|\| (dup_list & idmask)) {
365	OPENSSL_free(glist);
366	return 0;
367	}
368	dup_list \|= idmask;
369	glist[i] = id;
370	}
371	OPENSSL_free(*pext);
372	*pext = glist;
373	*pextlen = ngroups;
374	return 1;
375	}
376
377	# define MAX_CURVELIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
378
379	typedef struct {
380	size_t nidcnt;
381	int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
382	} nid_cb_st;
383
384	static int nid_cb(const char elem, int len, void arg)
385	{
386	nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
387	size_t i;
388	int nid;
389	char etmp[20];
390	if (elem == NULL)
391	return 0;
392	if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
393	return 0;
394	if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
395	return 0;
396	memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
397	etmp[len] = 0;
398	nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
399	if (nid == NID_undef)
400	nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
401	if (nid == NID_undef)
402	nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
403	if (nid == NID_undef)
404	return 0;
405	for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
406	if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
407	return 0;
408	narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
409	return 1;
410	}
411
412	/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
413	int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t *pext, size_t pextlen, const char *str)
414	{
415	nid_cb_st ncb;
416	ncb.nidcnt = 0;
417	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
418	return 0;
419	if (pext == NULL)
420	return 1;
421	return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
422	}
423	/* Return group id of a key */
424	static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
425	{
426	EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
427	const EC_GROUP *grp;
428
429	if (ec == NULL)
430	return 0;
431	grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
432	return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
433	}
434
435	/* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
436	static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL s, EVP_PKEY pkey)
437	{
438	const EC_KEY *ec;
439	const EC_GROUP *grp;
440	unsigned char comp_id;
441	size_t i;
442
443	/* If not an EC key nothing to check */
444	if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
445	return 1;
446	ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
447	grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
448
449	/* Get required compression id */
450	if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
451	comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
452	} else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
453	/*
454	* ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
455	* this check.
456	*/
457	return 1;
458	} else {
459	int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
460
461	if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
462	comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
463	else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
464	comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
465	else
466	return 0;
467	}
468	/*
469	* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
470	* supported (see RFC4492).
471	*/
472	if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
473	return 1;
474
475	for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
476	if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
477	return 1;
478	}
479	return 0;
480	}
481
482	/* Check a group id matches preferences */
483	int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
484	{
485	const uint16_t *groups;
486	size_t groups_len;
487
488	if (group_id == 0)
489	return 0;
490
491	/* Check for Suite B compliance */
492	if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
493	unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
494
495	if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
496	if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
497	return 0;
498	} else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
499	if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
500	return 0;
501	} else {
502	/* Should never happen */
503	return 0;
504	}
505	}
506
507	if (check_own_groups) {
508	/* Check group is one of our preferences */
509	tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
510	if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
511	return 0;
512	}
513
514	if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
515	return 0;
516
517	/* For clients, nothing more to check */
518	if (!s->server)
519	return 1;
520
521	/* Check group is one of peers preferences */
522	tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
523
524	/*
525	* RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
526	* so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
527	* It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
528	* extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
529	*/
530	if (groups_len == 0)
531	return 1;
532	return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
533	}
534
535	void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL s, const unsigned char *pformats,
536	size_t *num_formats)
537	{
538	/*
539	* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
540	*/
541	if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
542	*pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
543	*num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
544	} else {
545	*pformats = ecformats_default;
546	/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
547	if (tls1_suiteb(s))
548	*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
549	else
550	*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
551	}
552	}
553
554	/*
555	* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
556	* certificates have compatible curves and compression.
557	*/
558	static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL s, X509 x, int check_ee_md)
559	{
560	uint16_t group_id;
561	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
562	pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
563	if (pkey == NULL)
564	return 0;
565	/* If not EC nothing to do */
566	if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
567	return 1;
568	/* Check compression */
569	if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
570	return 0;
571	group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
572	/*
573	* For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
574	* groups.
575	*/
576	if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
577	return 0;
578	/*
579	* Special case for suite B. We MUST sign using SHA256+P-256 or
580	* SHA384+P-384.
581	*/
582	if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
583	int check_md;
584	size_t i;
585
586	/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
587	if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
588	check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
589	else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
590	check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
591	else
592	return 0; /* Should never happen */
593	for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
594	if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
595	return 1;;
596	}
597	return 0;
598	}
599	return 1;
600	}
601
602	/*
603	* tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
604	* @s: SSL connection
605	* @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
606	*
607	* Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
608	* is compatible with the client extensions.
609	*
610	* Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
611	*/
612	int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
613	{
614	/* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
615	if (!tls1_suiteb(s))
616	return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
617	/*
618	* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
619	* curves permitted.
620	*/
621	if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
622	return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
623	if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
624	return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
625
626	return 0;
627	}
628
629	#else
630
631	static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL s, X509 x, int set_ee_md)
632	{
633	return 1;
634	}
635
636	#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
637
638	/* Default sigalg schemes */
639	static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
640	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
641	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
642	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
643	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
644	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
645	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
646	#endif
647
648	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
649	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
650	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
651	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
652	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
653	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
654
655	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
656	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
657	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
658
659	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
660	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
661	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
662	#endif
663	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
664	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
665	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
666	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
667	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
668
669	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
670	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
671	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
672	#endif
673	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
674	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
675	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
676	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
677	#endif
678	};
679
680	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
681	static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
682	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
683	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
684	};
685	#endif
686
687	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
688	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
689	{"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
690	NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
691	NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
692	{"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
693	NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
694	NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
695	{"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
696	NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
697	NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
698	{"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
699	NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
700	NID_undef, NID_undef},
701	{"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
702	NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
703	NID_undef, NID_undef},
704	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
705	NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
706	NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
707	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
708	NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
709	NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
710	#endif
711	{"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
712	NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
713	NID_undef, NID_undef},
714	{"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
715	NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
716	NID_undef, NID_undef},
717	{"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
718	NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
719	NID_undef, NID_undef},
720	{"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
721	NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
722	NID_undef, NID_undef},
723	{"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
724	NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
725	NID_undef, NID_undef},
726	{"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
727	NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
728	NID_undef, NID_undef},
729	{"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
730	NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
731	NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
732	{"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
733	NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
734	NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
735	{"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
736	NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
737	NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
738	{"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
739	NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
740	NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
741	{"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
742	NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
743	NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
744	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
745	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
746	NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
747	NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
748	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
749	NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
750	NID_undef, NID_undef},
751	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
752	NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
753	NID_undef, NID_undef},
754	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
755	NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
756	NID_undef, NID_undef},
757	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
758	NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
759	NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
760	#endif
761	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
762	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
763	NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
764	NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
765	NID_undef, NID_undef},
766	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
767	NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
768	NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
769	NID_undef, NID_undef},
770	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
771	NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
772	NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
773	NID_undef, NID_undef}
774	#endif
775	};
776	/* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
777	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
778	"rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
779	NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
780	EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
781	NID_undef, NID_undef
782	};
783
784	/*
785	* Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
786	* From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
787	*/
788	static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
789	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
790	0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
791	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
792	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
793	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
794	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
795	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
796	0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
797	0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
798	};
799
800	/* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
801	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
802	{
803	size_t i;
804	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
805
806	for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
807	i++, s++) {
808	if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
809	return s;
810	}
811	return NULL;
812	}
813	/* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
814	int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu, const EVP_MD *pmd)
815	{
816	const EVP_MD *md;
817	if (lu == NULL)
818	return 0;
819	/* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
820	if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
821	md = NULL;
822	} else {
823	md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
824	if (md == NULL)
825	return 0;
826	}
827	if (pmd)
828	*pmd = md;
829	return 1;
830	}
831
832	/*
833	* Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
834	*
835	* The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
836	* SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
837	* with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
838	*/
839	#define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
840	static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu)
841	{
842	const EVP_MD *md;
843
844	if (rsa == NULL)
845	return 0;
846	if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) \|\| md == NULL)
847	return 0;
848	if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
849	return 0;
850	return 1;
851	}
852
853	/*
854	* Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
855	* signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
856	* type. \|idx\| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When \|idx\| is -1 the
857	* certificate type from \|s\| will be used.
858	* Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
859	*/
860	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL s, int idx)
861	{
862	if (idx == -1) {
863	if (s->server) {
864	size_t i;
865
866	/* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
867	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
868	const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
869
870	if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
871	idx = i;
872	break;
873	}
874	}
875
876	/*
877	* Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
878	* */
879	if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
880	int real_idx;
881
882	for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
883	real_idx--) {
884	if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
885	idx = real_idx;
886	break;
887	}
888	}
889	}
890	} else {
891	idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
892	}
893	}
894	if (idx < 0 \|\| idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
895	return NULL;
896	if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) \|\| idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
897	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
898
899	if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
900	return NULL;
901	if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
902	return NULL;
903	return lu;
904	}
905	if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
906	return NULL;
907	return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
908	}
909	/* Set peer sigalg based key type */
910	int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL s, const EVP_PKEY pkey)
911	{
912	size_t idx;
913	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
914
915	if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
916	return 0;
917	lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
918	if (lu == NULL)
919	return 0;
920	s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
921	return 1;
922	}
923
924	size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL s, int sent, const uint16_t *psigs)
925	{
926	/*
927	* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
928	* preferences.
929	*/
930	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
931	switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
932	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
933	*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
934	return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
935
936	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
937	*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
938	return 1;
939
940	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
941	*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
942	return 1;
943	}
944	#endif
945	/*
946	* We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
947	* and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
948	* determining which shared algorithm to use.
949	*/
950	if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
951	*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
952	return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
953	} else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
954	*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
955	return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
956	} else {
957	*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
958	return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
959	}
960	}
961
962	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
963	/*
964	* Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
965	* specified EC curve.
966	*/
967	int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
968	{
969	const uint16_t *sigs;
970	size_t siglen, i;
971
972	if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
973	sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
974	siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
975	} else {
976	sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
977	siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
978	}
979
980	for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
981	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
982
983	if (lu == NULL)
984	continue;
985	if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
986	&& lu->curve != NID_undef
987	&& curve == lu->curve)
988	return 1;
989	}
990
991	return 0;
992	}
993	#endif
994
995	/*
996	* Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
997	* error.
998	*/
999	static int sigalg_security_bits(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1000	{
1001	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1002	int secbits = 0;
1003
1004	if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md))
1005	return 0;
1006	if (md != NULL)
1007	{
1008	/* Security bits: half digest bits */
1009	secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
1010	} else {
1011	/* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1012	if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1013	secbits = 128;
1014	else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1015	secbits = 224;
1016	}
1017	return secbits;
1018	}
1019
1020	/*
1021	* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1022	* algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1023	* s.
1024	*/
1025	int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY pkey)
1026	{
1027	const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1028	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1029	char sigalgstr[2];
1030	size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1031	int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1032	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1033	int secbits = 0;
1034
1035	/* Should never happen */
1036	if (pkeyid == -1)
1037	return -1;
1038	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1039	/* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1040	if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1041	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1042	SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1043	return 0;
1044	}
1045	/* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1046	if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1047	pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1048	}
1049	lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1050	/*
1051	* Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1052	* is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1053	*/
1054	if (lu == NULL
1055	\|\| (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 \|\| lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1056	\|\| (pkeyid != lu->sig
1057	&& (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS \|\| pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1058	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1059	SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1060	return 0;
1061	}
1062	/* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1063	if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1064	\|\| lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1065	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1066	SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1067	return 0;
1068	}
1069
1070	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1071	if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1072
1073	/* Check point compression is permitted */
1074	if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1075	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1076	SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1077	SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1078	return 0;
1079	}
1080
1081	/* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1082	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) \|\| tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1083	EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
1084	int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
1085
1086	if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1087	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1088	SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1089	return 0;
1090	}
1091	}
1092	if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1093	/* Check curve matches extensions */
1094	if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1095	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1096	SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1097	return 0;
1098	}
1099	if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1100	/* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1101	if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1102	&& sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1103	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1104	SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1105	SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1106	return 0;
1107	}
1108	}
1109	}
1110	} else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1111	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1112	SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1113	return 0;
1114	}
1115	#endif
1116
1117	/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1118	sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1119	for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1120	if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1121	break;
1122	}
1123	/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1124	if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1125	\|\| s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1126	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1127	SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1128	return 0;
1129	}
1130	if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1131	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1132	SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1133	return 0;
1134	}
1135	/*
1136	* Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1137	* reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1138	*/
1139	sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1140	sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1141	secbits = sigalg_security_bits(lu);
1142	if (secbits == 0 \|\|
1143	!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1144	md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
1145	(void *)sigalgstr)) {
1146	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1147	SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1148	return 0;
1149	}
1150	/* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1151	s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1152	return 1;
1153	}
1154
1155	int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL s, int pnid)
1156	{
1157	if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1158	return 0;
1159	*pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1160	return 1;
1161	}
1162
1163	int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL s, int pnid)
1164	{
1165	if (s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1166	return 0;
1167	*pnid = s->s3->tmp.sigalg->sig;
1168	return 1;
1169	}
1170
1171	/*
1172	* Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1173	* supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1174	* by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1175	*
1176	* This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1177	* by the client.
1178	*
1179	* Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1180	*/
1181	int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1182	{
1183	s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1184	s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1185	ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1186	if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver,
1187	&s->s3->tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1188	return 0;
1189	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1190	/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1191	if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1192	s->s3->tmp.mask_a \|= SSL_aPSK;
1193	s->s3->tmp.mask_k \|= SSL_PSK;
1194	}
1195	#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1196	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1197	if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1198	s->s3->tmp.mask_a \|= SSL_aSRP;
1199	s->s3->tmp.mask_k \|= SSL_kSRP;
1200	}
1201	#endif
1202	return 1;
1203	}
1204
1205	/*
1206	* ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1207	* @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1208	* @c: cipher to check
1209	* @op: Security check that you want to do
1210	* @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1211	*
1212	* Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1213	*/
1214	int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL s, const SSL_CIPHER c, int op, int ecdhe)
1215	{
1216	if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1217	\|\| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1218	return 1;
1219	if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1220	return 1;
1221	if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1222	int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1223
1224	/*
1225	* For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1226	* in SSLv3 if we are a client
1227	*/
1228	if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1229	&& (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE \| SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1230	min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1231
1232	if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) \|\| (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1233	return 1;
1234	}
1235	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1236	\|\| DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1237	return 1;
1238
1239	return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1240	}
1241
1242	int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1243	{
1244	if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1245	return 0;
1246	return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1247	}
1248
1249	int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1250	{
1251	size_t i;
1252
1253	/* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1254	OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1255	s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1256	s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1257	/* Clear certificate validity flags */
1258	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1259	s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1260	/*
1261	* If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1262	* the default algorithm for each certificate type
1263	*/
1264	if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1265	&& s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1266	const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1267	size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1268
1269	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1270	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1271	size_t j;
1272
1273	if (lu == NULL)
1274	continue;
1275	/* Check default matches a type we sent */
1276	for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1277	if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1278	s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1279	break;
1280	}
1281	}
1282	}
1283	return 1;
1284	}
1285
1286	if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1287	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1288	SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1289	return 0;
1290	}
1291	if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1292	return 1;
1293
1294	/* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1295	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1296	SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1297	return 0;
1298	}
1299
1300	/*-
1301	* Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1302	*
1303	* hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1304	* ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1305	* point to the resulting session.
1306	*/
1307	SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG hello,
1308	SSL_SESSION **ret)
1309	{
1310	size_t size;
1311	RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1312
1313	*ret = NULL;
1314	s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1315
1316	/*
1317	* If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1318	* (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1319	* resumption.
1320	*/
1321	if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION \|\| !tls_use_ticket(s))
1322	return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1323
1324	ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1325	if (!ticketext->present)
1326	return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1327
1328	size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1329
1330	return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1331	hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1332	}
1333
1334	/*-
1335	* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1336	*
1337	* If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1338	* expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1339	* session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1340	* s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1341	*
1342	* Side effects:
1343	* Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1344	* a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1345	* (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1346	* a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1347	* s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1348	* Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1349	*
1350	* etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1351	* eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1352	* sess_id: points at the session ID.
1353	* sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1354	* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1355	* point to the resulting session.
1356	*/
1357	SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL s, const unsigned char etick,
1358	size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1359	size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1360	{
1361	SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1362	unsigned char *sdec;
1363	const unsigned char *p;
1364	int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1365	SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1366	size_t mlen;
1367	unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1368	HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1369	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1370	SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1371
1372	if (eticklen == 0) {
1373	/*
1374	* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1375	* one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1376	*/
1377	ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1378	goto end;
1379	}
1380	if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1381	/*
1382	* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1383	* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1384	* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1385	* calculate the master secret later.
1386	*/
1387	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1388	goto end;
1389	}
1390
1391	/* Need at least keyname + iv */
1392	if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1393	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1394	goto end;
1395	}
1396
1397	/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1398	hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1399	if (hctx == NULL) {
1400	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1401	goto end;
1402	}
1403	ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1404	if (ctx == NULL) {
1405	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1406	goto end;
1407	}
1408	if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1409	unsigned char nctick = (unsigned char )etick;
1410	int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1411	nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1412	ctx, hctx, 0);
1413	if (rv < 0) {
1414	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1415	goto end;
1416	}
1417	if (rv == 0) {
1418	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1419	goto end;
1420	}
1421	if (rv == 2)
1422	renew_ticket = 1;
1423	} else {
1424	/* Check key name matches */
1425	if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1426	TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1427	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1428	goto end;
1429	}
1430	if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1431	sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1432	EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1433	\|\| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1434	tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1435	etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1436	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1437	goto end;
1438	}
1439	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1440	renew_ticket = 1;
1441	}
1442	/*
1443	* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1444	* checks on ticket.
1445	*/
1446	mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1447	if (mlen == 0) {
1448	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1449	goto end;
1450	}
1451
1452	/* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1453	if (eticklen <=
1454	TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1455	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1456	goto end;
1457	}
1458	eticklen -= mlen;
1459	/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1460	if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1461	\|\| HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1462	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1463	goto end;
1464	}
1465
1466	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1467	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1468	goto end;
1469	}
1470	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1471	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1472	p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1473	eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1474	sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1475	if (sdec == NULL \|\| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1476	(int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1477	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1478	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1479	goto end;
1480	}
1481	if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1482	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1483	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1484	goto end;
1485	}
1486	slen += declen;
1487	p = sdec;
1488
1489	sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1490	slen -= p - sdec;
1491	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1492	if (sess) {
1493	/* Some additional consistency checks */
1494	if (slen != 0) {
1495	SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1496	sess = NULL;
1497	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1498	goto end;
1499	}
1500	/*
1501	* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1502	* that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1503	* structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1504	* standard.
1505	*/
1506	if (sesslen) {
1507	memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1508	sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1509	}
1510	if (renew_ticket)
1511	ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1512	else
1513	ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1514	goto end;
1515	}
1516	ERR_clear_error();
1517	/*
1518	* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1519	*/
1520	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1521
1522	end:
1523	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1524	HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1525
1526	/*
1527	* If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1528	* detected above. The callback is responsible for checking \|ret\| before it
1529	* performs any action
1530	*/
1531	if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1532	&& (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1533	\|\| ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1534	\|\| ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1535	\|\| ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1536	size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1537	int retcb;
1538
1539	if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1540	keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1541	retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1542	ret,
1543	s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1544	switch (retcb) {
1545	case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1546	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1547	break;
1548
1549	case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1550	ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1551	SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1552	sess = NULL;
1553	break;
1554
1555	case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1556	if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1557	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1558	/* else the value of \|ret\| will already do the right thing */
1559	SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1560	sess = NULL;
1561	break;
1562
1563	case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1564	case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1565	if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1566	&& ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1567	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1568	else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1569	ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1570	else
1571	ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1572	break;
1573
1574	default:
1575	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1576	}
1577	}
1578
1579	if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL \|\| SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1580	switch (ret) {
1581	case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1582	case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1583	case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1584	s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1585	}
1586	}
1587
1588	*psess = sess;
1589
1590	return ret;
1591	}
1592
1593	/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1594	static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu)
1595	{
1596	unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1597	int secbits;
1598
1599	/* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1600	if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1601	return 0;
1602	/* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1603	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1604	return 0;
1605	/* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1606	if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1607	&& (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA \|\| lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1608	\|\| lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1609	\|\| lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1610	return 0;
1611
1612	/* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1613	if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1614	return 0;
1615
1616	if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1617	\|\| lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1618	\|\| lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1619	/* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1620	if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1621	return 0;
1622	if (!s->server
1623	&& s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1624	&& s->s3->tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1625	int i, num;
1626	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1627
1628	/*
1629	* We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1630	* sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1631	* ciphersuites enabled.
1632	*/
1633
1634	if (s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1635	return 0;
1636
1637	sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1638	num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1639	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1640	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1641
1642	c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1643	/* Skip disabled ciphers */
1644	if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1645	continue;
1646
1647	if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1648	break;
1649	}
1650	if (i == num)
1651	return 0;
1652	}
1653	}
1654
1655	/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1656	secbits = sigalg_security_bits(lu);
1657	sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1658	sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1659	return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1660	}
1661
1662	/*
1663	* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1664	* algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1665	* disabled.
1666	*/
1667
1668	void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t pmask_a, SSL s, int op)
1669	{
1670	const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1671	size_t i, sigalgslen;
1672	uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA \| SSL_aDSS \| SSL_aECDSA;
1673	/*
1674	* Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1675	* in disabled_mask.
1676	*/
1677	sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1678	for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1679	const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigalgs);
1680	const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1681
1682	if (lu == NULL)
1683	continue;
1684
1685	clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1686	if (clu == NULL)
1687	continue;
1688
1689	/* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1690	if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1691	&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1692	disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1693	}
1694	*pmask_a \|= disabled_mask;
1695	}
1696
1697	int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL s, WPACKET pkt,
1698	const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1699	{
1700	size_t i;
1701	int rv = 0;
1702
1703	for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1704	const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(psig);
1705
1706	if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1707	continue;
1708	if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1709	return 0;
1710	/*
1711	* If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1712	* signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1713	*/
1714	if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1715	\|\| (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1716	&& lu->hash != NID_sha1
1717	&& lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1718	rv = 1;
1719	}
1720	if (rv == 0)
1721	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1722	return rv;
1723	}
1724
1725	/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1726	static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsig,
1727	const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1728	const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1729	{
1730	const uint16_t ptmp, atmp;
1731	size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1732	for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1733	const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(ptmp);
1734
1735	/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1736	if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1737	continue;
1738	for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1739	if (ptmp == atmp) {
1740	nmatch++;
1741	if (shsig)
1742	*shsig++ = lu;
1743	break;
1744	}
1745	}
1746	}
1747	return nmatch;
1748	}
1749
1750	/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1751	static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1752	{
1753	const uint16_t pref, allow, *conf;
1754	size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1755	size_t nmatch;
1756	const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1757	CERT *c = s->cert;
1758	unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1759
1760	OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1761	s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1762	s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1763	/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1764	if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1765	conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1766	conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1767	} else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1768	conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1769	conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1770	} else
1771	conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1772	if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE \|\| is_suiteb) {
1773	pref = conf;
1774	preflen = conflen;
1775	allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1776	allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1777	} else {
1778	allow = conf;
1779	allowlen = conflen;
1780	pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1781	preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1782	}
1783	nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1784	if (nmatch) {
1785	if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1786	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1787	return 0;
1788	}
1789	nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1790	} else {
1791	salgs = NULL;
1792	}
1793	s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1794	s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1795	return 1;
1796	}
1797
1798	int tls1_save_u16(PACKET pkt, uint16_t pdest, size_t pdestlen)
1799	{
1800	unsigned int stmp;
1801	size_t size, i;
1802	uint16_t *buf;
1803
1804	size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1805
1806	/* Invalid data length */
1807	if (size == 0 \|\| (size & 1) != 0)
1808	return 0;
1809
1810	size >>= 1;
1811
1812	if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1813	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1814	return 0;
1815	}
1816	for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1817	buf[i] = stmp;
1818
1819	if (i != size) {
1820	OPENSSL_free(buf);
1821	return 0;
1822	}
1823
1824	OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1825	*pdest = buf;
1826	*pdestlen = size;
1827
1828	return 1;
1829	}
1830
1831	int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL s, PACKET pkt, int cert)
1832	{
1833	/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1834	if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1835	return 1;
1836	/* Should never happen */
1837	if (s->cert == NULL)
1838	return 0;
1839
1840	if (cert)
1841	return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1842	&s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1843	else
1844	return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1845	&s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1846
1847	}
1848
1849	/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1850
1851	int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1852	{
1853	size_t i;
1854	uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1855
1856	if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1857	return 0;
1858
1859	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1860	pvalid[i] = 0;
1861
1862	for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1863	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
1864	int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1865
1866	/* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1867	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1868	continue;
1869	/* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1870	if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1871	pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN \| CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1872	}
1873	return 1;
1874	}
1875
1876	int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1877	int psign, int phash, int *psignhash,
1878	unsigned char rsig, unsigned char rhash)
1879	{
1880	uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1881	size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1882	if (psig == NULL \|\| numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1883	return 0;
1884	if (idx >= 0) {
1885	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1886
1887	if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1888	return 0;
1889	psig += idx;
1890	if (rhash != NULL)
1891	rhash = (unsigned char)((psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1892	if (rsig != NULL)
1893	rsig = (unsigned char)(psig & 0xff);
1894	lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1895	if (psign != NULL)
1896	*psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1897	if (phash != NULL)
1898	*phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1899	if (psignhash != NULL)
1900	*psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1901	}
1902	return (int)numsigalgs;
1903	}
1904
1905	int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1906	int psign, int phash, int *psignhash,
1907	unsigned char rsig, unsigned char rhash)
1908	{
1909	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1910	if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1911	\|\| idx < 0
1912	\|\| idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
1913	\|\| s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1914	return 0;
1915	shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1916	if (phash != NULL)
1917	*phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1918	if (psign != NULL)
1919	*psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1920	if (psignhash != NULL)
1921	*psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1922	if (rsig != NULL)
1923	*rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1924	if (rhash != NULL)
1925	*rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1926	return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
1927	}
1928
1929	/* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1930	#define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1931
1932	typedef struct {
1933	size_t sigalgcnt;
1934	/* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1935	uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1936	} sig_cb_st;
1937
1938	static void get_sigorhash(int psig, int phash, const char *str)
1939	{
1940	if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1941	*psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1942	} else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 \|\| strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1943	*psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1944	} else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1945	*psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1946	} else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1947	*psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1948	} else {
1949	*phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1950	if (*phash == NID_undef)
1951	*phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1952	}
1953	}
1954	/* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1955	#define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1956
1957	static int sig_cb(const char elem, int len, void arg)
1958	{
1959	sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1960	size_t i;
1961	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1962	char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1963	int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1964	if (elem == NULL)
1965	return 0;
1966	if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1967	return 0;
1968	if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1969	return 0;
1970	memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1971	etmp[len] = 0;
1972	p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1973	/*
1974	* We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1975	* if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
1976	* name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
1977	* Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
1978	* rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
1979	* we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
1980	* in the table.
1981	*/
1982	if (p == NULL) {
1983	for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1984	i++, s++) {
1985	if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1986	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1987	break;
1988	}
1989	}
1990	if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1991	return 0;
1992	} else {
1993	*p = 0;
1994	p++;
1995	if (*p == 0)
1996	return 0;
1997	get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1998	get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1999	if (sig_alg == NID_undef \|\| hash_alg == NID_undef)
2000	return 0;
2001	for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2002	i++, s++) {
2003	if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2004	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2005	break;
2006	}
2007	}
2008	if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2009	return 0;
2010	}
2011
2012	/* Reject duplicates */
2013	for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2014	if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2015	sarg->sigalgcnt--;
2016	return 0;
2017	}
2018	}
2019	return 1;
2020	}
2021
2022	/*
2023	* Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2024	* form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2025	*/
2026	int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT c, const char str, int client)
2027	{
2028	sig_cb_st sig;
2029	sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
2030	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2031	return 0;
2032	if (c == NULL)
2033	return 1;
2034	return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2035	}
2036
2037	int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT c, const uint16_t psigs, size_t salglen,
2038	int client)
2039	{
2040	uint16_t *sigalgs;
2041
2042	if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2043	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2044	return 0;
2045	}
2046	memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2047
2048	if (client) {
2049	OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2050	c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2051	c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2052	} else {
2053	OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2054	c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2055	c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2056	}
2057
2058	return 1;
2059	}
2060
2061	int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT c, const int psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2062	{
2063	uint16_t sigalgs, sptr;
2064	size_t i;
2065
2066	if (salglen & 1)
2067	return 0;
2068	if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2069	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2070	return 0;
2071	}
2072	for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2073	size_t j;
2074	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2075	int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2076	int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2077
2078	for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2079	j++, curr++) {
2080	if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2081	*sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2082	break;
2083	}
2084	}
2085
2086	if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2087	goto err;
2088	}
2089
2090	if (client) {
2091	OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2092	c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2093	c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2094	} else {
2095	OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2096	c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2097	c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2098	}
2099
2100	return 1;
2101
2102	err:
2103	OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2104	return 0;
2105	}
2106
2107	static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL s, X509 x, int default_nid)
2108	{
2109	int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2110	size_t i;
2111	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2112	size_t sigalgslen;
2113	if (default_nid == -1)
2114	return 1;
2115	sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2116	if (default_nid)
2117	return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2118
2119	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2120	/*
2121	* If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2122	* chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2123	* otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2124	*/
2125	sigalgslen = s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2126	use_pc_sigalgs = 1;
2127	} else {
2128	sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2129	}
2130	for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2131	sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2132	? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2133	: s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2134	if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2135	return 1;
2136	}
2137	return 0;
2138	}
2139
2140	/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2141	static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) names, X509 x)
2142	{
2143	X509_NAME *nm;
2144	int i;
2145	nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2146	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2147	if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2148	return 1;
2149	}
2150	return 0;
2151	}
2152
2153	/*
2154	* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2155	* server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2156	* passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2157	* attempting to use them.
2158	*/
2159
2160	/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2161
2162	#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2163	(CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE\|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2164	/* Strict mode flags */
2165	#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2166	(CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS\|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE\|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2167	\| CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME\|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2168
2169	int tls1_check_chain(SSL s, X509 x, EVP_PKEY pk, STACK_OF(X509) chain,
2170	int idx)
2171	{
2172	int i;
2173	int rv = 0;
2174	int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2175	CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2176	CERT *c = s->cert;
2177	uint32_t *pvalid;
2178	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2179	/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2180	if (idx != -1) {
2181	/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2182	if (idx == -2) {
2183	cpk = c->key;
2184	idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2185	} else
2186	cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2187	pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2188	x = cpk->x509;
2189	pk = cpk->privatekey;
2190	chain = cpk->chain;
2191	strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2192	/* If no cert or key, forget it */
2193	if (!x \|\| !pk)
2194	goto end;
2195	} else {
2196	size_t certidx;
2197
2198	if (!x \|\| !pk)
2199	return 0;
2200
2201	if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2202	return 0;
2203	idx = certidx;
2204	pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2205
2206	if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2207	check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2208	else
2209	check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2210	strict_mode = 1;
2211	}
2212
2213	if (suiteb_flags) {
2214	int ok;
2215	if (check_flags)
2216	check_flags \|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2217	ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2218	if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2219	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2220	else if (!check_flags)
2221	goto end;
2222	}
2223
2224	/*
2225	* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2226	* algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2227	*/
2228	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2229	int default_nid;
2230	int rsign = 0;
2231	if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2232	\|\| s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2233	default_nid = 0;
2234	/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2235	} else {
2236	switch (idx) {
2237	case SSL_PKEY_RSA:
2238	rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2239	default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2240	break;
2241
2242	case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2243	rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2244	default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2245	break;
2246
2247	case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
2248	rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2249	default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2250	break;
2251
2252	case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2253	rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2254	default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2255	break;
2256
2257	case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2258	rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2259	default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2260	break;
2261
2262	case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2263	rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2264	default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2265	break;
2266
2267	default:
2268	default_nid = -1;
2269	break;
2270	}
2271	}
2272	/*
2273	* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2274	* preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2275	*/
2276	if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2277	size_t j;
2278	const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2279	for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2280	const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(p);
2281
2282	if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2283	break;
2284	}
2285	if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2286	if (check_flags)
2287	goto skip_sigs;
2288	else
2289	goto end;
2290	}
2291	}
2292	/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2293	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2294	/*
2295	* We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2296	* so check_flags is always set.
2297	*/
2298	if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2299	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2300	} else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2301	if (!check_flags)
2302	goto end;
2303	} else
2304	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2305	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2306	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2307	if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2308	if (check_flags) {
2309	rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2310	break;
2311	} else
2312	goto end;
2313	}
2314	}
2315	}
2316	/* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2317	else if (check_flags)
2318	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE \| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2319	skip_sigs:
2320	/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2321	if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2322	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2323	else if (!check_flags)
2324	goto end;
2325	if (!s->server)
2326	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2327	/* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2328	else if (strict_mode) {
2329	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2330	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2331	X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2332	if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2333	if (check_flags) {
2334	rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2335	break;
2336	} else
2337	goto end;
2338	}
2339	}
2340	}
2341	if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2342	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2343	int check_type = 0;
2344	switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2345	case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
2346	check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2347	break;
2348	case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
2349	check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2350	break;
2351	case EVP_PKEY_EC:
2352	check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2353	break;
2354	}
2355	if (check_type) {
2356	const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2357	size_t j;
2358
2359	for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2360	if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2361	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2362	break;
2363	}
2364	}
2365	if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2366	goto end;
2367	} else {
2368	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2369	}
2370
2371	ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2372
2373	if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2374	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2375
2376	if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2377	if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2378	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2379	}
2380	if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2381	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2382	X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2383	if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2384	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2385	break;
2386	}
2387	}
2388	}
2389	if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2390	goto end;
2391	} else
2392	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME \| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2393
2394	if (!check_flags \|\| (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2395	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2396
2397	end:
2398
2399	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2400	rv \|= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN \| CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2401	else
2402	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN \| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2403
2404	/*
2405	* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2406	* chain is invalid.
2407	*/
2408	if (!check_flags) {
2409	if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2410	*pvalid = rv;
2411	} else {
2412	/* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2413	*pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN \| CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2414	return 0;
2415	}
2416	}
2417	return rv;
2418	}
2419
2420	/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2421	void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2422	{
2423	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2424	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2425	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2426	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2427	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2428	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2429	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2430	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2431	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2432	}
2433
2434	/* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2435	int SSL_check_chain(SSL s, X509 x, EVP_PKEY pk, STACK_OF(X509) chain)
2436	{
2437	return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2438	}
2439
2440	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2441	DH ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL s)
2442	{
2443	DH *dhp = NULL;
2444	BIGNUM p = NULL, g = NULL;
2445	int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
2446
2447	if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2448	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL \| SSL_aPSK)) {
2449	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2450	dh_secbits = 128;
2451	else
2452	dh_secbits = 80;
2453	} else {
2454	if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2455	return NULL;
2456	dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2457	}
2458	}
2459
2460	dhp = DH_new();
2461	if (dhp == NULL)
2462	return NULL;
2463	g = BN_new();
2464	if (g == NULL \|\| !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2465	DH_free(dhp);
2466	BN_free(g);
2467	return NULL;
2468	}
2469
2470	/* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
2471	sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(s, NULL, NULL);
2472	if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
2473	dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
2474
2475	if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2476	p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2477	else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2478	p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2479	else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2480	p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2481	else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2482	p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2483	else
2484	p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2485	if (p == NULL \|\| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2486	DH_free(dhp);
2487	BN_free(p);
2488	BN_free(g);
2489	return NULL;
2490	}
2491	return dhp;
2492	}
2493	#endif
2494
2495	static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL s, SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2496	{
2497	int secbits = -1;
2498	EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2499	if (pkey) {
2500	/*
2501	* If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2502	* security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2503	* reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2504	* omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2505	*/
2506	secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2507	}
2508	if (s)
2509	return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2510	else
2511	return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2512	}
2513
2514	static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL s, SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2515	{
2516	/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2517	int secbits, nid, pknid;
2518	/* Don't check signature if self signed */
2519	if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2520	return 1;
2521	if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2522	secbits = -1;
2523	/* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2524	if (nid == NID_undef)
2525	nid = pknid;
2526	if (s)
2527	return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2528	else
2529	return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2530	}
2531
2532	int ssl_security_cert(SSL s, SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2533	{
2534	if (vfy)
2535	vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2536	if (is_ee) {
2537	if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY \| vfy))
2538	return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2539	} else {
2540	if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY \| vfy))
2541	return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2542	}
2543	if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD \| vfy))
2544	return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2545	return 1;
2546	}
2547
2548	/*
2549	* Check security of a chain, if \|sk\| includes the end entity certificate then
2550	* \|x\| is NULL. If \|vfy\| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2551	* one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2552	*/
2553
2554	int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL s, STACK_OF(X509) sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2555	{
2556	int rv, start_idx, i;
2557	if (x == NULL) {
2558	x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2559	start_idx = 1;
2560	} else
2561	start_idx = 0;
2562
2563	rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2564	if (rv != 1)
2565	return rv;
2566
2567	for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2568	x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2569	rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2570	if (rv != 1)
2571	return rv;
2572	}
2573	return 1;
2574	}
2575
2576	/*
2577	* For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2578	* with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2579	*/
2580
2581	static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu)
2582	{
2583	int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2584	const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2585
2586	/* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2587	if (clu == NULL
2588	\|\| (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2589	\|\| (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2590	&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2591	return -1;
2592
2593	return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2594	}
2595
2596	/*
2597	* Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
2598	* the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
2599	* the key.
2600	* Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
2601	*/
2602	static int check_cert_usable(SSL s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP sig, X509 *x,
2603	EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2604	{
2605	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2606	int mdnid, pknid, default_mdnid;
2607	size_t i;
2608
2609	/* If the EVP_PKEY reports a mandatory digest, allow nothing else. */
2610	ERR_set_mark();
2611	if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &default_mdnid) == 2 &&
2612	sig->hash != default_mdnid)
2613	return 0;
2614
2615	/* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
2616	* just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
2617	ERR_pop_to_mark();
2618
2619	if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2620	for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2621	lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2622	if (lu == NULL
2623	\|\| !X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
2624	continue;
2625	/*
2626	* TODO this does not differentiate between the
2627	* rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2628	* have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2629	* signing certificate.
2630	*/
2631	if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
2632	return 1;
2633	}
2634	return 0;
2635	}
2636	return 1;
2637	}
2638
2639	/*
2640	* Returns true if \|s\| has a usable certificate configured for use
2641	* with signature scheme \|sig\|.
2642	* "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2643	* the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2644	* Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2645	*/
2646	static int has_usable_cert(SSL s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP sig, int idx)
2647	{
2648	/* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2649	if (idx == -1)
2650	idx = sig->sig_idx;
2651	if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2652	return 0;
2653
2654	return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
2655	s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2656	}
2657
2658	/*
2659	* Returns true if the supplied cert \|x\| and key \|pkey\| is usable with the
2660	* specified signature scheme \|sig\|, or false otherwise.
2661	*/
2662	static int is_cert_usable(SSL s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP sig, X509 *x,
2663	EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2664	{
2665	size_t idx;
2666
2667	if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
2668	return 0;
2669
2670	/* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
2671	if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
2672	return 0;
2673
2674	return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
2675	}
2676
2677	/*
2678	* Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate \|x\| and key
2679	* \|pkey\|. \|x\| and \|pkey\| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
2680	* available certs/keys to find one that works.
2681	*/
2682	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP find_sig_alg(SSL s, X509 x, EVP_PKEY pkey)
2683	{
2684	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2685	size_t i;
2686	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2687	int curve = -1;
2688	#endif
2689	EVP_PKEY *tmppkey;
2690
2691	/* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
2692	for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2693	lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2694
2695	/* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2696	if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2697	\|\| lu->hash == NID_sha224
2698	\|\| lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2699	\|\| lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2700	continue;
2701	/* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2702	if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
2703	continue;
2704	if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2705	\|\| (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
2706	continue;
2707
2708	tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
2709	: s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2710
2711	if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2712	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2713	if (curve == -1) {
2714	EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmppkey);
2715	curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2716	}
2717	if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2718	continue;
2719	#else
2720	continue;
2721	#endif
2722	} else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2723	/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2724	if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(tmppkey), lu))
2725	continue;
2726	}
2727	break;
2728	}
2729
2730	if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
2731	return NULL;
2732
2733	return lu;
2734	}
2735
2736	/*
2737	* Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2738	* Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2739	*
2740	* For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2741	* an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2742	*
2743	* For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2744	* a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2745	* to the server. In this case no error is set.
2746	*/
2747	int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2748	{
2749	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2750	int sig_idx = -1;
2751
2752	s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2753	s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2754
2755	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2756	lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
2757	if (lu == NULL) {
2758	if (!fatalerrs)
2759	return 1;
2760	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2761	SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2762	return 0;
2763	}
2764	} else {
2765	/* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2766	if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2767	return 1;
2768	if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2769	return 1;
2770
2771	if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2772	size_t i;
2773	if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2774	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2775	int curve;
2776
2777	/* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2778	if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2779	EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2780	curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2781	} else {
2782	curve = -1;
2783	}
2784	#endif
2785
2786	/*
2787	* Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2788	* cert type
2789	*/
2790	for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2791	lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2792
2793	if (s->server) {
2794	if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2795	continue;
2796	} else {
2797	int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2798
2799	sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2800	if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2801	continue;
2802	}
2803	/* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2804	if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2805	continue;
2806	if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2807	/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2808	EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2809
2810	if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2811	continue;
2812	}
2813	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2814	if (curve == -1 \|\| lu->curve == curve)
2815	#endif
2816	break;
2817	}
2818	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2819	/*
2820	* Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
2821	* in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
2822	* we have to assume GOST support.
2823	*/
2824	if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 \| SSL_aGOST12)) {
2825	if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2826	if (!fatalerrs)
2827	return 1;
2828	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2829	SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2830	SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2831	return 0;
2832	} else {
2833	i = 0;
2834	sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2835	}
2836	}
2837	#endif
2838	if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2839	if (!fatalerrs)
2840	return 1;
2841	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2842	SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2843	SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2844	return 0;
2845	}
2846	} else {
2847	/*
2848	* If we have no sigalg use defaults
2849	*/
2850	const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2851	size_t sent_sigslen;
2852
2853	if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2854	if (!fatalerrs)
2855	return 1;
2856	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2857	ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2858	return 0;
2859	}
2860
2861	/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2862	sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2863	for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2864	if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2865	&& has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2866	break;
2867	}
2868	if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2869	if (!fatalerrs)
2870	return 1;
2871	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2872	SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2873	SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2874	return 0;
2875	}
2876	}
2877	} else {
2878	if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2879	if (!fatalerrs)
2880	return 1;
2881	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2882	ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2883	return 0;
2884	}
2885	}
2886	}
2887	if (sig_idx == -1)
2888	sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2889	s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2890	s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2891	s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;
2892	return 1;
2893	}
2894
2895	int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
2896	{
2897	if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2898	&& !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2899	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2900	SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2901	return 0;
2902	}
2903
2904	ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2905	return 1;
2906	}
2907
2908	int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
2909	{
2910	if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2911	&& !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2912	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2913	SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2914	return 0;
2915	}
2916
2917	ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2918	return 1;
2919	}
2920
2921	uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
2922	{
2923	return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
2924	}

Note: See TracBrowser for help on using the repository browser.

source: vbox/trunk/src/libs/openssl-3.0.1/ssl/t1_lib.c@ 94081

Download in other formats: