/* $Id: SUPR3HardenedMain-win.cpp 54139 2015-02-11 13:54:44Z vboxsync $ */ /** @file * VirtualBox Support Library - Hardened main(), windows bits. */ /* * Copyright (C) 2006-2014 Oracle Corporation * * This file is part of VirtualBox Open Source Edition (OSE), as * available from http://www.virtualbox.org. This file is free software; * you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU * General Public License (GPL) as published by the Free Software * Foundation, in version 2 as it comes in the "COPYING" file of the * VirtualBox OSE distribution. VirtualBox OSE is distributed in the * hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY of any kind. * * The contents of this file may alternatively be used under the terms * of the Common Development and Distribution License Version 1.0 * (CDDL) only, as it comes in the "COPYING.CDDL" file of the * VirtualBox OSE distribution, in which case the provisions of the * CDDL are applicable instead of those of the GPL. * * You may elect to license modified versions of this file under the * terms and conditions of either the GPL or the CDDL or both. */ /******************************************************************************* * Header Files * *******************************************************************************/ #include #include #include #ifndef PROCESS_SET_LIMITED_INFORMATION # define PROCESS_SET_LIMITED_INFORMATION 0x2000 #endif #ifndef LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR # define LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR 0x200 # define LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32 0x800 #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "SUPLibInternal.h" #include "win/SUPHardenedVerify-win.h" #include "../SUPDrvIOC.h" #ifndef IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_NOLOAD # define IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_NOLOAD 0x00000002 #endif /******************************************************************************* * Defined Constants And Macros * *******************************************************************************/ /** The first argument of a respawed stub when respawned for the first time. * This just needs to be unique enough to avoid most confusion with real * executable names, there are other checks in place to make sure we've respanwed. */ #define SUPR3_RESPAWN_1_ARG0 "60eaff78-4bdd-042d-2e72-669728efd737-suplib-2ndchild" /** The first argument of a respawed stub when respawned for the second time. * This just needs to be unique enough to avoid most confusion with real * executable names, there are other checks in place to make sure we've respanwed. */ #define SUPR3_RESPAWN_2_ARG0 "60eaff78-4bdd-042d-2e72-669728efd737-suplib-3rdchild" /** Unconditional assertion. */ #define SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(a_Expr) \ do { \ if (!(a_Expr)) \ supR3HardenedFatal("%s: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, #a_Expr); \ } while (0) /** Unconditional assertion of NT_SUCCESS. */ #define SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(a_Expr) \ do { \ NTSTATUS rcNtAssert = (a_Expr); \ if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNtAssert)) \ supR3HardenedFatal("%s: %s -> %#x\n", __FUNCTION__, #a_Expr, rcNtAssert); \ } while (0) /** Unconditional assertion of a WIN32 API returning non-FALSE. */ #define SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_WIN32_SUCCESS(a_Expr) \ do { \ BOOL fRcAssert = (a_Expr); \ if (fRcAssert == FALSE) \ supR3HardenedFatal("%s: %s -> %#x\n", __FUNCTION__, #a_Expr, RtlGetLastWin32Error()); \ } while (0) /******************************************************************************* * Structures and Typedefs * *******************************************************************************/ /** * Security descriptor cleanup structure. */ typedef struct MYSECURITYCLEANUP { union { SID Sid; uint8_t abPadding[SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE]; } Everyone, Owner, User, Login; union { ACL AclHdr; uint8_t abPadding[1024]; } Acl; PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSecDesc; } MYSECURITYCLEANUP; /** Pointer to security cleanup structure. */ typedef MYSECURITYCLEANUP *PMYSECURITYCLEANUP; /** * Image verifier cache entry. */ typedef struct VERIFIERCACHEENTRY { /** Pointer to the next entry with the same hash value. */ struct VERIFIERCACHEENTRY * volatile pNext; /** Next entry in the WinVerifyTrust todo list. */ struct VERIFIERCACHEENTRY * volatile pNextTodoWvt; /** The file handle. */ HANDLE hFile; /** If fIndexNumber is set, this is an file system internal file identifier. */ LARGE_INTEGER IndexNumber; /** The path hash value. */ uint32_t uHash; /** The verification result. */ int rc; /** Used for shutting up load and error messages after a while so they don't * flood the the log file and fill up the disk. */ uint32_t volatile cHits; /** The validation flags (for WinVerifyTrust retry). */ uint32_t fFlags; /** Whether IndexNumber is valid */ bool fIndexNumberValid; /** Whether verified by WinVerifyTrust. */ bool volatile fWinVerifyTrust; /** cwcPath * sizeof(RTUTF16). */ uint16_t cbPath; /** The full path of this entry (variable size). */ RTUTF16 wszPath[1]; } VERIFIERCACHEENTRY; /** Pointer to an image verifier path entry. */ typedef VERIFIERCACHEENTRY *PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY; /** * Name of an import DLL that we need to check out. */ typedef struct VERIFIERCACHEIMPORT { /** Pointer to the next DLL in the list. */ struct VERIFIERCACHEIMPORT * volatile pNext; /** The length of pwszAltSearchDir if available. */ uint32_t cwcAltSearchDir; /** This points the directory containing the DLL needing it, this will be * NULL for a System32 DLL. */ PWCHAR pwszAltSearchDir; /** The name of the import DLL (variable length). */ char szName[1]; } VERIFIERCACHEIMPORT; /** Pointer to a import DLL that needs checking out. */ typedef VERIFIERCACHEIMPORT *PVERIFIERCACHEIMPORT; /** * Child requests. */ typedef enum SUPR3WINCHILDREQ { /** Perform child purification and close full access handles (must be zero). */ kSupR3WinChildReq_PurifyChildAndCloseHandles = 0, /** Close the events, we're good on our own from here on. */ kSupR3WinChildReq_CloseEvents, /** Reporting error. */ kSupR3WinChildReq_Error, /** End of valid requests. */ kSupR3WinChildReq_End } SUPR3WINCHILDREQ; /** * Child process parameters. */ typedef struct SUPR3WINPROCPARAMS { /** The event semaphore the child will be waiting on. */ HANDLE hEvtChild; /** The event semaphore the parent will be waiting on. */ HANDLE hEvtParent; /** The address of the NTDLL. This is only valid during the very early * initialization as we abuse for thread creation protection. */ uintptr_t uNtDllAddr; /** The requested operation (set by the child). */ SUPR3WINCHILDREQ enmRequest; /** The last status. */ int32_t rc; /** The init operation the error relates to if message, kSupInitOp_Invalid if * not message. */ SUPINITOP enmWhat; /** Where if message. */ char szWhere[80]; /** Error message / path name string space. */ char szErrorMsg[4096]; } SUPR3WINPROCPARAMS; /** * Child process data structure for use during child process init setup and * purification. */ typedef struct SUPR3HARDNTCHILD { /** Process handle. */ HANDLE hProcess; /** Primary thread handle. */ HANDLE hThread; /** Handle to the parent process, if we're the middle (stub) process. */ HANDLE hParent; /** The event semaphore the child will be waiting on. */ HANDLE hEvtChild; /** The event semaphore the parent will be waiting on. */ HANDLE hEvtParent; /** The address of NTDLL in the child. */ uintptr_t uNtDllAddr; /** The address of NTDLL in this process. */ uintptr_t uNtDllParentAddr; /** Which respawn number this is (1 = stub, 2 = VM). */ int iWhich; /** The basic process info. */ PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION BasicInfo; /** The probable size of the PEB. */ size_t cbPeb; /** The pristine process environment block. */ PEB Peb; /** The child process parameters. */ SUPR3WINPROCPARAMS ProcParams; } SUPR3HARDNTCHILD; /** Pointer to a child process data structure. */ typedef SUPR3HARDNTCHILD *PSUPR3HARDNTCHILD; /******************************************************************************* * Global Variables * *******************************************************************************/ /** Process parameters. Specified by parent if VM process, see * supR3HardenedVmProcessInit. */ static SUPR3WINPROCPARAMS g_ProcParams = { NULL, NULL, 0, (SUPR3WINCHILDREQ)0, 0 }; /** Set if supR3HardenedEarlyProcessInit was invoked. */ bool g_fSupEarlyProcessInit = false; /** Set if the stub device has been opened (stub process only). */ bool g_fSupStubOpened = false; /** @name Global variables initialized by suplibHardenedWindowsMain. * @{ */ /** Combined windows NT version number. See SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED. */ uint32_t g_uNtVerCombined = 0; /** Count calls to the special main function for linking santity checks. */ static uint32_t volatile g_cSuplibHardenedWindowsMainCalls; /** The UTF-16 windows path to the executable. */ RTUTF16 g_wszSupLibHardenedExePath[1024]; /** The NT path of the executable. */ SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath; /** The offset into g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath of the executable name (WCHAR, * not byte). This also gives the length of the exectuable directory path, * including a trailing slash. */ uint32_t g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName; /** @} */ /** @name Hook related variables. * @{ */ /** Pointer to the bit of assembly code that will perform the original * NtCreateSection operation. */ static NTSTATUS (NTAPI * g_pfnNtCreateSectionReal)(PHANDLE, ACCESS_MASK, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES, PLARGE_INTEGER, ULONG, ULONG, HANDLE); /** Pointer to the NtCreateSection function in NtDll (for patching purposes). */ static uint8_t *g_pbNtCreateSection; /** The patched NtCreateSection bytes (for restoring). */ static uint8_t g_abNtCreateSectionPatch[16]; /** Pointer to the bit of assembly code that will perform the original * LdrLoadDll operation. */ static NTSTATUS (NTAPI * g_pfnLdrLoadDllReal)(PWSTR, PULONG, PUNICODE_STRING, PHANDLE); /** Pointer to the LdrLoadDll function in NtDll (for patching purposes). */ static uint8_t *g_pbLdrLoadDll; /** The patched LdrLoadDll bytes (for restoring). */ static uint8_t g_abLdrLoadDllPatch[16]; /** The hash table of verifier cache . */ static PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY volatile g_apVerifierCache[128]; /** Queue of cached images which needs WinVerifyTrust to check them. */ static PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY volatile g_pVerifierCacheTodoWvt = NULL; /** Queue of cached images which needs their imports checked. */ static PVERIFIERCACHEIMPORT volatile g_pVerifierCacheTodoImports = NULL; /** The windows path to dir \\SystemRoot\\System32 directory (technically * this whatever \KnownDlls\KnownDllPath points to). */ SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_System32WinPath; /** @ */ /** Positive if the DLL notification callback has been registered, counts * registration attempts as negative. */ static int g_cDllNotificationRegistered = 0; /** The registration cookie of the DLL notification callback. */ static PVOID g_pvDllNotificationCookie = NULL; /** Static error info structure used during init. */ static RTERRINFOSTATIC g_ErrInfoStatic; /** In the assembly file. */ extern "C" uint8_t g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[PAGE_SIZE]; /** Whether we've patched our own LdrInitializeThunk or not. We do this to * disable thread creation. */ static bool g_fSupInitThunkSelfPatched; /** The backup of our own LdrInitializeThunk code, for enabling and disabling * thread creation in this process. */ static uint8_t g_abLdrInitThunkSelfBackup[16]; /** Mask of adversaries that we've detected (SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_XXX). */ static uint32_t g_fSupAdversaries = 0; /** @name SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_XXX - Adversaries * @{ */ /** Symantec endpoint protection or similar including SysPlant.sys. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_SYSPLANT RT_BIT_32(0) /** Symantec Norton 360. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360 RT_BIT_32(1) /** Avast! */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST RT_BIT_32(2) /** TrendMicro OfficeScan and probably others. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO RT_BIT_32(3) /** TrendMicro potentially buggy sakfile.sys. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO_SAKFILE RT_BIT_32(4) /** McAfee. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE RT_BIT_32(5) /** Kaspersky or OEMs of it. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY RT_BIT_32(6) /** Malwarebytes Anti-Malware (MBAM). */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MBAM RT_BIT_32(7) /** AVG Internet Security. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVG RT_BIT_32(8) /** Panda Security. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA RT_BIT_32(9) /** Microsoft Security Essentials. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MSE RT_BIT_32(10) /** Comodo. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO RT_BIT_32(11) /** Check Point's Zone Alarm (may include Kaspersky). */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_ZONE_ALARM RT_BIT_32(12) /** Digital guardian. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_DIGITAL_GUARDIAN RT_BIT_32(13) /** Unknown adversary detected while waiting on child. */ #define SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_UNKNOWN RT_BIT_32(31) /** @} */ /******************************************************************************* * Internal Functions * *******************************************************************************/ static NTSTATUS supR3HardenedScreenImage(HANDLE hFile, bool fImage, bool fIgnoreArch, PULONG pfAccess, PULONG pfProtect, bool *pfCallRealApi, const char *pszCaller, bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, bool *pfQuiet); static void supR3HardenedWinRegisterDllNotificationCallback(void); static void supR3HardenedWinReInstallHooks(bool fFirst); DECLASM(void) supR3HardenedEarlyProcessInitThunk(void); /** * Simple wide char search routine. * * @returns Pointer to the first location of @a wcNeedle in @a pwszHaystack. * NULL if not found. * @param pwszHaystack Pointer to the string that should be searched. * @param wcNeedle The character to search for. */ static PRTUTF16 suplibHardenedWStrChr(PCRTUTF16 pwszHaystack, RTUTF16 wcNeedle) { for (;;) { RTUTF16 wcCur = *pwszHaystack; if (wcCur == wcNeedle) return (PRTUTF16)pwszHaystack; if (wcCur == '\0') return NULL; pwszHaystack++; } } /** * Simple wide char string length routine. * * @returns The number of characters in the given string. (Excludes the * terminator.) * @param pwsz The string. */ static size_t suplibHardenedWStrLen(PCRTUTF16 pwsz) { PCRTUTF16 pwszCur = pwsz; while (*pwszCur != '\0') pwszCur++; return pwszCur - pwsz; } /** * Our version of GetTickCount. * @returns Millisecond timestamp. */ static uint64_t supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS(void) { PKUSER_SHARED_DATA pUserSharedData = (PKUSER_SHARED_DATA)(uintptr_t)0x7ffe0000; /* use interrupt time */ LARGE_INTEGER Time; do { Time.HighPart = pUserSharedData->InterruptTime.High1Time; Time.LowPart = pUserSharedData->InterruptTime.LowPart; } while (pUserSharedData->InterruptTime.High2Time != Time.HighPart); return (uint64_t)Time.QuadPart / 10000; } /** * Wrapper around LoadLibraryEx that deals with the UTF-8 to UTF-16 conversion * and supplies the right flags. * * @returns Module handle on success, NULL on failure. * @param pszName The full path to the DLL. * @param fSystem32Only Whether to only look for imports in the system32 * directory. If set to false, the application * directory is also searched. */ DECLHIDDEN(void *) supR3HardenedWinLoadLibrary(const char *pszName, bool fSystem32Only) { WCHAR wszPath[RTPATH_MAX]; PRTUTF16 pwszPath = wszPath; int rc = RTStrToUtf16Ex(pszName, RTSTR_MAX, &pwszPath, RT_ELEMENTS(wszPath), NULL); if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) { while (*pwszPath) { if (*pwszPath == '/') *pwszPath = '\\'; pwszPath++; } DWORD fFlags = 0; if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) { fFlags |= LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32; if (!fSystem32Only) fFlags |= LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR; } void *pvRet = (void *)LoadLibraryExW(wszPath, NULL /*hFile*/, fFlags); /* Vista, W7, W2K8R might not work without KB2533623, so retry with no flags. */ if ( !pvRet && fFlags && g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) && RtlGetLastWin32Error() == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER) pvRet = (void *)LoadLibraryExW(wszPath, NULL /*hFile*/, 0); return pvRet; } supR3HardenedFatal("RTStrToUtf16Ex failed on '%s': %Rrc", pszName, rc); return NULL; } /** * Gets the internal index number of the file. * * @returns True if we got an index number, false if not. * @param hFile The file in question. * @param pIndexNumber where to return the index number. */ static bool supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheGetIndexNumber(HANDLE hFile, PLARGE_INTEGER pIndexNumber) { IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, pIndexNumber, sizeof(*pIndexNumber), FileInternalInformation); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) rcNt = Ios.Status; #ifdef DEBUG_bird if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) __debugbreak(); #endif return NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) && pIndexNumber->QuadPart != 0; } /** * Calculates the hash value for the given UTF-16 path string. * * @returns Hash value. * @param pUniStr String to hash. */ static uint32_t supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheHashPath(PCUNICODE_STRING pUniStr) { uint32_t uHash = 0; unsigned cwcLeft = pUniStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR); PRTUTF16 pwc = pUniStr->Buffer; while (cwcLeft-- > 0) { RTUTF16 wc = *pwc++; if (wc < 0x80) wc = wc != '/' ? RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc) : '\\'; uHash = wc + (uHash << 6) + (uHash << 16) - uHash; } return uHash; } /** * Calculates the hash value for a directory + filename combo as if they were * one single string. * * @returns Hash value. * @param pawcDir The directory name. * @param cwcDir The length of the directory name. RTSTR_MAX if * not available. * @param pszName The import name (UTF-8). */ static uint32_t supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheHashDirAndFile(PCRTUTF16 pawcDir, uint32_t cwcDir, const char *pszName) { uint32_t uHash = 0; while (cwcDir-- > 0) { RTUTF16 wc = *pawcDir++; if (wc < 0x80) wc = wc != '/' ? RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc) : '\\'; uHash = wc + (uHash << 6) + (uHash << 16) - uHash; } unsigned char ch = '\\'; uHash = ch + (uHash << 6) + (uHash << 16) - uHash; while ((ch = *pszName++) != '\0') { ch = RT_C_TO_LOWER(ch); uHash = ch + (uHash << 6) + (uHash << 16) - uHash; } return uHash; } /** * Verify string cache compare function. * * @returns true if the strings match, false if not. * @param pawcLeft The left hand string. * @param pawcRight The right hand string. * @param cwcToCompare The number of chars to compare. */ static bool supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheIsMatch(PCRTUTF16 pawcLeft, PCRTUTF16 pawcRight, uint32_t cwcToCompare) { /* Try a quick memory compare first. */ if (memcmp(pawcLeft, pawcRight, cwcToCompare * sizeof(RTUTF16)) == 0) return true; /* Slow char by char compare. */ while (cwcToCompare-- > 0) { RTUTF16 wcLeft = *pawcLeft++; RTUTF16 wcRight = *pawcRight++; if (wcLeft != wcRight) { wcLeft = wcLeft != '/' ? RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcLeft) : '\\'; wcRight = wcRight != '/' ? RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcRight) : '\\'; if (wcLeft != wcRight) return false; } } return true; } /** * Inserts the given verifier result into the cache. * * @param pUniStr The full path of the image. * @param hFile The file handle - must either be entered into * the cache or closed. * @param rc The verifier result. * @param fWinVerifyTrust Whether verified by WinVerifyTrust or not. * @param fFlags The image verification flags. */ static void supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheInsert(PCUNICODE_STRING pUniStr, HANDLE hFile, int rc, bool fWinVerifyTrust, uint32_t fFlags) { /* * Allocate and initalize a new entry. */ PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY pEntry = (PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY)RTMemAllocZ(sizeof(VERIFIERCACHEENTRY) + pUniStr->Length); if (pEntry) { pEntry->pNext = NULL; pEntry->pNextTodoWvt = NULL; pEntry->hFile = hFile; pEntry->uHash = supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheHashPath(pUniStr); pEntry->rc = rc; pEntry->fFlags = fFlags; pEntry->cHits = 0; pEntry->fWinVerifyTrust = fWinVerifyTrust; pEntry->cbPath = pUniStr->Length; memcpy(pEntry->wszPath, pUniStr->Buffer, pUniStr->Length); pEntry->wszPath[pUniStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0'; pEntry->fIndexNumberValid = supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheGetIndexNumber(hFile, &pEntry->IndexNumber); /* * Try insert it, careful with concurrent code as well as potential duplicates. */ uint32_t iHashTab = pEntry->uHash % RT_ELEMENTS(g_apVerifierCache); VERIFIERCACHEENTRY * volatile *ppEntry = &g_apVerifierCache[iHashTab]; for (;;) { if (ASMAtomicCmpXchgPtr(ppEntry, pEntry, NULL)) { if (!fWinVerifyTrust) do pEntry->pNextTodoWvt = g_pVerifierCacheTodoWvt; while (!ASMAtomicCmpXchgPtr(&g_pVerifierCacheTodoWvt, pEntry, pEntry->pNextTodoWvt)); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheInsert: %ls\n", pUniStr->Buffer)); return; } PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY pOther = *ppEntry; if (!pOther) continue; if ( pOther->uHash == pEntry->uHash && pOther->cbPath == pEntry->cbPath && supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheIsMatch(pOther->wszPath, pEntry->wszPath, pEntry->cbPath / sizeof(RTUTF16))) break; ppEntry = &pOther->pNext; } /* Duplicate entry (may happen due to races). */ RTMemFree(pEntry); } NtClose(hFile); } /** * Looks up an entry in the verifier hash table. * * @return Pointer to the entry on if found, NULL if not. * @param pUniStr The full path of the image. * @param hFile The file handle. */ static PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheLookup(PCUNICODE_STRING pUniStr, HANDLE hFile) { PRTUTF16 const pwszPath = pUniStr->Buffer; uint16_t const cbPath = pUniStr->Length; uint32_t uHash = supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheHashPath(pUniStr); uint32_t iHashTab = uHash % RT_ELEMENTS(g_apVerifierCache); PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY pCur = g_apVerifierCache[iHashTab]; while (pCur) { if ( pCur->uHash == uHash && pCur->cbPath == cbPath && supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheIsMatch(pCur->wszPath, pwszPath, cbPath / sizeof(RTUTF16))) { if (!pCur->fIndexNumberValid) return pCur; LARGE_INTEGER IndexNumber; bool fIndexNumberValid = supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheGetIndexNumber(hFile, &IndexNumber); if ( fIndexNumberValid && IndexNumber.QuadPart == pCur->IndexNumber.QuadPart) return pCur; #ifdef DEBUG_bird __debugbreak(); #endif } pCur = pCur->pNext; } return NULL; } /** * Looks up an import DLL in the verifier hash table. * * @return Pointer to the entry on if found, NULL if not. * @param pawcDir The directory name. * @param cwcDir The length of the directory name. * @param pszName The import name (UTF-8). */ static PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheLookupImport(PCRTUTF16 pawcDir, uint32_t cwcDir, const char *pszName) { uint32_t uHash = supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheHashDirAndFile(pawcDir, cwcDir, pszName); uint32_t iHashTab = uHash % RT_ELEMENTS(g_apVerifierCache); uint32_t const cbPath = (uint32_t)((cwcDir + 1 + strlen(pszName)) * sizeof(RTUTF16)); PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY pCur = g_apVerifierCache[iHashTab]; while (pCur) { if ( pCur->uHash == uHash && pCur->cbPath == cbPath) { if (supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheIsMatch(pCur->wszPath, pawcDir, cwcDir)) { if (pCur->wszPath[cwcDir] == '\\' || pCur->wszPath[cwcDir] == '/') { if (RTUtf16ICmpAscii(&pCur->wszPath[cwcDir + 1], pszName)) { return pCur; } } } } pCur = pCur->pNext; } return NULL; } /** * Schedules the import DLLs for verification and entry into the cache. * * @param hLdrMod The loader module which imports should be * scheduled for verification. * @param pwszName The full NT path of the module. */ DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName) { /* * Any imports? */ uint32_t cImports; int rc = RTLdrQueryPropEx(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_IMPORT_COUNT, NULL /*pvBits*/, &cImports, sizeof(cImports), NULL); if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) { if (cImports) { /* * Figure out the DLL directory from pwszName. */ PCRTUTF16 pawcDir = pwszName; uint32_t cwcDir = 0; uint32_t i = 0; RTUTF16 wc; while ((wc = pawcDir[i++]) != '\0') if ((wc == '\\' || wc == '/' || wc == ':') && cwcDir + 2 != i) cwcDir = i - 1; if ( g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR) == cwcDir && supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheIsMatch(pawcDir, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcDir)) pawcDir = NULL; /* * Enumerate the imports. */ for (i = 0; i < cImports; i++) { union { char szName[256]; uint32_t iImport; } uBuf; uBuf.iImport = i; rc = RTLdrQueryPropEx(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_IMPORT_MODULE, NULL /*pvBits*/, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf), NULL); if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) { /* * Skip kernel32, ntdll and API set stuff. */ RTStrToLower(uBuf.szName); if ( RTStrCmp(uBuf.szName, "kernel32.dll") == 0 || RTStrCmp(uBuf.szName, "kernelbase.dll") == 0 || RTStrCmp(uBuf.szName, "ntdll.dll") == 0 || RTStrNCmp(uBuf.szName, RT_STR_TUPLE("api-ms-win-")) == 0 ) { continue; } /* * Skip to the next one if it's already in the cache. */ if (supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheLookupImport(g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), uBuf.szName) != NULL) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports: '%s' cached for system32\n", uBuf.szName)); continue; } if (supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheLookupImport(g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName, uBuf.szName) != NULL) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports: '%s' cached for appdir\n", uBuf.szName)); continue; } if (pawcDir && supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheLookupImport(pawcDir, cwcDir, uBuf.szName) != NULL) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports: '%s' cached for dll dir\n", uBuf.szName)); continue; } /* We could skip already scheduled modules, but that'll require serialization and extra work... */ /* * Add it to the todo list. */ SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports: Import todo: #%u '%s'.\n", i, uBuf.szName)); uint32_t cbName = (uint32_t)strlen(uBuf.szName) + 1; uint32_t cbNameAligned = RT_ALIGN_32(cbName, sizeof(RTUTF16)); uint32_t cbNeeded = RT_OFFSETOF(VERIFIERCACHEIMPORT, szName[cbNameAligned]) + (pawcDir ? (cwcDir + 1) * sizeof(RTUTF16) : 0); PVERIFIERCACHEIMPORT pImport = (PVERIFIERCACHEIMPORT)RTMemAllocZ(cbNeeded); if (pImport) { /* Init it. */ memcpy(pImport->szName, uBuf.szName, cbName); if (!pawcDir) { pImport->cwcAltSearchDir = 0; pImport->pwszAltSearchDir = NULL; } else { pImport->cwcAltSearchDir = cwcDir; pImport->pwszAltSearchDir = (PRTUTF16)&pImport->szName[cbNameAligned]; memcpy(pImport->pwszAltSearchDir, pawcDir, cwcDir * sizeof(RTUTF16)); pImport->pwszAltSearchDir[cwcDir] = '\0'; } /* Insert it. */ do pImport->pNext = g_pVerifierCacheTodoImports; while (!ASMAtomicCmpXchgPtr(&g_pVerifierCacheTodoImports, pImport, pImport->pNext)); } } else SUP_DPRINTF(("RTLDRPROP_IMPORT_MODULE failed with rc=%Rrc i=%#x on '%ls'\n", rc, i, pwszName)); } } else SUP_DPRINTF(("'%ls' has no imports\n", pwszName)); } else SUP_DPRINTF(("RTLDRPROP_IMPORT_COUNT failed with rc=%Rrc on '%ls'\n", rc, pwszName)); } /** * Processes the list of import todos. */ static void supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessImportTodos(void) { /* * Work until we've got nothing more todo. */ for (;;) { PVERIFIERCACHEIMPORT pTodo = ASMAtomicXchgPtrT(&g_pVerifierCacheTodoImports, NULL, PVERIFIERCACHEIMPORT); if (!pTodo) break; do { PVERIFIERCACHEIMPORT pCur = pTodo; pTodo = pTodo->pNext; /* * Not in the cached already? */ if ( !supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheLookupImport(g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pCur->szName) && !supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheLookupImport(g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName, pCur->szName) && ( pCur->cwcAltSearchDir == 0 || !supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheLookupImport(pCur->pwszAltSearchDir, pCur->cwcAltSearchDir, pCur->szName)) ) { /* * Try locate the imported DLL and open it. */ SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessImportTodos: Processing '%s'...\n", pCur->szName)); NTSTATUS rcNt; NTSTATUS rcNtRedir = 0x22222222; HANDLE hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; RTUTF16 wszPath[260 + 260]; /* Assumes we've limited the import name length to 256. */ AssertCompile(sizeof(wszPath) > sizeof(g_System32NtPath)); /* * Check for DLL isolation / redirection / mapping. */ size_t cwcName = 260; PRTUTF16 pwszName = &wszPath[0]; int rc = RTStrToUtf16Ex(pCur->szName, RTSTR_MAX, &pwszName, cwcName, &cwcName); if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) { UNICODE_STRING UniStrName; UniStrName.Buffer = wszPath; UniStrName.Length = (USHORT)cwcName * sizeof(WCHAR); UniStrName.MaximumLength = UniStrName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); UNICODE_STRING UniStrStatic; UniStrStatic.Buffer = &wszPath[cwcName + 1]; UniStrStatic.Length = 0; UniStrStatic.MaximumLength = (USHORT)(sizeof(wszPath) - cwcName * sizeof(WCHAR) - sizeof(WCHAR)); static UNICODE_STRING const s_DefaultSuffix = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L".dll"); UNICODE_STRING UniStrDynamic = { 0, 0, NULL }; PUNICODE_STRING pUniStrResult = NULL; rcNtRedir = RtlDosApplyFileIsolationRedirection_Ustr(1 /*fFlags*/, &UniStrName, (PUNICODE_STRING)&s_DefaultSuffix, &UniStrStatic, &UniStrDynamic, &pUniStrResult, NULL /*pNewFlags*/, NULL /*pcbFilename*/, NULL /*pcbNeeded*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNtRedir)) { IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, pUniStrResult, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_DATA | READ_CONTROL | SYNCHRONIZE, &ObjAttr, &Ios, NULL /* Allocation Size*/, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ, FILE_OPEN, FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL /*EaBuffer*/, 0 /*EaLength*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) rcNt = Ios.Status; if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { /* For accurate logging. */ size_t cwcCopy = RT_MIN(pUniStrResult->Length / sizeof(RTUTF16), RT_ELEMENTS(wszPath) - 1); memcpy(wszPath, pUniStrResult->Buffer, cwcCopy * sizeof(RTUTF16)); wszPath[cwcCopy] = '\0'; } else hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; RtlFreeUnicodeString(&UniStrDynamic); } } else SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessImportTodos: RTStrToUtf16Ex #1 failed: %Rrc\n", rc)); /* * If not something that gets remapped, do the half normal searching we need. */ if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { struct { PRTUTF16 pawcDir; uint32_t cwcDir; } Tmp, aDirs[] = { { g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR) }, { g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName - 1 }, { pCur->pwszAltSearchDir, pCur->cwcAltSearchDir }, }; /* Search System32 first, unless it's a 'V*' or 'm*' name, the latter for msvcrt. */ if ( pCur->szName[0] == 'v' || pCur->szName[0] == 'V' || pCur->szName[0] == 'm' || pCur->szName[0] == 'M') { Tmp = aDirs[0]; aDirs[0] = aDirs[1]; aDirs[1] = Tmp; } for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(aDirs); i++) { if (aDirs[i].pawcDir && aDirs[i].cwcDir && aDirs[i].cwcDir < RT_ELEMENTS(wszPath) / 3 * 2) { memcpy(wszPath, aDirs[i].pawcDir, aDirs[i].cwcDir * sizeof(RTUTF16)); uint32_t cwc = aDirs[i].cwcDir; wszPath[cwc++] = '\\'; cwcName = RT_ELEMENTS(wszPath) - cwc; pwszName = &wszPath[cwc]; rc = RTStrToUtf16Ex(pCur->szName, RTSTR_MAX, &pwszName, cwcName, &cwcName); if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) { IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; UNICODE_STRING NtName; NtName.Buffer = wszPath; NtName.Length = (USHORT)((cwc + cwcName) * sizeof(WCHAR)); NtName.MaximumLength = NtName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_DATA | READ_CONTROL | SYNCHRONIZE, &ObjAttr, &Ios, NULL /* Allocation Size*/, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ, FILE_OPEN, FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL /*EaBuffer*/, 0 /*EaLength*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) rcNt = Ios.Status; if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) break; hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; } else SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessImportTodos: RTStrToUtf16Ex #2 failed: %Rrc\n", rc)); } } } /* * If we successfully opened it, verify it and cache the result. */ if (hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessImportTodos: '%s' -> '%ls' [rcNtRedir=%#x]\n", pCur->szName, wszPath, rcNtRedir)); ULONG fAccess = 0; ULONG fProtect = 0; bool fCallRealApi = false; rcNt = supR3HardenedScreenImage(hFile, true /*fImage*/, false /*fIgnoreArch*/, &fAccess, &fProtect, &fCallRealApi, "Imports", false /*fAvoidWinVerifyTrust*/, NULL /*pfQuiet*/); NtClose(hFile); } else SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessImportTodos: Failed to locate '%s'\n", pCur->szName)); } else SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessImportTodos: '%s' is in the cache.\n", pCur->szName)); RTMemFree(pCur); } while (pTodo); } } /** * Processes the list of WinVerifyTrust todos. */ static void supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessWvtTodos(void) { PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY pReschedule = NULL; PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY volatile *ppReschedLastNext = NULL; /* * Work until we've got nothing more todo. */ for (;;) { if (!supHardenedWinIsWinVerifyTrustCallable()) break; PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY pTodo = ASMAtomicXchgPtrT(&g_pVerifierCacheTodoWvt, NULL, PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY); if (!pTodo) break; do { PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY pCur = pTodo; pTodo = pTodo->pNextTodoWvt; pCur->pNextTodoWvt = NULL; if ( !pCur->fWinVerifyTrust && RT_SUCCESS(pCur->rc)) { bool fWinVerifyTrust = false; int rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(pCur->hFile, pCur->wszPath, pCur->fFlags, pCur->rc, &fWinVerifyTrust, NULL /* pErrInfo*/); if (RT_FAILURE(rc) || fWinVerifyTrust) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessWvtTodos: %d (was %d) fWinVerifyTrust=%d for '%ls'\n", rc, pCur->rc, fWinVerifyTrust, pCur->wszPath)); pCur->fWinVerifyTrust = true; pCur->rc = rc; } else { /* Retry it at a later time. */ SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessWvtTodos: %d (was %d) fWinVerifyTrust=%d for '%ls' [rescheduled]\n", rc, pCur->rc, fWinVerifyTrust, pCur->wszPath)); if (!pReschedule) ppReschedLastNext = &pCur->pNextTodoWvt; pCur->pNextTodoWvt = pReschedule; } } /* else: already processed. */ } while (pTodo); } /* * Anything to reschedule. */ if (pReschedule) { do *ppReschedLastNext = g_pVerifierCacheTodoWvt; while (!ASMAtomicCmpXchgPtr(&g_pVerifierCacheTodoWvt, pReschedule, *ppReschedLastNext)); } } /** * Checks whether the path could be containing alternative 8.3 names generated * by NTFS, FAT, or other similar file systems. * * @returns Pointer to the first component that might be an 8.3 name, NULL if * not 8.3 path. * @param pwszPath The path to check. */ static PRTUTF16 supR3HardenedWinIsPossible8dot3Path(PCRTUTF16 pwszPath) { PCRTUTF16 pwszName = pwszPath; for (;;) { RTUTF16 wc = *pwszPath++; if (wc == '~') { /* Could check more here before jumping to conclusions... */ if (pwszPath - pwszName <= 8+1+3) return (PRTUTF16)pwszName; } else if (wc == '\\' || wc == '/' || wc == ':') pwszName = pwszPath; else if (wc == 0) break; } return NULL; } /** * Fixes up a path possibly containing one or more alternative 8-dot-3 style * components. * * The path is fixed up in place. Errors are ignored. * * @param hFile The handle to the file which path we're fixing up. * @param pUniStr The path to fix up. MaximumLength is the max buffer * length. */ static void supR3HardenedWinFix8dot3Path(HANDLE hFile, PUNICODE_STRING pUniStr) { /* * We could use FileNormalizedNameInformation here and slap the volume device * path in front of the result, but it's only supported since windows 8.0 * according to some docs... So we expand all supicious names. */ PRTUTF16 pwszFix = pUniStr->Buffer; while (*pwszFix) { pwszFix = supR3HardenedWinIsPossible8dot3Path(pwszFix); if (pwszFix == NULL) break; RTUTF16 wc; PRTUTF16 pwszFixEnd = pwszFix; while ((wc = *pwszFixEnd) != '\0' && wc != '\\' && wc != '/') pwszFixEnd++; if (wc == '\0') break; RTUTF16 const wcSaved = *pwszFix; *pwszFix = '\0'; /* paranoia. */ UNICODE_STRING NtDir; NtDir.Buffer = pUniStr->Buffer; NtDir.Length = NtDir.MaximumLength = (USHORT)((pwszFix - pUniStr->Buffer) * sizeof(WCHAR)); HANDLE hDir = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtDir, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hDir, FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &ObjAttr, &Ios, NULL /* Allocation Size*/, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL /*EaBuffer*/, 0 /*EaLength*/); *pwszFix = wcSaved; if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { union { FILE_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION Info; uint8_t abBuffer[sizeof(FILE_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION) + 2048 * sizeof(WCHAR)]; } uBuf; RT_ZERO(uBuf); IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; UNICODE_STRING NtFilterStr; NtFilterStr.Buffer = pwszFix; NtFilterStr.Length = (USHORT)((uintptr_t)pwszFixEnd - (uintptr_t)pwszFix); NtFilterStr.MaximumLength = NtFilterStr.Length; rcNt = NtQueryDirectoryFile(hDir, NULL /* Event */, NULL /* ApcRoutine */, NULL /* ApcContext */, &Ios, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR), FileBothDirectoryInformation, FALSE /*ReturnSingleEntry*/, &NtFilterStr, FALSE /*RestartScan */); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) && uBuf.Info.NextEntryOffset == 0) /* There shall only be one entry matching... */ { uint32_t offName = uBuf.Info.FileNameLength / sizeof(WCHAR); while (offName > 0 && uBuf.Info.FileName[offName - 1] != '\\' && uBuf.Info.FileName[offName - 1] != '/') offName--; uint32_t cwcNameNew = (uBuf.Info.FileNameLength / sizeof(WCHAR)) - offName; uint32_t cwcNameOld = pwszFixEnd - pwszFix; if (cwcNameOld == cwcNameNew) memcpy(pwszFix, &uBuf.Info.FileName[offName], cwcNameNew * sizeof(WCHAR)); else if ( pUniStr->Length + cwcNameNew * sizeof(WCHAR) - cwcNameOld * sizeof(WCHAR) + sizeof(WCHAR) <= pUniStr->MaximumLength) { size_t cwcLeft = pUniStr->Length - (pwszFixEnd - pUniStr->Buffer) * sizeof(WCHAR) + sizeof(WCHAR); memmove(&pwszFix[cwcNameNew], pwszFixEnd, cwcLeft * sizeof(WCHAR)); pUniStr->Length -= (USHORT)(cwcNameOld * sizeof(WCHAR)); pUniStr->Length += (USHORT)(cwcNameNew * sizeof(WCHAR)); pwszFixEnd -= cwcNameOld; pwszFixEnd -= cwcNameNew; memcpy(pwszFix, &uBuf.Info.FileName[offName], cwcNameNew * sizeof(WCHAR)); } /* else: ignore overflow. */ } /* else: ignore failure. */ NtClose(hDir); } /* Advance */ pwszFix = pwszFixEnd; } } /** * Screens an image file or file mapped with execute access. * * @returns NT status code. * @param hFile The file handle. * @param fImage Set if image file mapping being made * (NtCreateSection thing). * @param fIgnoreArch Using the DONT_RESOLVE_DLL_REFERENCES flag, * which also implies that DLL init / term code * isn't called, so the architecture should be * ignored. * @param pfAccess Pointer to the NtCreateSection access flags, * so we can modify them if necessary. * @param pfProtect Pointer to the NtCreateSection protection * flags, so we can modify them if necessary. * @param pfCallRealApi Whether it's ok to go on to the real API. * @param pszCaller Who is calling (for debugging / logging). * @param fAvoidWinVerifyTrust Whether we should avoid WinVerifyTrust. * @param pfQuiet Where to return whether to be quiet about * this image in the log (i.e. we've seen it * lots of times already). Optional. */ static NTSTATUS supR3HardenedScreenImage(HANDLE hFile, bool fImage, bool fIgnoreArch, PULONG pfAccess, PULONG pfProtect, bool *pfCallRealApi, const char *pszCaller, bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, bool *pfQuiet) { *pfCallRealApi = false; if (pfQuiet) *pfQuiet = false; /* * Query the name of the file, making sure to zero terminator the * string. (2nd half of buffer is used for error info, see below.) */ union { UNICODE_STRING UniStr; uint8_t abBuffer[sizeof(UNICODE_STRING) + 2048 * sizeof(WCHAR)]; } uBuf; RT_ZERO(uBuf); ULONG cbNameBuf; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile, ObjectNameInformation, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR) - 128, &cbNameBuf); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: NtQueryObject -> %#x (fImage=%d fProtect=%#x fAccess=%#x)\n", pszCaller, fImage, *pfProtect, *pfAccess); return rcNt; } if (supR3HardenedWinIsPossible8dot3Path(uBuf.UniStr.Buffer)) { uBuf.UniStr.MaximumLength = sizeof(uBuf) - 128; supR3HardenedWinFix8dot3Path(hFile, &uBuf.UniStr); } /* * Check the cache. */ PVERIFIERCACHEENTRY pCacheHit = supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheLookup(&uBuf.UniStr, hFile); if (pCacheHit) { /* Do hit accounting and figure whether we need to be quiet or not. */ uint32_t cHits = ASMAtomicIncU32(&pCacheHit->cHits); bool const fQuiet = cHits >= 8 && !RT_IS_POWER_OF_TWO(cHits); if (pfQuiet) *pfQuiet = fQuiet; /* If we haven't done the WinVerifyTrust thing, do it if we can. */ if ( !pCacheHit->fWinVerifyTrust && RT_SUCCESS(pCacheHit->rc) && supHardenedWinIsWinVerifyTrustCallable() ) { if (!fAvoidWinVerifyTrust) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: cache hit (%Rrc) on %ls [redoing WinVerifyTrust]\n", pszCaller, pCacheHit->rc, pCacheHit->wszPath)); bool fWinVerifyTrust = false; int rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(pCacheHit->hFile, pCacheHit->wszPath, pCacheHit->fFlags, pCacheHit->rc, &fWinVerifyTrust, NULL /* pErrInfo*/); if (RT_FAILURE(rc) || fWinVerifyTrust) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: %d (was %d) fWinVerifyTrust=%d for '%ls'\n", pszCaller, rc, pCacheHit->rc, fWinVerifyTrust, pCacheHit->wszPath)); pCacheHit->fWinVerifyTrust = true; pCacheHit->rc = rc; } else SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: WinVerifyTrust not available, rescheduling %ls\n", pszCaller, pCacheHit->wszPath)); } else SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: cache hit (%Rrc) on %ls [avoiding WinVerifyTrust]\n", pszCaller, pCacheHit->rc, pCacheHit->wszPath)); } else if (!fQuiet || !pCacheHit->fWinVerifyTrust) SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: cache hit (%Rrc) on %ls%s\n", pszCaller, pCacheHit->rc, pCacheHit->wszPath, pCacheHit->fWinVerifyTrust ? "" : " [lacks WinVerifyTrust]")); /* Return the cached value. */ if (RT_SUCCESS(pCacheHit->rc)) { *pfCallRealApi = true; return STATUS_SUCCESS; } if (!fQuiet) supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: cached rc=%Rrc fImage=%d fProtect=%#x fAccess=%#x cHits=%u %ls\n", pszCaller, pCacheHit->rc, fImage, *pfProtect, *pfAccess, cHits, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer); return STATUS_TRUST_FAILURE; } /* * On XP the loader might hand us handles with just FILE_EXECUTE and * SYNCHRONIZE, the means reading will fail later on. Also, we need * READ_CONTROL access to check the file ownership later on, and non * of the OS versions seems be giving us that. So, in effect we * more or less always reopen the file here. */ HANDLE hMyFile = NULL; rcNt = NtDuplicateObject(NtCurrentProcess(), hFile, NtCurrentProcess(), &hMyFile, FILE_READ_DATA | READ_CONTROL | SYNCHRONIZE, 0 /* Handle attributes*/, 0 /* Options */); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { if (rcNt == STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED) { IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &uBuf.UniStr, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hMyFile, FILE_READ_DATA | READ_CONTROL | SYNCHRONIZE, &ObjAttr, &Ios, NULL /* Allocation Size*/, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ, FILE_OPEN, FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL /*EaBuffer*/, 0 /*EaLength*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) rcNt = Ios.Status; if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: Failed to duplicate and open the file: rcNt=%#x hFile=%p %ls\n", pszCaller, rcNt, hFile, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer); return rcNt; } /* Check that we've got the same file. */ LARGE_INTEGER idMyFile, idInFile; bool fMyValid = supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheGetIndexNumber(hMyFile, &idMyFile); bool fInValid = supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheGetIndexNumber(hFile, &idInFile); if ( fMyValid && ( fMyValid != fInValid || idMyFile.QuadPart != idInFile.QuadPart)) { supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: Re-opened has different ID that input: %#llx vx %#llx (%ls)\n", pszCaller, rcNt, idMyFile.QuadPart, idInFile.QuadPart, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer); NtClose(hMyFile); return STATUS_TRUST_FAILURE; } } else { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: NtDuplicateObject -> %#x\n", pszCaller, rcNt)); #ifdef DEBUG supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: NtDuplicateObject(,%#x,) failed: %#x\n", pszCaller, hFile, rcNt); #endif hMyFile = hFile; } } /* * Special Kludge for Windows XP and W2K3 and their stupid attempts * at mapping a hidden XML file called c:\Windows\WindowsShell.Manifest * with executable access. The image bit isn't set, fortunately. */ if ( !fImage && uBuf.UniStr.Length > g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"System32") + sizeof(WCHAR) && memcmp(uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"System32") + sizeof(WCHAR)) == 0) { PRTUTF16 pwszName = &uBuf.UniStr.Buffer[(g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"System32") + sizeof(WCHAR)) / sizeof(WCHAR)]; if (RTUtf16ICmpAscii(pwszName, "WindowsShell.Manifest") == 0) { /* * Drop all executable access to the mapping and let it continue. */ SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: Applying the drop-exec-kludge for '%ls'\n", pszCaller, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer)); if (*pfAccess & SECTION_MAP_EXECUTE) *pfAccess = (*pfAccess & ~SECTION_MAP_EXECUTE) | SECTION_MAP_READ; if (*pfProtect & PAGE_EXECUTE) *pfProtect = (*pfProtect & ~PAGE_EXECUTE) | PAGE_READONLY; *pfProtect = (*pfProtect & ~UINT32_C(0xf0)) | ((*pfProtect & UINT32_C(0xe0)) >> 4); if (hMyFile != hFile) NtClose(hMyFile); *pfCallRealApi = true; return STATUS_SUCCESS; } } #ifndef VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE /* * Check the path. We don't allow DLLs to be loaded from just anywhere: * 1. System32 - normal code or cat signing, owner TrustedInstaller. * 2. WinSxS - normal code or cat signing, owner TrustedInstaller. * 3. VirtualBox - kernel code signing and integrity checks. * 4. AppPatchDir - normal code or cat signing, owner TrustedInstaller. * 5. Program Files - normal code or cat signing, owner TrustedInstaller. * 6. Common Files - normal code or cat signing, owner TrustedInstaller. * 7. x86 variations of 4 & 5 - ditto. */ Assert(g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer[g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName - 1] == '\\'); uint32_t fFlags = 0; if (supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(&uBuf.UniStr, &g_System32NtPath.UniStr, true /*fCheckSlash*/)) fFlags |= SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION | SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER; else if (supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(&uBuf.UniStr, &g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr, true /*fCheckSlash*/)) fFlags |= SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION | SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER; else if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName, false /*fCheckSlash*/)) fFlags |= SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING | SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT; # ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE else if (supHardViIsAppPatchDir(uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR))) fFlags |= SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION | SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER; else if (supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(&uBuf.UniStr, &g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr, true /*fCheckSlash*/)) fFlags |= SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION | SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER; else if (supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(&uBuf.UniStr, &g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr, true /*fCheckSlash*/)) fFlags |= SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION | SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER; # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 else if (supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(&uBuf.UniStr, &g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr, true /*fCheckSlash*/)) fFlags |= SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION | SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER; else if (supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(&uBuf.UniStr, &g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr, true /*fCheckSlash*/)) fFlags |= SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION | SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER; # endif # endif # ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_VISUAL_STUDIO_PROFILING /* Hack to allow profiling our code with Visual Studio. */ else if ( uBuf.UniStr.Length > sizeof(L"\\SamplingRuntime.dll") && memcmp(uBuf.UniStr.Buffer + (uBuf.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"\\SamplingRuntime.dll") + sizeof(WCHAR)) / sizeof(WCHAR), L"\\SamplingRuntime.dll", sizeof(L"\\SamplingRuntime.dll") - sizeof(WCHAR)) == 0 ) { if (hMyFile != hFile) NtClose(hMyFile); *pfCallRealApi = true; return STATUS_SUCCESS; } # endif else { supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: Not a trusted location: '%ls' (fImage=%d fProtect=%#x fAccess=%#x)\n", pszCaller, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, fImage, *pfAccess, *pfProtect); if (hMyFile != hFile) NtClose(hMyFile); return STATUS_TRUST_FAILURE; } #else /* VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */ /* * Require trusted installer + some kind of signature on everything, except * for the VBox bits where we require kernel code signing and special * integrity checks. */ Assert(g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer[g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName - 1] == '\\'); uint32_t fFlags = 0; if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName, false /*fCheckSlash*/)) fFlags |= SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING | SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT; else fFlags |= SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION | SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER; #endif /* VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */ /* * Do the verification. For better error message we borrow what's * left of the path buffer for an RTERRINFO buffer. */ if (fIgnoreArch) fFlags |= SUPHNTVI_F_IGNORE_ARCHITECTURE; RTERRINFO ErrInfo; RTErrInfoInit(&ErrInfo, (char *)&uBuf.abBuffer[cbNameBuf], sizeof(uBuf) - cbNameBuf); int rc; bool fWinVerifyTrust = false; rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(hMyFile, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, fFlags, fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, &fWinVerifyTrust, &ErrInfo); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) { supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedScreenImage/%s: rc=%Rrc fImage=%d fProtect=%#x fAccess=%#x %ls: %s\n", pszCaller, rc, fImage, *pfAccess, *pfProtect, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, ErrInfo.pszMsg); if (hMyFile != hFile) supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheInsert(&uBuf.UniStr, hMyFile, rc, fWinVerifyTrust, fFlags); return STATUS_TRUST_FAILURE; } /* * Insert into the cache. */ if (hMyFile != hFile) supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheInsert(&uBuf.UniStr, hMyFile, rc, fWinVerifyTrust, fFlags); *pfCallRealApi = true; return STATUS_SUCCESS; } /** * Preloads a file into the verify cache if possible. * * This is used to avoid known cyclic LoadLibrary issues with WinVerifyTrust. * * @param pwszName The name of the DLL to verify. */ DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(PCRTUTF16 pwszName) { HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; UNICODE_STRING UniStr; UniStr.Buffer = (PWCHAR)pwszName; UniStr.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(pwszName) * sizeof(WCHAR)); UniStr.MaximumLength = UniStr.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &UniStr, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_DATA | READ_CONTROL | SYNCHRONIZE, &ObjAttr, &Ios, NULL /* Allocation Size*/, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ, FILE_OPEN, FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL /*EaBuffer*/, 0 /*EaLength*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) rcNt = Ios.Status; if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload: Error %#x opening '%ls'.\n", rcNt, pwszName)); return; } ULONG fAccess = 0; ULONG fProtect = 0; bool fCallRealApi; //SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload: scanning %ls\n", pwszName)); supR3HardenedScreenImage(hFile, false, false /*fIgnoreArch*/, &fAccess, &fProtect, &fCallRealApi, "preload", false /*fAvoidWinVerifyTrust*/, NULL /*pfQuiet*/); //SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload: done %ls\n", pwszName)); NtClose(hFile); } /** * Hook that monitors NtCreateSection calls. * * @returns NT status code. * @param phSection Where to return the section handle. * @param fAccess The desired access. * @param pObjAttribs The object attributes (optional). * @param pcbSection The section size (optional). * @param fProtect The max section protection. * @param fAttribs The section attributes. * @param hFile The file to create a section from (optional). */ static NTSTATUS NTAPI supR3HardenedMonitor_NtCreateSection(PHANDLE phSection, ACCESS_MASK fAccess, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES pObjAttribs, PLARGE_INTEGER pcbSection, ULONG fProtect, ULONG fAttribs, HANDLE hFile) { if ( hFile != NULL && hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { bool const fImage = RT_BOOL(fAttribs & (SEC_IMAGE | SEC_PROTECTED_IMAGE)); bool const fExecMap = RT_BOOL(fAccess & SECTION_MAP_EXECUTE); bool const fExecProt = RT_BOOL(fProtect & (PAGE_EXECUTE | PAGE_EXECUTE_READ | PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY | PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)); if (fImage || fExecMap || fExecProt) { DWORD dwSavedLastError = RtlGetLastWin32Error(); bool fCallRealApi; //SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_NtCreateSection: 1\n")); NTSTATUS rcNt = supR3HardenedScreenImage(hFile, fImage, true /*fIgnoreArch*/, &fAccess, &fProtect, &fCallRealApi, "NtCreateSection", true /*fAvoidWinVerifyTrust*/, NULL /*pfQuiet*/); //SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_NtCreateSection: 2 rcNt=%#x fCallRealApi=%#x\n", rcNt, fCallRealApi)); RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) return rcNt; Assert(fCallRealApi); if (!fCallRealApi) return STATUS_TRUST_FAILURE; } } /* * Call checked out OK, call the original. */ return g_pfnNtCreateSectionReal(phSection, fAccess, pObjAttribs, pcbSection, fProtect, fAttribs, hFile); } /** * Helper for supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll. * * @returns NT status code. * @param pwszPath The path destination buffer. * @param cwcPath The size of the path buffer. * @param pUniStrResult The result string. * @param pOrgName The orignal name (for errors). * @param pcwc Where to return the actual length. */ static NTSTATUS supR3HardenedCopyRedirectionResult(WCHAR *pwszPath, size_t cwcPath, PUNICODE_STRING pUniStrResult, PUNICODE_STRING pOrgName, UINT *pcwc) { UINT cwc; *pcwc = cwc = pUniStrResult->Length / sizeof(WCHAR); if (pUniStrResult->Buffer == pwszPath) pwszPath[cwc] = '\0'; else { if (cwc > cwcPath - 1) { supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: Name too long: %.*ls -> %.*ls (RtlDosApplyFileIoslationRedirection_Ustr)\n", pOrgName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pOrgName->Buffer, pUniStrResult->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pUniStrResult->Buffer); return STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG; } memcpy(&pwszPath[0], pUniStrResult->Buffer, pUniStrResult->Length); pwszPath[cwc] = '\0'; } return STATUS_SUCCESS; } /** * Hooks that intercepts LdrLoadDll calls. * * Two purposes: * -# Enforce our own search path restrictions. * -# Prevalidate DLLs about to be loaded so we don't upset the loader data * by doing it from within the NtCreateSection hook (WinVerifyTrust * seems to be doing harm there on W7/32). * * @returns * @param pwszSearchPath The search path to use. * @param pfFlags Flags on input. DLL characteristics or something * on return? * @param pName The name of the module. * @param phMod Where the handle of the loaded DLL is to be * returned to the caller. */ static NTSTATUS NTAPI supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll(PWSTR pwszSearchPath, PULONG pfFlags, PUNICODE_STRING pName, PHANDLE phMod) { DWORD dwSavedLastError = RtlGetLastWin32Error(); PUNICODE_STRING const pOrgName = pName; NTSTATUS rcNt; /* * Make sure the DLL notification callback is registered. If we could, we * would've done this during early process init, but due to lack of heap * and uninitialized loader lock, it's not possible that early on. * * The callback protects our NtDll hooks from getting unhooked by * "friendly" fire from the AV crowd. */ supR3HardenedWinRegisterDllNotificationCallback(); /* * Process WinVerifyTrust todo before and after. */ supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessWvtTodos(); /* * Reject things we don't want to deal with. */ if (!pName || pName->Length == 0) { supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: name is NULL or have a zero length.\n"); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: returns rcNt=%#x (pName=%p)\n", STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER, pName)); RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } /*SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: pName=%.*ls *pfFlags=%#x pwszSearchPath=%p:%ls\n", (unsigned)pName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pName->Buffer, pfFlags ? *pfFlags : UINT32_MAX, pwszSearchPath, !((uintptr_t)pwszSearchPath & 1) && (uintptr_t)pwszSearchPath >= 0x2000U ? pwszSearchPath : L""));*/ /* * Reject long paths that's close to the 260 limit without looking. */ if (pName->Length > 256 * sizeof(WCHAR)) { supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: too long name: %#x bytes\n", pName->Length); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: returns rcNt=%#x\n", STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG)); RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); return STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG; } /* * Absolute path? */ NTSTATUS rcNtResolve = STATUS_SUCCESS; bool fSkipValidation = false; bool fCheckIfLoaded = false; WCHAR wszPath[260]; static UNICODE_STRING const s_DefaultSuffix = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L".dll"); UNICODE_STRING UniStrStatic = { 0, (USHORT)sizeof(wszPath) - sizeof(WCHAR), wszPath }; UNICODE_STRING UniStrDynamic = { 0, 0, NULL }; PUNICODE_STRING pUniStrResult = NULL; UNICODE_STRING ResolvedName; if ( ( pName->Length >= 4 * sizeof(WCHAR) && RT_C_IS_ALPHA(pName->Buffer[0]) && pName->Buffer[1] == ':' && RTPATH_IS_SLASH(pName->Buffer[2]) ) || ( pName->Length >= 1 * sizeof(WCHAR) && RTPATH_IS_SLASH(pName->Buffer[1]) ) ) { rcNtResolve = RtlDosApplyFileIsolationRedirection_Ustr(1 /*fFlags*/, pName, (PUNICODE_STRING)&s_DefaultSuffix, &UniStrStatic, &UniStrDynamic, &pUniStrResult, NULL /*pNewFlags*/, NULL /*pcbFilename*/, NULL /*pcbNeeded*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNtResolve)) { UINT cwc; rcNt = supR3HardenedCopyRedirectionResult(wszPath, RT_ELEMENTS(wszPath), pUniStrResult, pName, &cwc); RtlFreeUnicodeString(&UniStrDynamic); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: returns rcNt=%#x\n", rcNt)); RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); return rcNt; } ResolvedName.Buffer = wszPath; ResolvedName.Length = (USHORT)(cwc * sizeof(WCHAR)); ResolvedName.MaximumLength = ResolvedName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: '%.*ls' -> '%.*ls' [redir]\n", (unsigned)pName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pName->Buffer, ResolvedName.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), ResolvedName.Buffer, rcNt)); pName = &ResolvedName; } else { memcpy(wszPath, pName->Buffer, pName->Length); wszPath[pName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0'; } } /* * Not an absolute path. Check if it's one of those special API set DLLs * or something we're known to use but should be taken from WinSxS. */ else if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pName->Buffer, pName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), L"api-ms-win-", 11, false /*fCheckSlash*/)) { memcpy(wszPath, pName->Buffer, pName->Length); wszPath[pName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0'; fSkipValidation = true; } /* * Not an absolute path or special API set. There are two alternatives * now, either there is no path at all or there is a relative path. We * will resolve it to an absolute path in either case, failing the call * if we can't. */ else { PCWCHAR pawcName = pName->Buffer; uint32_t cwcName = pName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR); uint32_t offLastSlash = UINT32_MAX; uint32_t offLastDot = UINT32_MAX; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < cwcName; i++) switch (pawcName[i]) { case '\\': case '/': offLastSlash = i; offLastDot = UINT32_MAX; break; case '.': offLastDot = i; break; } bool const fNeedDllSuffix = offLastDot == UINT32_MAX && offLastSlash == UINT32_MAX; if (offLastDot != UINT32_MAX && offLastDot == cwcName - 1) cwcName--; /* * Reject relative paths for now as they might be breakout attempts. */ if (offLastSlash != UINT32_MAX) { supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: relative name not permitted: %.*ls\n", cwcName, pawcName); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: returns rcNt=%#x\n", STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID)); RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID; } /* * Perform dll redirection to WinSxS such. We using an undocumented * API here, which as always is a bit risky... ASSUMES that the API * returns a full DOS path. */ UINT cwc; rcNtResolve = RtlDosApplyFileIsolationRedirection_Ustr(1 /*fFlags*/, pName, (PUNICODE_STRING)&s_DefaultSuffix, &UniStrStatic, &UniStrDynamic, &pUniStrResult, NULL /*pNewFlags*/, NULL /*pcbFilename*/, NULL /*pcbNeeded*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNtResolve)) { rcNt = supR3HardenedCopyRedirectionResult(wszPath, RT_ELEMENTS(wszPath), pUniStrResult, pName, &cwc); RtlFreeUnicodeString(&UniStrDynamic); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: returns rcNt=%#x\n", rcNt)); RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); return rcNt; } } else { /* * Search for the DLL. Only System32 is allowed as the target of * a search on the API level, all VBox calls will have full paths. * If the DLL is not in System32, we will resort to check if it's * refering to an already loaded DLL (fCheckIfLoaded). */ AssertCompile(sizeof(g_System32WinPath.awcBuffer) <= sizeof(wszPath)); cwc = g_System32WinPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(RTUTF16); Assert(cwc > 2); if (cwc + 1 + cwcName + fNeedDllSuffix * 4 >= RT_ELEMENTS(wszPath)) { supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: Name too long (system32): %.*ls\n", cwcName, pawcName); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: returns rcNt=%#x\n", STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG)); RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); return STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG; } memcpy(wszPath, g_System32WinPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwc * sizeof(RTUTF16)); wszPath[cwc++] = '\\'; memcpy(&wszPath[cwc], pawcName, cwcName * sizeof(WCHAR)); cwc += cwcName; if (!fNeedDllSuffix) wszPath[cwc] = '\0'; else { memcpy(&wszPath[cwc], L".dll", 5 * sizeof(WCHAR)); cwc += 4; } fCheckIfLoaded = true; } ResolvedName.Buffer = wszPath; ResolvedName.Length = (USHORT)(cwc * sizeof(WCHAR)); ResolvedName.MaximumLength = ResolvedName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); pName = &ResolvedName; } bool fQuiet = false; if (!fSkipValidation) { /* * Try open the file. If this fails, never mind, just pass it on to * the real API as we've replaced any searchable name with a full name * and the real API can come up with a fitting status code for it. */ HANDLE hRootDir; UNICODE_STRING NtPathUniStr; int rc = RTNtPathFromWinUtf16Ex(&NtPathUniStr, &hRootDir, wszPath, RTSTR_MAX); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) { supR3HardenedError(rc, false, "supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: RTNtPathFromWinUtf16Ex failed on '%ls': %Rrc\n", wszPath, rc); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: returns rcNt=%#x\n", STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID)); RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID; } HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtPathUniStr, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, hRootDir, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_DATA | READ_CONTROL | SYNCHRONIZE, &ObjAttr, &Ios, NULL /* Allocation Size*/, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ, FILE_OPEN, FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL /*EaBuffer*/, 0 /*EaLength*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) rcNt = Ios.Status; if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { ULONG fAccess = 0; ULONG fProtect = 0; bool fCallRealApi = false; rcNt = supR3HardenedScreenImage(hFile, true /*fImage*/, RT_VALID_PTR(pfFlags) && (*pfFlags & 0x2) /*fIgnoreArch*/, &fAccess, &fProtect, &fCallRealApi, "LdrLoadDll", false /*fAvoidWinVerifyTrust*/, &fQuiet); NtClose(hFile); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { if (!fQuiet) { if (pOrgName != pName) supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: rejecting '%ls': rcNt=%#x\n", wszPath, rcNt); else supR3HardenedError(VINF_SUCCESS, false, "supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: rejecting '%ls' (%.*ls): rcNt=%#x\n", wszPath, pOrgName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pOrgName->Buffer, rcNt); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: returns rcNt=%#x '%ls'\n", rcNt, wszPath)); } RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); return rcNt; } supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessImportTodos(); } else { DWORD dwErr = RtlGetLastWin32Error(); /* * Deal with special case where the caller (first case was MS LifeCam) * is using LoadLibrary instead of GetModuleHandle to find a loaded DLL. */ NTSTATUS rcNtGetDll = STATUS_SUCCESS; if ( fCheckIfLoaded && ( rcNt == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND || rcNt == STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND)) { rcNtGetDll = LdrGetDllHandle(NULL /*DllPath*/, NULL /*pfFlags*/, pOrgName, phMod); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNtGetDll)) { RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); return rcNtGetDll; } } SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: error opening '%ls': %u (NtPath=%.*ls; Input=%.*ls; rcNtGetDll=%#x\n", wszPath, dwErr, NtPathUniStr.Length / sizeof(RTUTF16), NtPathUniStr.Buffer, pOrgName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pOrgName->Buffer, rcNtGetDll)); } RTNtPathFree(&NtPathUniStr, &hRootDir); } /* * Screened successfully enough. Call the real thing. */ if (!fQuiet) { if (pOrgName != pName) SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: pName=%.*ls (Input=%.*ls, rcNtResolve=%#x) *pfFlags=%#x pwszSearchPath=%p:%ls [calling]\n", (unsigned)pName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pName->Buffer, (unsigned)pOrgName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pOrgName->Buffer, rcNtResolve, pfFlags ? *pfFlags : UINT32_MAX, pwszSearchPath, !((uintptr_t)pwszSearchPath & 1) && (uintptr_t)pwszSearchPath >= 0x2000U ? pwszSearchPath : L"")); else SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: pName=%.*ls (rcNtResolve=%#x) *pfFlags=%#x pwszSearchPath=%p:%ls [calling]\n", (unsigned)pName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pName->Buffer, rcNtResolve, pfFlags ? *pfFlags : UINT32_MAX, pwszSearchPath, !((uintptr_t)pwszSearchPath & 1) && (uintptr_t)pwszSearchPath >= 0x2000U ? pwszSearchPath : L"")); } RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); rcNt = g_pfnLdrLoadDllReal(pwszSearchPath, pfFlags, pName, phMod); /* * Log the result and process pending WinVerifyTrust work if we can. */ dwSavedLastError = RtlGetLastWin32Error(); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) && phMod) SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: returns rcNt=%#x hMod=%p '%ls'\n", rcNt, *phMod, wszPath)); else if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) || !fQuiet) SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll: returns rcNt=%#x '%ls'\n", rcNt, wszPath)); supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheProcessWvtTodos(); RtlRestoreLastWin32Error(dwSavedLastError); return rcNt; } /** * DLL load and unload notification callback. * * This is a safety against our LdrLoadDll hook being replaced by protection * software. Though, we prefer the LdrLoadDll hook to this one as it allows us * to call WinVerifyTrust more freely. * * @param ulReason The reason we're called, see * LDR_DLL_NOTIFICATION_REASON_XXX. * @param pData Reason specific data. (Format is currently the same for * both load and unload.) * @param pvUser User parameter (ignored). * * @remarks Vista and later. * @remarks The loader lock is held when we're called, at least on Windows 7. */ static VOID CALLBACK supR3HardenedDllNotificationCallback(ULONG ulReason, PCLDR_DLL_NOTIFICATION_DATA pData, PVOID pvUser) { NOREF(pvUser); /* * Screen the image on load. We will normally get a verification cache * hit here because of the LdrLoadDll and NtCreateSection hooks, so it * should be relatively cheap to recheck. In case our NtDll patches * got re * * This ASSUMES that we get informed after the fact as indicated by the * available documentation. */ if (ulReason == LDR_DLL_NOTIFICATION_REASON_LOADED) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedDllNotificationCallback: load %p LB %#010x %.*ls [fFlags=%#x]\n", pData->Loaded.DllBase, pData->Loaded.SizeOfImage, pData->Loaded.FullDllName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pData->Loaded.FullDllName->Buffer, pData->Loaded.Flags)); /* Convert the windows path to an NT path and open it. */ HANDLE hRootDir; UNICODE_STRING NtPathUniStr; int rc = RTNtPathFromWinUtf16Ex(&NtPathUniStr, &hRootDir, pData->Loaded.FullDllName->Buffer, pData->Loaded.FullDllName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) { supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedDllNotificationCallback: RTNtPathFromWinUtf16Ex failed on '%.*ls': %Rrc\n", pData->Loaded.FullDllName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pData->Loaded.FullDllName->Buffer, rc); return; } HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtPathUniStr, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, hRootDir, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_DATA | READ_CONTROL | SYNCHRONIZE, &ObjAttr, &Ios, NULL /* Allocation Size*/, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ, FILE_OPEN, FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL /*EaBuffer*/, 0 /*EaLength*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) rcNt = Ios.Status; if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedDllNotificationCallback: NtCreateFile failed on '%.*ls' / '%.*ls': %#x\n", pData->Loaded.FullDllName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pData->Loaded.FullDllName->Buffer, NtPathUniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), NtPathUniStr.Buffer, rcNt); RTNtPathFree(&NtPathUniStr, &hRootDir); return; } /* Do the screening. */ ULONG fAccess = 0; ULONG fProtect = 0; bool fCallRealApi = false; bool fQuietFailure = false; rcNt = supR3HardenedScreenImage(hFile, true /*fImage*/, true /*fIgnoreArch*/, &fAccess, &fProtect, &fCallRealApi, "LdrLoadDll", true /*fAvoidWinVerifyTrust*/, &fQuietFailure); NtClose(hFile); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedDllNotificationCallback: supR3HardenedScreenImage failed on '%.*ls' / '%.*ls': %#x\n", pData->Loaded.FullDllName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pData->Loaded.FullDllName->Buffer, NtPathUniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), NtPathUniStr.Buffer, rcNt); RTNtPathFree(&NtPathUniStr, &hRootDir); return; } RTNtPathFree(&NtPathUniStr, &hRootDir); } /* * Log the unload call. */ else if (ulReason == LDR_DLL_NOTIFICATION_REASON_UNLOADED) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedDllNotificationCallback: Unload %p LB %#010x %.*ls [flags=%#x]\n", pData->Unloaded.DllBase, pData->Unloaded.SizeOfImage, pData->Unloaded.FullDllName->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pData->Unloaded.FullDllName->Buffer, pData->Unloaded.Flags)); } /* * Just log things we don't know and then return without caching anything. */ else { static uint32_t s_cLogEntries = 0; if (s_cLogEntries++ < 32) SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedDllNotificationCallback: ulReason=%u pData=%p\n", ulReason, pData)); return; } /* * Use this opportunity to make sure our NtDll patches are still in place, * since they may be replaced by indecent protection software solutions. */ supR3HardenedWinReInstallHooks(false /*fFirstCall */); } /** * Registers the DLL notification callback if it hasn't already been registered. */ static void supR3HardenedWinRegisterDllNotificationCallback(void) { /* * The notification API was added in Vista, so it's an optional (weak) import. */ if ( LdrRegisterDllNotification != NULL && g_cDllNotificationRegistered <= 0 && g_cDllNotificationRegistered > -32) { NTSTATUS rcNt = LdrRegisterDllNotification(0, supR3HardenedDllNotificationCallback, NULL, &g_pvDllNotificationCookie); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { SUP_DPRINTF(("Registered Dll notification callback with NTDLL.\n")); g_cDllNotificationRegistered = 1; } else { supR3HardenedError(rcNt, false /*fFatal*/, "LdrRegisterDllNotification failed: %#x\n", rcNt); g_cDllNotificationRegistered--; } } } static void supR3HardenedWinHookFailed(const char *pszWhich, uint8_t const *pbPrologue) { supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinInstallHooks", kSupInitOp_Misc, VERR_NO_MEMORY, "Failed to install %s monitor: %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %x %x\n " #ifdef RT_ARCH_X86 "(It is also possible you are running 32-bit VirtualBox under 64-bit windows.)\n" #endif , pszWhich, pbPrologue[0], pbPrologue[1], pbPrologue[2], pbPrologue[3], pbPrologue[4], pbPrologue[5], pbPrologue[6], pbPrologue[7], pbPrologue[8], pbPrologue[9], pbPrologue[10], pbPrologue[11], pbPrologue[12], pbPrologue[13], pbPrologue[14], pbPrologue[15]); } /** * IPRT thread that waits for the parent process to terminate and reacts by * exiting the current process. * * @returns VINF_SUCCESS * @param hSelf The current thread. Ignored. * @param pvUser The handle of the parent process. */ static DECLCALLBACK(int) supR3HardenedWinParentWatcherThread(RTTHREAD hSelf, void *pvUser) { HANDLE hProcWait = (HANDLE)pvUser; NOREF(hSelf); /* * Wait for the parent to terminate. */ NTSTATUS rcNt; for (;;) { rcNt = NtWaitForSingleObject(hProcWait, TRUE /*Alertable*/, NULL /*pTimeout*/); if ( rcNt == STATUS_WAIT_0 || rcNt == STATUS_ABANDONED_WAIT_0) break; if ( rcNt != STATUS_TIMEOUT && rcNt != STATUS_USER_APC && rcNt != STATUS_ALERTED) supR3HardenedFatal("NtWaitForSingleObject returned %#x\n", rcNt); } /* * Proxy the termination code of the child, if it exited already. */ PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION BasicInfo; NTSTATUS rcNt2 = NtQueryInformationProcess(hProcWait, ProcessBasicInformation, &BasicInfo, sizeof(BasicInfo), NULL); if ( !NT_SUCCESS(rcNt2) || BasicInfo.ExitStatus == STATUS_PENDING) BasicInfo.ExitStatus = RTEXITCODE_FAILURE; NtClose(hProcWait); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinParentWatcherThread: Quitting: ExitCode=%#x rcNt=%#x\n", BasicInfo.ExitStatus, rcNt)); suplibHardenedExit((RTEXITCODE)BasicInfo.ExitStatus); return VINF_SUCCESS; /* won't be reached. */ } /** * Creates the parent watcher thread that will make sure this process exits when * the parent does. * * This is a necessary evil to make VBoxNetDhcp and VBoxNetNat termination from * Main work without too much new magic. It also makes Ctrl-C or similar work * in on the hardened processes in the windows console. * * @param hVBoxRT The VBoxRT.dll handle. We use RTThreadCreate to * spawn the thread to avoid duplicating thread * creation and thread naming code from IPRT. */ DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinCreateParentWatcherThread(HMODULE hVBoxRT) { /* * Resolve runtime methods that we need. */ PFNRTTHREADCREATE pfnRTThreadCreate = (PFNRTTHREADCREATE)GetProcAddress(hVBoxRT, "RTThreadCreate"); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(pfnRTThreadCreate != NULL); /* * Find the parent process ID. */ PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION BasicInfo; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationProcess(NtCurrentProcess(), ProcessBasicInformation, &BasicInfo, sizeof(BasicInfo), NULL); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedWinCreateParentWatcherThread: NtQueryInformationProcess failed: %#x\n", rcNt); /* * Open the parent process for waiting and exitcode query. */ OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, NULL, 0, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); CLIENT_ID ClientId; ClientId.UniqueProcess = (HANDLE)BasicInfo.InheritedFromUniqueProcessId; ClientId.UniqueThread = NULL; HANDLE hParent; rcNt = NtOpenProcess(&hParent, SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, &ObjAttr, &ClientId); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinCreateParentWatcherThread", kSupInitOp_Misc, VERR_GENERAL_FAILURE, "NtOpenProcess(%p.0) failed: %#x\n", ClientId.UniqueProcess, rcNt); /* * Create the thread that should do the waiting. */ int rc = pfnRTThreadCreate(NULL, supR3HardenedWinParentWatcherThread, hParent, _64K /* stack */, RTTHREADTYPE_DEFAULT, 0 /*fFlags*/, "ParentWatcher"); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedWinCreateParentWatcherThread: RTThreadCreate failed: %Rrc\n", rc); } /** * Checks if the calling thread is the only one in the process. * * @returns true if we're positive we're alone, false if not. */ static bool supR3HardenedWinAmIAlone(void) { ULONG fAmIAlone = 0; ULONG cbIgn = 0; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationThread(NtCurrentThread(), ThreadAmILastThread, &fAmIAlone, sizeof(fAmIAlone), &cbIgn); Assert(NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)); return NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) && fAmIAlone != 0; } /** * Simplify NtProtectVirtualMemory interface. * * Modifies protection for the current process. Caller must know the current * protection as it's not returned. * * @returns NT status code. * @param pvMem The memory to change protection for. * @param cbMem The amount of memory to change. * @param fNewProt The new protection. */ static NTSTATUS supR3HardenedWinProtectMemory(PVOID pvMem, SIZE_T cbMem, ULONG fNewProt) { ULONG fOldProt = 0; return NtProtectVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess(), &pvMem, &cbMem, fNewProt, &fOldProt); } /** * Installs or reinstalls the NTDLL patches. */ static void supR3HardenedWinReInstallHooks(bool fFirstCall) { struct { size_t cbPatch; uint8_t const *pabPatch; uint8_t **ppbApi; const char *pszName; } const s_aPatches[] = { { sizeof(g_abNtCreateSectionPatch), g_abNtCreateSectionPatch, &g_pbNtCreateSection, "NtCreateSection" }, { sizeof(g_abLdrLoadDllPatch), g_abLdrLoadDllPatch, &g_pbLdrLoadDll, "LdrLoadDll" }, }; ULONG fAmIAlone = ~(ULONG)0; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPatches); i++) { uint8_t *pbApi = *s_aPatches[i].ppbApi; if (memcmp(pbApi, s_aPatches[i].pabPatch, s_aPatches[i].cbPatch) != 0) { /* * Log the incident if it's not the initial call. */ static uint32_t volatile s_cTimes = 0; if (!fFirstCall && s_cTimes < 128) { s_cTimes++; SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinReInstallHooks: Reinstalling %s (%p: %.*Rhxs).\n", s_aPatches[i].pszName, pbApi, s_aPatches[i].cbPatch, pbApi)); } Assert(s_aPatches[i].cbPatch >= 4); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(supR3HardenedWinProtectMemory(pbApi, s_aPatches[i].cbPatch, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)); /* * If we're alone, just memcpy the patch in. */ if (fAmIAlone == ~(ULONG)0) fAmIAlone = supR3HardenedWinAmIAlone(); if (fAmIAlone) memcpy(pbApi, s_aPatches[i].pabPatch, s_aPatches[i].cbPatch); else { /* * Not alone. Start by injecting a JMP $-2, then waste some * CPU cycles to get the other threads a good chance of getting * out of the code before we replace it. */ RTUINT32U uJmpDollarMinus; uJmpDollarMinus.au8[0] = 0xeb; uJmpDollarMinus.au8[1] = 0xfe; uJmpDollarMinus.au8[2] = pbApi[2]; uJmpDollarMinus.au8[3] = pbApi[3]; ASMAtomicXchgU32((uint32_t volatile *)pbApi, uJmpDollarMinus.u); NtYieldExecution(); NtYieldExecution(); /* Copy in the tail bytes of the patch, then xchg the jmp $-2. */ if (s_aPatches[i].cbPatch > 4) memcpy(&pbApi[4], &s_aPatches[i].pabPatch[4], s_aPatches[i].cbPatch - 4); ASMAtomicXchgU32((uint32_t volatile *)pbApi, *(uint32_t *)s_aPatches[i].pabPatch); } SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(supR3HardenedWinProtectMemory(pbApi, s_aPatches[i].cbPatch, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ)); } } } /** * Install hooks for intercepting calls dealing with mapping shared libraries * into the process. * * This allows us to prevent undesirable shared libraries from being loaded. * * @remarks We assume we're alone in this process, so no seralizing trickery is * necessary when installing the patch. * * @remarks We would normally just copy the prologue sequence somewhere and add * a jump back at the end of it. But because we wish to avoid * allocating executable memory, we need to have preprepared assembly * "copies". This makes the non-system call patching a little tedious * and inflexible. */ static void supR3HardenedWinInstallHooks(void) { NTSTATUS rcNt; /* * Disable hard error popups so we can quietly refuse images to be loaded. */ ULONG fHardErr = 0; rcNt = NtQueryInformationProcess(NtCurrentProcess(), ProcessDefaultHardErrorMode, &fHardErr, sizeof(fHardErr), NULL); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinInstallHooks", kSupInitOp_Misc, VERR_GENERAL_FAILURE, "NtQueryInformationProcess/ProcessDefaultHardErrorMode failed: %#x\n", rcNt); if (fHardErr & PROCESS_HARDERR_CRITICAL_ERROR) { fHardErr &= ~PROCESS_HARDERR_CRITICAL_ERROR; rcNt = NtSetInformationProcess(NtCurrentProcess(), ProcessDefaultHardErrorMode, &fHardErr, sizeof(fHardErr)); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinInstallHooks", kSupInitOp_Misc, VERR_GENERAL_FAILURE, "NtSetInformationProcess/ProcessDefaultHardErrorMode failed: %#x\n", rcNt); } /* * Locate the routines first so we can allocate memory that's near enough. */ PFNRT pfnNtCreateSection = supR3HardenedWinGetRealDllSymbol("ntdll.dll", "NtCreateSection"); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(pfnNtCreateSection != NULL); //SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(pfnNtCreateSection == (FARPROC)NtCreateSection); PFNRT pfnLdrLoadDll = supR3HardenedWinGetRealDllSymbol("ntdll.dll", "LdrLoadDll"); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(pfnLdrLoadDll != NULL); //SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(pfnLdrLoadDll == (FARPROC)LdrLoadDll); /* * Exec page setup & management. */ uint32_t offExecPage = 0; memset(g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage, 0xcc, PAGE_SIZE); /* * Hook #1 - NtCreateSection. * Purpose: Validate everything that can be mapped into the process before * it's mapped and we still have a file handle to work with. */ uint8_t * const pbNtCreateSection = (uint8_t *)(uintptr_t)pfnNtCreateSection; g_pbNtCreateSection = pbNtCreateSection; memcpy(g_abNtCreateSectionPatch, pbNtCreateSection, sizeof(g_abNtCreateSectionPatch)); g_pfnNtCreateSectionReal = NtCreateSection; /* our direct syscall */ #ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 /* * Patch 64-bit hosts. */ /* Pattern #1: XP64/W2K3-64 thru Windows 8.1 0:000> u ntdll!NtCreateSection ntdll!NtCreateSection: 00000000`779f1750 4c8bd1 mov r10,rcx 00000000`779f1753 b847000000 mov eax,47h 00000000`779f1758 0f05 syscall 00000000`779f175a c3 ret 00000000`779f175b 0f1f440000 nop dword ptr [rax+rax] The variant is the value loaded into eax: W2K3=??, Vista=47h?, W7=47h, W80=48h, W81=49h */ /* Assemble the patch. */ g_abNtCreateSectionPatch[0] = 0x48; /* mov rax, qword */ g_abNtCreateSectionPatch[1] = 0xb8; *(uint64_t *)&g_abNtCreateSectionPatch[2] = (uint64_t)supR3HardenedMonitor_NtCreateSection; g_abNtCreateSectionPatch[10] = 0xff; /* jmp rax */ g_abNtCreateSectionPatch[11] = 0xe0; #else /* * Patch 32-bit hosts. */ /* Pattern #1: XP thru Windows 7 kd> u ntdll!NtCreateSection ntdll!NtCreateSection: 7c90d160 b832000000 mov eax,32h 7c90d165 ba0003fe7f mov edx,offset SharedUserData!SystemCallStub (7ffe0300) 7c90d16a ff12 call dword ptr [edx] 7c90d16c c21c00 ret 1Ch 7c90d16f 90 nop The variable bit is the value loaded into eax: XP=32h, W2K3=34h, Vista=4bh, W7=54h Pattern #2: Windows 8.1 0:000:x86> u ntdll_6a0f0000!NtCreateSection ntdll_6a0f0000!NtCreateSection: 6a15eabc b854010000 mov eax,154h 6a15eac1 e803000000 call ntdll_6a0f0000!NtCreateSection+0xd (6a15eac9) 6a15eac6 c21c00 ret 1Ch 6a15eac9 8bd4 mov edx,esp 6a15eacb 0f34 sysenter 6a15eacd c3 ret The variable bit is the value loaded into eax: W81=154h */ /* Assemble the patch. */ g_abNtCreateSectionPatch[0] = 0xe9; /* jmp rel32 */ *(uint32_t *)&g_abNtCreateSectionPatch[1] = (uintptr_t)supR3HardenedMonitor_NtCreateSection - (uintptr_t)&pbNtCreateSection[1+4]; #endif /* * Hook #2 - LdrLoadDll * Purpose: (a) Enforce LdrLoadDll search path constraints, and (b) pre-validate * DLLs so we can avoid calling WinVerifyTrust from the first hook, * and thus avoiding messing up the loader data on some installations. * * This differs from the above function in that is no a system call and * we're at the mercy of the compiler. */ uint8_t * const pbLdrLoadDll = (uint8_t *)(uintptr_t)pfnLdrLoadDll; g_pbLdrLoadDll = pbLdrLoadDll; memcpy(g_abLdrLoadDllPatch, pbLdrLoadDll, sizeof(g_abLdrLoadDllPatch)); DISSTATE Dis; uint32_t cbInstr; uint32_t offJmpBack = 0; #ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 /* * Patch 64-bit hosts. */ /* Just use the disassembler to skip 12 bytes or more. */ while (offJmpBack < 12) { cbInstr = 1; int rc = DISInstr(pbLdrLoadDll + offJmpBack, DISCPUMODE_64BIT, &Dis, &cbInstr); if ( RT_FAILURE(rc) || (Dis.pCurInstr->fOpType & (DISOPTYPE_CONTROLFLOW)) || (Dis.ModRM.Bits.Mod == 0 && Dis.ModRM.Bits.Rm == 5 /* wrt RIP */) ) supR3HardenedWinHookFailed("LdrLoadDll", pbLdrLoadDll); offJmpBack += cbInstr; } /* Assemble the code for resuming the call.*/ *(PFNRT *)&g_pfnLdrLoadDllReal = (PFNRT)(uintptr_t)&g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[offExecPage]; memcpy(&g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[offExecPage], pbLdrLoadDll, offJmpBack); offExecPage += offJmpBack; g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[offExecPage++] = 0xff; /* jmp qword [$+8 wrt RIP] */ g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[offExecPage++] = 0x25; *(uint32_t *)&g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[offExecPage] = RT_ALIGN_32(offExecPage + 4, 8) - (offExecPage + 4); offExecPage = RT_ALIGN_32(offExecPage + 4, 8); *(uint64_t *)&g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[offExecPage] = (uintptr_t)&pbLdrLoadDll[offJmpBack]; offExecPage = RT_ALIGN_32(offJmpBack + 8, 16); /* Assemble the LdrLoadDll patch. */ Assert(offJmpBack >= 12); g_abLdrLoadDllPatch[0] = 0x48; /* mov rax, qword */ g_abLdrLoadDllPatch[1] = 0xb8; *(uint64_t *)&g_abLdrLoadDllPatch[2] = (uint64_t)supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll; g_abLdrLoadDllPatch[10] = 0xff; /* jmp rax */ g_abLdrLoadDllPatch[11] = 0xe0; #else /* * Patch 32-bit hosts. */ /* Just use the disassembler to skip 5 bytes or more. */ while (offJmpBack < 5) { cbInstr = 1; int rc = DISInstr(pbLdrLoadDll + offJmpBack, DISCPUMODE_32BIT, &Dis, &cbInstr); if ( RT_FAILURE(rc) || (Dis.pCurInstr->fOpType & (DISOPTYPE_CONTROLFLOW)) ) supR3HardenedWinHookFailed("LdrLoadDll", pbLdrLoadDll); offJmpBack += cbInstr; } /* Assemble the code for resuming the call.*/ *(PFNRT *)&g_pfnLdrLoadDllReal = (PFNRT)(uintptr_t)&g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[offExecPage]; memcpy(&g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[offExecPage], pbLdrLoadDll, offJmpBack); offExecPage += offJmpBack; g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[offExecPage++] = 0xe9; /* jmp rel32 */ *(uint32_t *)&g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[offExecPage] = (uintptr_t)&pbLdrLoadDll[offJmpBack] - (uintptr_t)&g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage[offExecPage + 4]; offExecPage = RT_ALIGN_32(offJmpBack + 4, 16); /* Assemble the LdrLoadDll patch. */ memcpy(g_abLdrLoadDllPatch, pbLdrLoadDll, sizeof(g_abLdrLoadDllPatch)); Assert(offJmpBack >= 5); g_abLdrLoadDllPatch[0] = 0xe9; *(uint32_t *)&g_abLdrLoadDllPatch[1] = (uintptr_t)supR3HardenedMonitor_LdrLoadDll - (uintptr_t)&pbLdrLoadDll[1+4]; #endif /* * Seal the rwx page. */ SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(supR3HardenedWinProtectMemory(g_abSupHardReadWriteExecPage, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ)); /* * Install the patches. */ supR3HardenedWinReInstallHooks(true /*fFirstCall*/); } /* * * T h r e a d c r e a t i o n c o n t r o l * T h r e a d c r e a t i o n c o n t r o l * T h r e a d c r e a t i o n c o n t r o l * */ /** * Common code used for child and parent to make new threads exit immediately. * * This patches the LdrInitializeThunk code to call NtTerminateThread with * STATUS_SUCCESS instead of doing the NTDLL initialization. * * @returns VBox status code. * @param hProcess The process to do this to. * @param pvLdrInitThunk The address of the LdrInitializeThunk code to * override. * @param pvNtTerminateThread The address of the NtTerminateThread function in * the NTDLL instance we're patching. (Must be +/- * 2GB from the thunk code.) * @param pabBackup Where to back up the original instruction bytes * at pvLdrInitThunk. * @param cbBackup The size of the backup area. Must be 16 bytes. * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error information. * Optional. */ static int supR3HardNtDisableThreadCreationEx(HANDLE hProcess, void *pvLdrInitThunk, void *pvNtTerminateThread, uint8_t *pabBackup, size_t cbBackup, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtDisableThreadCreation: pvLdrInitThunk=%p pvNtTerminateThread=%p\n", pvLdrInitThunk, pvNtTerminateThread)); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(cbBackup == 16); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(RT_ABS((intptr_t)pvLdrInitThunk - (intptr_t)pvNtTerminateThread) < 16*_1M); /* * Back up the thunk code. */ SIZE_T cbIgnored; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtReadVirtualMemory(hProcess, pvLdrInitThunk, pabBackup, cbBackup, &cbIgnored); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_GENERAL_FAILURE, "supR3HardNtDisableThreadCreation: NtReadVirtualMemory/LdrInitializeThunk failed: %#x", rcNt); /* * Cook up replacement code that calls NtTerminateThread. */ uint8_t abReplacement[16]; memcpy(abReplacement, pabBackup, sizeof(abReplacement)); #ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 abReplacement[0] = 0x31; /* xor ecx, ecx */ abReplacement[1] = 0xc9; abReplacement[2] = 0x31; /* xor edx, edx */ abReplacement[3] = 0xd2; abReplacement[4] = 0xe8; /* call near NtTerminateThread */ *(int32_t *)&abReplacement[5] = (int32_t)((uintptr_t)pvNtTerminateThread - ((uintptr_t)pvLdrInitThunk + 9)); abReplacement[9] = 0xcc; /* int3 */ #elif defined(RT_ARCH_X86) abReplacement[0] = 0x6a; /* push 0 */ abReplacement[1] = 0x00; abReplacement[2] = 0x6a; /* push 0 */ abReplacement[3] = 0x00; abReplacement[4] = 0xe8; /* call near NtTerminateThread */ *(int32_t *)&abReplacement[5] = (int32_t)((uintptr_t)pvNtTerminateThread - ((uintptr_t)pvLdrInitThunk + 9)); abReplacement[9] = 0xcc; /* int3 */ #else # error "Unsupported arch." #endif /* * Install the replacment code. */ PVOID pvProt = pvLdrInitThunk; SIZE_T cbProt = cbBackup; ULONG fOldProt = 0; rcNt = NtProtectVirtualMemory(hProcess, &pvProt, &cbProt, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &fOldProt); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_GENERAL_FAILURE, "supR3HardNtDisableThreadCreationEx: NtProtectVirtualMemory/LdrInitializeThunk failed: %#x", rcNt); rcNt = NtWriteVirtualMemory(hProcess, pvLdrInitThunk, abReplacement, sizeof(abReplacement), &cbIgnored); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_GENERAL_FAILURE, "supR3HardNtDisableThreadCreationEx: NtWriteVirtualMemory/LdrInitializeThunk failed: %#x", rcNt); pvProt = pvLdrInitThunk; cbProt = cbBackup; rcNt = NtProtectVirtualMemory(hProcess, &pvProt, &cbProt, fOldProt, &fOldProt); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_GENERAL_FAILURE, "supR3HardNtDisableThreadCreationEx: NtProtectVirtualMemory/LdrInitializeThunk/2 failed: %#x", rcNt); return VINF_SUCCESS; } /** * Undo the effects of supR3HardNtDisableThreadCreationEx. * * @returns VBox status code. * @param hProcess The process to do this to. * @param pvLdrInitThunk The address of the LdrInitializeThunk code to * override. * @param pabBackup Where to back up the original instruction bytes * at pvLdrInitThunk. * @param cbBackup The size of the backup area. Must be 16 bytes. * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error information. * Optional. */ static int supR3HardNtEnableThreadCreationEx(HANDLE hProcess, void *pvLdrInitThunk, uint8_t const *pabBackup, size_t cbBackup, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtEnableThreadCreation:\n")); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(cbBackup == 16); PVOID pvProt = pvLdrInitThunk; SIZE_T cbProt = cbBackup; ULONG fOldProt = 0; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtProtectVirtualMemory(hProcess, &pvProt, &cbProt, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &fOldProt); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_GENERAL_FAILURE, "supR3HardNtDisableThreadCreationEx: NtProtectVirtualMemory/LdrInitializeThunk failed: %#x", rcNt); SIZE_T cbIgnored; rcNt = NtWriteVirtualMemory(hProcess, pvLdrInitThunk, pabBackup, cbBackup, &cbIgnored); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_GENERAL_FAILURE, "supR3HardNtEnableThreadCreation: NtWriteVirtualMemory/LdrInitializeThunk[restore] failed: %#x", rcNt); pvProt = pvLdrInitThunk; cbProt = cbBackup; rcNt = NtProtectVirtualMemory(hProcess, &pvProt, &cbProt, fOldProt, &fOldProt); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_GENERAL_FAILURE, "supR3HardNtEnableThreadCreation: NtProtectVirtualMemory/LdrInitializeThunk[restore] failed: %#x", rcNt); return VINF_SUCCESS; } /** * Disable thread creation for the current process. * * @remarks Doesn't really disables it, just makes the threads exit immediately * without executing any real code. */ static void supR3HardenedWinDisableThreadCreation(void) { /* Cannot use the imported NtTerminateThread as it's pointing to our own syscall assembly code. */ static PFNRT s_pfnNtTerminateThread = NULL; if (s_pfnNtTerminateThread == NULL) s_pfnNtTerminateThread = supR3HardenedWinGetRealDllSymbol("ntdll.dll", "NtTerminateThread"); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(s_pfnNtTerminateThread); int rc = supR3HardNtDisableThreadCreationEx(NtCurrentProcess(), (void *)(uintptr_t)&LdrInitializeThunk, (void *)(uintptr_t)s_pfnNtTerminateThread, g_abLdrInitThunkSelfBackup, sizeof(g_abLdrInitThunkSelfBackup), NULL /* pErrInfo*/); g_fSupInitThunkSelfPatched = RT_SUCCESS(rc); } /** * Undoes the effects of supR3HardenedWinDisableThreadCreation. */ DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinEnableThreadCreation(void) { if (g_fSupInitThunkSelfPatched) { int rc = supR3HardNtEnableThreadCreationEx(NtCurrentProcess(), (void *)(uintptr_t)&LdrInitializeThunk, g_abLdrInitThunkSelfBackup, sizeof(g_abLdrInitThunkSelfBackup), RTErrInfoInitStatic(&g_ErrInfoStatic)); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) supR3HardenedError(rc, true /*fFatal*/, "%s", g_ErrInfoStatic.szMsg); g_fSupInitThunkSelfPatched = false; } } /* * * R e s p a w n * R e s p a w n * R e s p a w n * */ /** * Gets the SID of the user associated with the process. * * @returns @c true if we've got a login SID, @c false if not. * @param pSidUser Where to return the user SID. * @param cbSidUser The size of the user SID buffer. * @param pSidLogin Where to return the login SID. * @param cbSidLogin The size of the login SID buffer. */ static bool supR3HardNtChildGetUserAndLogSids(PSID pSidUser, ULONG cbSidUser, PSID pSidLogin, ULONG cbSidLogin) { HANDLE hToken; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(NtOpenProcessToken(NtCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &hToken)); union { TOKEN_USER UserInfo; TOKEN_GROUPS Groups; uint8_t abPadding[4096]; } uBuf; ULONG cbRet = 0; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(NtQueryInformationToken(hToken, TokenUser, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf), &cbRet)); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlCopySid(cbSidUser, pSidUser, uBuf.UserInfo.User.Sid)); bool fLoginSid = false; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationToken(hToken, TokenLogonSid, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf), &cbRet); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { for (DWORD i = 0; i < uBuf.Groups.GroupCount; i++) if ((uBuf.Groups.Groups[i].Attributes & SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID) == SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID) { SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlCopySid(cbSidLogin, pSidLogin, uBuf.Groups.Groups[i].Sid)); fLoginSid = true; break; } } SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(NtClose(hToken)); return fLoginSid; } /** * Build security attributes for the process or the primary thread (@a fProcess) * * Process DACLs can be bypassed using the SeDebugPrivilege (generally available * to admins, i.e. normal windows users), or by taking ownership and/or * modifying the DACL. However, it restricts * * @param pSecAttrs Where to return the security attributes. * @param pCleanup Cleanup record. * @param fProcess Set if it's for the process, clear if it's for * the primary thread. */ static void supR3HardNtChildInitSecAttrs(PSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES pSecAttrs, PMYSECURITYCLEANUP pCleanup, bool fProcess) { /* * Safe return values. */ suplibHardenedMemSet(pCleanup, 0, sizeof(*pCleanup)); pSecAttrs->nLength = sizeof(*pSecAttrs); pSecAttrs->bInheritHandle = FALSE; pSecAttrs->lpSecurityDescriptor = NULL; /** @todo This isn't at all complete, just sketches... */ /* * Create an ACL detailing the access of the above groups. */ SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlCreateAcl(&pCleanup->Acl.AclHdr, sizeof(pCleanup->Acl), ACL_REVISION)); ULONG fDeny = DELETE | WRITE_DAC | WRITE_OWNER; ULONG fAllow = SYNCHRONIZE | READ_CONTROL; ULONG fAllowLogin = SYNCHRONIZE | READ_CONTROL; if (fProcess) { fDeny |= PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD | PROCESS_SET_SESSIONID | PROCESS_VM_OPERATION | PROCESS_VM_WRITE | PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS | PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE | PROCESS_SET_QUOTA | PROCESS_SET_INFORMATION | PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME; fAllow |= PROCESS_TERMINATE | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION; fAllowLogin |= PROCESS_TERMINATE | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION; if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) /* Introduced in Vista. */ { fAllow |= PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION; fAllowLogin |= PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION; } if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3)) /* Introduced in Windows 8.1. */ fAllow |= PROCESS_SET_LIMITED_INFORMATION; } else { fDeny |= THREAD_SUSPEND_RESUME | THREAD_SET_CONTEXT | THREAD_SET_INFORMATION | THREAD_SET_THREAD_TOKEN | THREAD_IMPERSONATE | THREAD_DIRECT_IMPERSONATION; fAllow |= THREAD_GET_CONTEXT | THREAD_QUERY_INFORMATION; fAllowLogin |= THREAD_GET_CONTEXT | THREAD_QUERY_INFORMATION; if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) /* Introduced in Vista. */ { fAllow |= THREAD_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | THREAD_SET_LIMITED_INFORMATION; fAllowLogin |= THREAD_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION; } } fDeny |= ~fAllow & (SPECIFIC_RIGHTS_ALL | STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL); /* Deny everyone access to bad bits. */ #if 1 SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY SIDAuthWorld = SECURITY_WORLD_SID_AUTHORITY; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlInitializeSid(&pCleanup->Everyone.Sid, &SIDAuthWorld, 1)); *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&pCleanup->Everyone.Sid, 0) = SECURITY_WORLD_RID; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlAddAccessDeniedAce(&pCleanup->Acl.AclHdr, ACL_REVISION, fDeny, &pCleanup->Everyone.Sid)); #endif #if 0 /* Grant some access to the owner - doesn't work. */ SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY SIDAuthCreator = SECURITY_CREATOR_SID_AUTHORITY; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlInitializeSid(&pCleanup->Owner.Sid, &SIDAuthCreator, 1)); *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&pCleanup->Owner.Sid, 0) = SECURITY_CREATOR_OWNER_RID; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlAddAccessDeniedAce(&pCleanup->Acl.AclHdr, ACL_REVISION, fDeny, &pCleanup->Owner.Sid)); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlAddAccessAllowedAce(&pCleanup->Acl.AclHdr, ACL_REVISION, fAllow, &pCleanup->Owner.Sid)); #endif #if 1 bool fHasLoginSid = supR3HardNtChildGetUserAndLogSids(&pCleanup->User.Sid, sizeof(pCleanup->User), &pCleanup->Login.Sid, sizeof(pCleanup->Login)); # if 1 /* Grant minimal access to the user. */ SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlAddAccessDeniedAce(&pCleanup->Acl.AclHdr, ACL_REVISION, fDeny, &pCleanup->User.Sid)); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlAddAccessAllowedAce(&pCleanup->Acl.AclHdr, ACL_REVISION, fAllow, &pCleanup->User.Sid)); # endif # if 1 /* Grant very limited access to the login sid. */ if (fHasLoginSid) { SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlAddAccessAllowedAce(&pCleanup->Acl.AclHdr, ACL_REVISION, fAllowLogin, &pCleanup->Login.Sid)); } # endif #endif /* * Create a security descriptor with the above ACL. */ PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSecDesc = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)RTMemAllocZ(SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH); pCleanup->pSecDesc = pSecDesc; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor(pSecDesc, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlSetDaclSecurityDescriptor(pSecDesc, TRUE /*fDaclPresent*/, &pCleanup->Acl.AclHdr, FALSE /*fDaclDefaulted*/)); pSecAttrs->lpSecurityDescriptor = pSecDesc; } /** * Predicate function which tests whether @a ch is a argument separator * character. * * @returns True/false. * @param ch The character to examine. */ DECLINLINE(bool) suplibCommandLineIsArgSeparator(int ch) { return ch == ' ' || ch == '\t' || ch == '\n' || ch == '\r'; } /** * Construct the new command line. * * Since argc/argv are both derived from GetCommandLineW (see * suplibHardenedWindowsMain), we skip the argument by argument UTF-8 -> UTF-16 * conversion and quoting by going to the original source. * * The executable name, though, is replaced in case it's not a fullly * qualified path. * * The re-spawn indicator is added immediately after the executable name * so that we don't get tripped up missing close quote chars in the last * argument. * * @returns Pointer to a command line string (heap). * @param pUniStr Unicode string structure to initialize to the * command line. Optional. * @param iWhich Which respawn we're to check for, 1 being the first * one, and 2 the second and final. */ static PRTUTF16 supR3HardNtChildConstructCmdLine(PUNICODE_STRING pString, int iWhich) { SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(iWhich == 1 || iWhich == 2); /* * Get the command line and skip the executable name. */ PUNICODE_STRING pCmdLineStr = &NtCurrentPeb()->ProcessParameters->CommandLine; PCRTUTF16 pawcArgs = pCmdLineStr->Buffer; uint32_t cwcArgs = pCmdLineStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR); /* Skip leading space (shouldn't be any, but whatever). */ while (cwcArgs > 0 && suplibCommandLineIsArgSeparator(*pawcArgs) ) cwcArgs--, pawcArgs++; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(cwcArgs > 0 && *pawcArgs != '\0'); /* Walk to the end of it. */ int fQuoted = false; do { if (*pawcArgs == '"') { fQuoted = !fQuoted; cwcArgs--; pawcArgs++; } else if (*pawcArgs != '\\' || (pawcArgs[1] != '\\' && pawcArgs[1] != '"')) cwcArgs--, pawcArgs++; else { unsigned cSlashes = 0; do { cSlashes++; cwcArgs--; pawcArgs++; } while (cwcArgs > 0 && *pawcArgs == '\\'); if (cwcArgs > 0 && *pawcArgs == '"' && (cSlashes & 1)) cwcArgs--, pawcArgs++; /* odd number of slashes == escaped quote */ } } while (cwcArgs > 0 && (fQuoted || !suplibCommandLineIsArgSeparator(*pawcArgs))); /* Skip trailing spaces. */ while (cwcArgs > 0 && suplibCommandLineIsArgSeparator(*pawcArgs)) cwcArgs--, pawcArgs++; /* * Allocate a new buffer. */ AssertCompile(sizeof(SUPR3_RESPAWN_1_ARG0) == sizeof(SUPR3_RESPAWN_2_ARG0)); size_t cwcCmdLine = (sizeof(SUPR3_RESPAWN_1_ARG0) - 1) / sizeof(SUPR3_RESPAWN_1_ARG0[0]) /* Respawn exe name. */ + !!cwcArgs + cwcArgs; /* if arguments present, add space + arguments. */ if (cwcCmdLine * sizeof(WCHAR) >= 0xfff0) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardNtChildConstructCmdLine", kSupInitOp_Misc, VERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "Command line is too long (%u chars)!", cwcCmdLine); PRTUTF16 pwszCmdLine = (PRTUTF16)RTMemAlloc((cwcCmdLine + 1) * sizeof(RTUTF16)); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(pwszCmdLine != NULL); /* * Construct the new command line. */ PRTUTF16 pwszDst = pwszCmdLine; for (const char *pszSrc = iWhich == 1 ? SUPR3_RESPAWN_1_ARG0 : SUPR3_RESPAWN_2_ARG0; *pszSrc; pszSrc++) *pwszDst++ = *pszSrc; if (cwcArgs) { *pwszDst++ = ' '; suplibHardenedMemCopy(pwszDst, pawcArgs, cwcArgs * sizeof(RTUTF16)); pwszDst += cwcArgs; } *pwszDst = '\0'; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(pwszDst - pwszCmdLine == cwcCmdLine); if (pString) { pString->Buffer = pwszCmdLine; pString->Length = (USHORT)(cwcCmdLine * sizeof(WCHAR)); pString->MaximumLength = pString->Length + sizeof(WCHAR); } return pwszCmdLine; } /** * Terminates the child process. * * @param hProcess The process handle. * @param pszWhere Who's having child rasing troubles. * @param rc The status code to report. * @param pszFormat The message format string. * @param ... Message format arguments. */ static void supR3HardenedWinKillChild(HANDLE hProcess, const char *pszWhere, int rc, const char *pszFormat, ...) { /* * Terminate the process ASAP and display error. */ NtTerminateProcess(hProcess, RTEXITCODE_FAILURE); va_list va; va_start(va, pszFormat); supR3HardenedErrorV(rc, false /*fFatal*/, pszFormat, va); va_end(va); /* * Wait for the process to really go away. */ PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION BasicInfo; NTSTATUS rcNtExit = NtQueryInformationProcess(hProcess, ProcessBasicInformation, &BasicInfo, sizeof(BasicInfo), NULL); bool fExitOk = NT_SUCCESS(rcNtExit) && BasicInfo.ExitStatus != STATUS_PENDING; if (!fExitOk) { NTSTATUS rcNtWait; uint64_t uMsTsStart = supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS(); do { NtTerminateProcess(hProcess, DBG_TERMINATE_PROCESS); LARGE_INTEGER Timeout; Timeout.QuadPart = -20000000; /* 2 second */ rcNtWait = NtWaitForSingleObject(hProcess, TRUE /*Alertable*/, &Timeout); rcNtExit = NtQueryInformationProcess(hProcess, ProcessBasicInformation, &BasicInfo, sizeof(BasicInfo), NULL); fExitOk = NT_SUCCESS(rcNtExit) && BasicInfo.ExitStatus != STATUS_PENDING; } while ( !fExitOk && ( rcNtWait == STATUS_TIMEOUT || rcNtWait == STATUS_USER_APC || rcNtWait == STATUS_ALERTED) && supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS() - uMsTsStart < 60 * 1000); if (fExitOk) supR3HardenedError(rc, false /*fFatal*/, "NtDuplicateObject failed and we failed to kill child: rc=%u (%#x) rcNtWait=%#x hProcess=%p\n", rc, rc, rcNtWait, hProcess); } /* * Final error message. */ va_start(va, pszFormat); supR3HardenedFatalMsgV(pszWhere, kSupInitOp_Misc, rc, pszFormat, va); va_end(va); } /** * Checks the child process when hEvtParent is signalled. * * This will read the request data from the child and check it against expected * request. If an error is signalled, we'll raise it and make sure the child * terminates before terminating the calling process. * * @param pThis The child process data structure. * @param enmExpectedRequest The expected child request. * @param pszWhat What we're waiting for. */ static void supR3HardNtChildProcessRequest(PSUPR3HARDNTCHILD pThis, SUPR3WINCHILDREQ enmExpectedRequest, const char *pszWhat) { /* * Read the process parameters from the child. */ uintptr_t uChildAddr = (uintptr_t)pThis->Peb.ImageBaseAddress + ((uintptr_t)&g_ProcParams - (uintptr_t)NtCurrentPeb()->ImageBaseAddress); SIZE_T cbIgnored = 0; RT_ZERO(pThis->ProcParams); NTSTATUS rcNt = NtReadVirtualMemory(pThis->hProcess, (PVOID)uChildAddr, &pThis->ProcParams, sizeof(pThis->ProcParams), &cbIgnored); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardNtChildProcessRequest", rcNt, "NtReadVirtualMemory(,%p,) failed reading child process status: %#x\n", uChildAddr, rcNt); /* * Is it the expected request? */ if (pThis->ProcParams.enmRequest == enmExpectedRequest) return; /* * No, not the expected request. If it's an error request, tell the child * to terminate itself, otherwise we'll have to terminate it. */ pThis->ProcParams.szErrorMsg[sizeof(pThis->ProcParams.szErrorMsg) - 1] = '\0'; pThis->ProcParams.szWhere[sizeof(pThis->ProcParams.szWhere) - 1] = '\0'; SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinCheckChild: enmRequest=%d rc=%d enmWhat=%d %s: %s\n", pThis->ProcParams.enmRequest, pThis->ProcParams.rc, pThis->ProcParams.enmWhat, pThis->ProcParams.szWhere, pThis->ProcParams.szErrorMsg)); if (pThis->ProcParams.enmRequest != kSupR3WinChildReq_Error) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardenedWinCheckChild", VERR_INVALID_PARAMETER, "Unexpected child request #%d. Was expecting #%d (%s).\n", pThis->ProcParams.enmRequest, enmExpectedRequest, pszWhat); rcNt = NtSetEvent(pThis->hEvtChild, NULL); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardNtChildProcessRequest", rcNt, "NtSetEvent failed: %#x\n", rcNt); /* Wait for it to terminate. */ LARGE_INTEGER Timeout; Timeout.QuadPart = -50000000; /* 5 seconds */ rcNt = NtWaitForSingleObject(pThis->hProcess, FALSE /*Alertable*/, &Timeout); if (rcNt != STATUS_WAIT_0) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtChildProcessRequest: Child is taking too long to quit (rcWait=%#x), killing it...\n", rcNt)); NtTerminateProcess(pThis->hProcess, DBG_TERMINATE_PROCESS); } /* * Report the error in the same way as it occured in the guest. */ if (pThis->ProcParams.enmWhat == kSupInitOp_Invalid) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinCheckChild", kSupInitOp_Misc, pThis->ProcParams.rc, "%s", pThis->ProcParams.szErrorMsg); else supR3HardenedFatalMsg(pThis->ProcParams.szWhere, pThis->ProcParams.enmWhat, pThis->ProcParams.rc, "%s", pThis->ProcParams.szErrorMsg); } /** * Waits for the child to make a certain request or terminate. * * The stub process will also wait on it's parent to terminate. * This call will only return if the child made the expected request. * * @param pThis The child process data structure. * @param enmExpectedRequest The child request to wait for. * @param cMsTimeout The number of milliseconds to wait (at least). * @param pszWhat What we're waiting for. */ static void supR3HardNtChildWaitFor(PSUPR3HARDNTCHILD pThis, SUPR3WINCHILDREQ enmExpectedRequest, RTMSINTERVAL cMsTimeout, const char *pszWhat) { /* * The wait loop. * Will return when the expected request arrives. * Will break out when one of the processes terminates. */ NTSTATUS rcNtWait; LARGE_INTEGER Timeout; uint64_t uMsTsStart = supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS(); uint64_t cMsElapsed = 0; for (;;) { /* * Assemble handles to wait for. */ ULONG cHandles = 1; HANDLE ahHandles[3]; ahHandles[0] = pThis->hProcess; if (pThis->hEvtParent) ahHandles[cHandles++] = pThis->hEvtParent; if (pThis->hParent) ahHandles[cHandles++] = pThis->hParent; /* * Do the waiting according to the callers wishes. */ if ( enmExpectedRequest == kSupR3WinChildReq_End || cMsTimeout == RT_INDEFINITE_WAIT) rcNtWait = NtWaitForMultipleObjects(cHandles, &ahHandles[0], WaitAnyObject, TRUE /*Alertable*/, NULL /*Timeout*/); else { Timeout.QuadPart = -(int64_t)(cMsTimeout - cMsElapsed) * 10000; rcNtWait = NtWaitForMultipleObjects(cHandles, &ahHandles[0], WaitAnyObject, TRUE /*Alertable*/, &Timeout); } /* * Process child request. */ if (rcNtWait == STATUS_WAIT_0 + 1 && pThis->hEvtParent != NULL) { supR3HardNtChildProcessRequest(pThis, enmExpectedRequest, pszWhat); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtChildWaitFor: Found expected request %d (%s) after %llu ms.\n", enmExpectedRequest, pszWhat, supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS() - uMsTsStart)); return; /* Expected request received. */ } /* * Process termination? */ if ( (ULONG)rcNtWait - (ULONG)STATUS_WAIT_0 < cHandles || (ULONG)rcNtWait - (ULONG)STATUS_ABANDONED_WAIT_0 < cHandles) break; /* * Check sanity. */ if ( rcNtWait != STATUS_TIMEOUT && rcNtWait != STATUS_USER_APC && rcNtWait != STATUS_ALERTED) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardNtChildWaitFor", rcNtWait, "NtWaitForMultipleObjects returned %#x waiting for #%d (%s)\n", rcNtWait, enmExpectedRequest, pszWhat); /* * Calc elapsed time for the next timeout calculation, checking to see * if we've timed out already. */ cMsElapsed = supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS() - uMsTsStart; if ( cMsElapsed > cMsTimeout && cMsTimeout != RT_INDEFINITE_WAIT && enmExpectedRequest != kSupR3WinChildReq_End) { if (rcNtWait == STATUS_USER_APC || rcNtWait == STATUS_ALERTED) cMsElapsed = cMsTimeout - 1; /* try again */ else { /* We timed out. */ supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardNtChildWaitFor", rcNtWait, "Timed out after %llu ms waiting for child request #%d (%s).\n", cMsElapsed, enmExpectedRequest, pszWhat); } } } /* * Proxy the termination code of the child, if it exited already. */ PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION BasicInfo; NTSTATUS rcNt1 = NtQueryInformationProcess(pThis->hProcess, ProcessBasicInformation, &BasicInfo, sizeof(BasicInfo), NULL); NTSTATUS rcNt2 = STATUS_PENDING; NTSTATUS rcNt3 = STATUS_PENDING; if ( !NT_SUCCESS(rcNt1) || BasicInfo.ExitStatus == STATUS_PENDING) { rcNt2 = NtTerminateProcess(pThis->hProcess, RTEXITCODE_FAILURE); Timeout.QuadPart = NT_SUCCESS(rcNt2) ? -20000000 /* 2 sec */ : -1280000 /* 128 ms */; rcNt3 = NtWaitForSingleObject(pThis->hProcess, FALSE /*Alertable*/, NULL /*Timeout*/); BasicInfo.ExitStatus = RTEXITCODE_FAILURE; } SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtChildWaitFor[%d]: Quitting: ExitCode=%#x (rcNtWait=%#x, rcNt1=%#x, rcNt2=%#x, rcNt3=%#x, %llu ms, %s);\n", pThis->iWhich, BasicInfo.ExitStatus, rcNtWait, rcNt1, rcNt2, rcNt3, supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS() - uMsTsStart, pszWhat)); suplibHardenedExit((RTEXITCODE)BasicInfo.ExitStatus); } /** * Closes full access child thread and process handles, making a harmless * duplicate of the process handle first. * * The hProcess member of the child process data structure will be change to the * harmless handle, while the hThread will be set to NULL. * * @param pThis The child process data structure. */ static void supR3HardNtChildCloseFullAccessHandles(PSUPR3HARDNTCHILD pThis) { /* * The thread handle. */ NTSTATUS rcNt = NtClose(pThis->hThread); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", rcNt, "NtClose(hThread) failed: %#x", rcNt); pThis->hThread = NULL; /* * Duplicate the process handle into a harmless one. */ HANDLE hProcWait; ULONG fRights = SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_TERMINATE | PROCESS_VM_READ; if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) /* Introduced in Vista. */ fRights |= PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION; else fRights |= PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION; rcNt = NtDuplicateObject(NtCurrentProcess(), pThis->hProcess, NtCurrentProcess(), &hProcWait, fRights, 0 /*HandleAttributes*/, 0); if (rcNt == STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED) { supR3HardenedError(rcNt, false /*fFatal*/, "supR3HardenedWinDoReSpawn: NtDuplicateObject(,,,,%#x,,) -> %#x, retrying with only %#x...\n", fRights, rcNt, SYNCHRONIZE); rcNt = NtDuplicateObject(NtCurrentProcess(), pThis->hProcess, NtCurrentProcess(), &hProcWait, SYNCHRONIZE, 0 /*HandleAttributes*/, 0); } if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", rcNt, "NtDuplicateObject failed on child process handle: %#x\n", rcNt); /* * Close the process handle and replace it with the harmless one. */ rcNt = NtClose(pThis->hProcess); pThis->hProcess = hProcWait; if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", VERR_INVALID_NAME, "NtClose failed on child process handle: %#x\n", rcNt); } /** * This restores the child PEB and tweaks a couple of fields before we do the * child purification and let the process run normally. * * @param pThis The child process data structure. */ static void supR3HardNtChildSanitizePeb(PSUPR3HARDNTCHILD pThis) { /* * Make a copy of the pre-execution PEB. */ PEB Peb = pThis->Peb; #if 0 /* * There should not be any activation context, so if there is, we scratch the memory associated with it. */ int rc = 0; if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && Peb.pShimData && !((uintptr_t)Peb.pShimData & PAGE_OFFSET_MASK)) rc = supR3HardenedWinScratchChildMemory(hProcess, Peb.pShimData, PAGE_SIZE, "pShimData", pErrInfo); if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && Peb.ActivationContextData && !((uintptr_t)Peb.ActivationContextData & PAGE_OFFSET_MASK)) rc = supR3HardenedWinScratchChildMemory(hProcess, Peb.ActivationContextData, PAGE_SIZE, "ActivationContextData", pErrInfo); if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && Peb.ProcessAssemblyStorageMap && !((uintptr_t)Peb.ProcessAssemblyStorageMap & PAGE_OFFSET_MASK)) rc = supR3HardenedWinScratchChildMemory(hProcess, Peb.ProcessAssemblyStorageMap, PAGE_SIZE, "ProcessAssemblyStorageMap", pErrInfo); if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && Peb.SystemDefaultActivationContextData && !((uintptr_t)Peb.SystemDefaultActivationContextData & PAGE_OFFSET_MASK)) rc = supR3HardenedWinScratchChildMemory(hProcess, Peb.ProcessAssemblyStorageMap, PAGE_SIZE, "SystemDefaultActivationContextData", pErrInfo); if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && Peb.SystemAssemblyStorageMap && !((uintptr_t)Peb.SystemAssemblyStorageMap & PAGE_OFFSET_MASK)) rc = supR3HardenedWinScratchChildMemory(hProcess, Peb.SystemAssemblyStorageMap, PAGE_SIZE, "SystemAssemblyStorageMap", pErrInfo); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) return rc; #endif /* * Clear compatibility and activation related fields. */ Peb.AppCompatFlags.QuadPart = 0; Peb.AppCompatFlagsUser.QuadPart = 0; Peb.pShimData = NULL; Peb.AppCompatInfo = NULL; #if 0 Peb.ActivationContextData = NULL; Peb.ProcessAssemblyStorageMap = NULL; Peb.SystemDefaultActivationContextData = NULL; Peb.SystemAssemblyStorageMap = NULL; /*Peb.Diff0.W6.IsProtectedProcess = 1;*/ #endif /* * Write back the PEB. */ SIZE_T cbActualMem = pThis->cbPeb; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtWriteVirtualMemory(pThis->hProcess, pThis->BasicInfo.PebBaseAddress, &Peb, pThis->cbPeb, &cbActualMem); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardNtChildSanitizePeb", rcNt, "NtWriteVirtualMemory/Peb failed: %#x", rcNt); } /** * Purifies the child process after very early init has been performed. * * @param pThis The child process data structure. */ static void supR3HardNtChildPurify(PSUPR3HARDNTCHILD pThis) { /* * We loop until we no longer make any fixes. This is similar to what * we do (or used to do, really) in the fAvastKludge case of * supR3HardenedWinInit. We might be up against asynchronous changes, * which we fudge by waiting a short while before earch purification. This * is arguably a fragile technique, but it's currently the best we've got. * Fortunately, most AVs seems to either favor immediate action on initial * load events or (much better for us) later events like kernel32. */ uint64_t uMsTsOuterStart = supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS(); uint32_t cMsFudge = g_fSupAdversaries ? 512 : 256; uint32_t cTotalFixes = 0; uint32_t cFixes; for (uint32_t iLoop = 0; iLoop < 16; iLoop++) { /* * Delay. */ uint32_t cSleeps = 0; uint64_t uMsTsStart = supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS(); do { NtYieldExecution(); LARGE_INTEGER Time; Time.QuadPart = -8000000 / 100; /* 8ms in 100ns units, relative time. */ NtDelayExecution(FALSE, &Time); cSleeps++; } while ( supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS() - uMsTsStart <= cMsFudge || cSleeps < 8); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtChildPurify: Startup delay kludge #1/%u: %u ms, %u sleeps\n", iLoop, supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS() - uMsTsStart, cSleeps)); /* * Purify. */ cFixes = 0; int rc = supHardenedWinVerifyProcess(pThis->hProcess, pThis->hThread, SUPHARDNTVPKIND_CHILD_PURIFICATION, g_fSupAdversaries & ( SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO_SAKFILE | SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_DIGITAL_GUARDIAN) ? SUPHARDNTVP_F_EXEC_ALLOC_REPLACE_WITH_RW : 0, &cFixes, RTErrInfoInitStatic(&g_ErrInfoStatic)); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardNtChildPurify", rc, "supHardenedWinVerifyProcess failed with %Rrc: %s", rc, g_ErrInfoStatic.szMsg); if (cFixes == 0) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtChildPurify: Done after %llu ms and %u fixes (loop #%u).\n", supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS() - uMsTsOuterStart, cTotalFixes, iLoop)); return; /* We're probably good. */ } cTotalFixes += cFixes; if (!g_fSupAdversaries) g_fSupAdversaries |= SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_UNKNOWN; cMsFudge = 512; /* * Log the KiOpPrefetchPatchCount value if available, hoping it might * sched some light on spider38's case. */ ULONG cPatchCount = 0; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemInformation_KiOpPrefetchPatchCount, &cPatchCount, sizeof(cPatchCount), NULL); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtChildPurify: cFixes=%u g_fSupAdversaries=%#x cPatchCount=%#u\n", cFixes, g_fSupAdversaries, cPatchCount)); else SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtChildPurify: cFixes=%u g_fSupAdversaries=%#x\n", cFixes, g_fSupAdversaries)); } /* * We've given up fixing the child process. Probably fighting someone * that monitors their patches or/and our activities. */ supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardNtChildPurify", VERR_TRY_AGAIN, "Unable to purify child process! After 16 tries over %llu ms, we still %u fix(es) in the last pass.", supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS() - uMsTsOuterStart, cFixes); } /** * Sets up the early process init. * * @param pThis The child process data structure. */ static void supR3HardNtChildSetUpChildInit(PSUPR3HARDNTCHILD pThis) { uintptr_t const uChildExeAddr = (uintptr_t)pThis->Peb.ImageBaseAddress; /* * Plant the process parameters. This ASSUMES the handle inheritance is * performed when creating the child process. */ RT_ZERO(pThis->ProcParams); pThis->ProcParams.hEvtChild = pThis->hEvtChild; pThis->ProcParams.hEvtParent = pThis->hEvtParent; pThis->ProcParams.uNtDllAddr = pThis->uNtDllAddr; pThis->ProcParams.enmRequest = kSupR3WinChildReq_Error; pThis->ProcParams.rc = VINF_SUCCESS; uintptr_t uChildAddr = uChildExeAddr + ((uintptr_t)&g_ProcParams - (uintptr_t)NtCurrentPeb()->ImageBaseAddress); SIZE_T cbIgnored; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtWriteVirtualMemory(pThis->hProcess, (PVOID)uChildAddr, &pThis->ProcParams, sizeof(pThis->ProcParams), &cbIgnored); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardenedWinSetupChildInit", rcNt, "NtWriteVirtualMemory(,%p,) failed writing child process parameters: %#x\n", uChildAddr, rcNt); /* * Locate the LdrInitializeThunk address in the child as well as pristine * code bits for it. */ PSUPHNTLDRCACHEENTRY pLdrEntry; int rc = supHardNtLdrCacheOpen("ntdll.dll", &pLdrEntry); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardenedWinSetupChildInit", rc, "supHardNtLdrCacheOpen failed on NTDLL: %Rrc\n", rc); uint8_t *pbChildNtDllBits; rc = supHardNtLdrCacheEntryGetBits(pLdrEntry, &pbChildNtDllBits, pThis->uNtDllAddr, NULL, NULL, NULL /*pErrInfo*/); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardenedWinSetupChildInit", rc, "supHardNtLdrCacheEntryGetBits failed on NTDLL: %Rrc\n", rc); RTLDRADDR uLdrInitThunk; rc = RTLdrGetSymbolEx(pLdrEntry->hLdrMod, pbChildNtDllBits, pThis->uNtDllAddr, UINT32_MAX, "LdrInitializeThunk", &uLdrInitThunk); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardenedWinSetupChildInit", rc, "Error locating LdrInitializeThunk in NTDLL: %Rrc", rc); PVOID pvLdrInitThunk = (PVOID)(uintptr_t)uLdrInitThunk; SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinSetupChildInit: uLdrInitThunk=%p\n", (uintptr_t)uLdrInitThunk)); /* * Calculate the address of our code in the child process. */ uintptr_t uEarlyProcInitEP = uChildExeAddr + ( (uintptr_t)&supR3HardenedEarlyProcessInitThunk - (uintptr_t)NtCurrentPeb()->ImageBaseAddress); /* * Compose the LdrInitializeThunk replacement bytes. * Note! The amount of code we replace here must be less or equal to what * the process verification code ignores. */ uint8_t abNew[16]; memcpy(abNew, pbChildNtDllBits + ((uintptr_t)uLdrInitThunk - pThis->uNtDllAddr), sizeof(abNew)); #ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 abNew[0] = 0xff; abNew[1] = 0x25; *(uint32_t *)&abNew[2] = 0; *(uint64_t *)&abNew[6] = uEarlyProcInitEP; #elif defined(RT_ARCH_X86) abNew[0] = 0xe9; *(uint32_t *)&abNew[1] = uEarlyProcInitEP - ((uint32_t)uLdrInitThunk + 5); #else # error "Unsupported arch." #endif /* * Install the LdrInitializeThunk replacement code in the child process. */ PVOID pvProt = pvLdrInitThunk; SIZE_T cbProt = sizeof(abNew); ULONG fOldProt; rcNt = NtProtectVirtualMemory(pThis->hProcess, &pvProt, &cbProt, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &fOldProt); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardenedWinSetupChildInit", rcNt, "NtProtectVirtualMemory/LdrInitializeThunk failed: %#x", rcNt); rcNt = NtWriteVirtualMemory(pThis->hProcess, pvLdrInitThunk, abNew, sizeof(abNew), &cbIgnored); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardenedWinSetupChildInit", rcNt, "NtWriteVirtualMemory/LdrInitializeThunk failed: %#x", rcNt); pvProt = pvLdrInitThunk; cbProt = sizeof(abNew); rcNt = NtProtectVirtualMemory(pThis->hProcess, &pvProt, &cbProt, fOldProt, &fOldProt); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardenedWinSetupChildInit", rcNt, "NtProtectVirtualMemory/LdrInitializeThunk[restore] failed: %#x", rcNt); /* Caller starts child execution. */ SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinSetupChildInit: Start child.\n")); } /** * This messes with the child PEB before we trigger the initial image events. * * @param pThis The child process data structure. */ static void supR3HardNtChildScrewUpPebForInitialImageEvents(PSUPR3HARDNTCHILD pThis) { /* * Not sure if any of the cracker software uses the PEB at this point, but * just in case they do make some of the PEB fields a little less useful. */ PEB Peb = pThis->Peb; /* Make ImageBaseAddress useless. */ Peb.ImageBaseAddress = (PVOID)((uintptr_t)Peb.ImageBaseAddress ^ UINT32_C(0x5f139000)); #ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64 Peb.ImageBaseAddress = (PVOID)((uintptr_t)Peb.ImageBaseAddress | UINT64_C(0x0313000000000000)); #endif /* * Write the PEB. */ SIZE_T cbActualMem = pThis->cbPeb; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtWriteVirtualMemory(pThis->hProcess, pThis->BasicInfo.PebBaseAddress, &Peb, pThis->cbPeb, &cbActualMem); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardNtChildScrewUpPebForInitialImageEvents", rcNt, "NtWriteVirtualMemory/Peb failed: %#x", rcNt); } /** * Check if the zero terminated NT unicode string is the path to the given * system32 DLL. * * @returns true if it is, false if not. * @param pUniStr The zero terminated NT unicode string path. * @param pszName The name of the system32 DLL. */ static bool supR3HardNtIsNamedSystem32Dll(PUNICODE_STRING pUniStr, const char *pszName) { if (pUniStr->Length > g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length) { if (memcmp(pUniStr->Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length) == 0) { if (pUniStr->Buffer[g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] == '\\') { if (RTUtf16ICmpAscii(&pUniStr->Buffer[g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR) + 1], pszName) == 0) return true; } } } return false; } /** * Worker for supR3HardNtChildGatherData that locates NTDLL in the child * process. * * @param pThis The child process data structure. */ static void supR3HardNtChildFindNtdll(PSUPR3HARDNTCHILD pThis) { /* * Find NTDLL in this process first and take that as a starting point. */ pThis->uNtDllParentAddr = (uintptr_t)GetModuleHandleW(L"ntdll.dll"); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(pThis->uNtDllParentAddr != 0 && !(pThis->uNtDllParentAddr & PAGE_OFFSET_MASK)); pThis->uNtDllAddr = pThis->uNtDllParentAddr; /* * Scan the virtual memory of the child. */ uintptr_t cbAdvance = 0; uintptr_t uPtrWhere = 0; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < 1024; i++) { /* Query information. */ SIZE_T cbActual = 0; MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION MemInfo = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryVirtualMemory(pThis->hProcess, (void const *)uPtrWhere, MemoryBasicInformation, &MemInfo, sizeof(MemInfo), &cbActual); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) break; if ( MemInfo.Type == SEC_IMAGE || MemInfo.Type == SEC_PROTECTED_IMAGE || MemInfo.Type == (SEC_IMAGE | SEC_PROTECTED_IMAGE)) { if (MemInfo.BaseAddress == MemInfo.AllocationBase) { /* Get the image name. */ union { UNICODE_STRING UniStr; uint8_t abPadding[4096]; } uBuf; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryVirtualMemory(pThis->hProcess, MemInfo.BaseAddress, MemorySectionName, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR), &cbActual); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { uBuf.UniStr.Buffer[uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0'; if (supR3HardNtIsNamedSystem32Dll(&uBuf.UniStr, "ntdll.dll")) { pThis->uNtDllAddr = (uintptr_t)MemInfo.AllocationBase; SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtPuChFindNtdll: uNtDllParentAddr=%p uNtDllChildAddr=%p\n", pThis->uNtDllParentAddr, pThis->uNtDllAddr)); return; } } } } /* * Advance. */ cbAdvance = MemInfo.RegionSize; if (uPtrWhere + cbAdvance <= uPtrWhere) break; uPtrWhere += MemInfo.RegionSize; } supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardNtChildFindNtdll", VERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND, "ntdll.dll not found in child process."); } /** * Gather child data. * * @param This The child process data structure. */ static void supR3HardNtChildGatherData(PSUPR3HARDNTCHILD pThis) { /* * Basic info. */ ULONG cbActual = 0; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationProcess(pThis->hProcess, ProcessBasicInformation, &pThis->BasicInfo, sizeof(pThis->BasicInfo), &cbActual); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardNtChildGatherData", rcNt, "NtQueryInformationProcess/ProcessBasicInformation failed: %#x", rcNt); /* * If this is the middle (stub) process, we wish to wait for both child * and parent. So open the parent process. Not fatal if we cannnot. */ if (pThis->iWhich > 1) { PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION SelfInfo; rcNt = NtQueryInformationProcess(NtCurrentProcess(), ProcessBasicInformation, &SelfInfo, sizeof(SelfInfo), &cbActual); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, NULL, 0, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); CLIENT_ID ClientId; ClientId.UniqueProcess = (HANDLE)SelfInfo.InheritedFromUniqueProcessId; ClientId.UniqueThread = NULL; rcNt = NtOpenProcess(&pThis->hParent, SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, &ObjAttr, &ClientId); #ifdef DEBUG SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(rcNt); #endif if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { pThis->hParent = NULL; SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtChildGatherData: Failed to open parent process (%#p): %#x\n", ClientId.UniqueProcess, rcNt)); } } } /* * Process environment block. */ if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_W2K3) pThis->cbPeb = PEB_SIZE_W51; else if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA) pThis->cbPeb = PEB_SIZE_W52; else if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_W70) pThis->cbPeb = PEB_SIZE_W6; else if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_W80) pThis->cbPeb = PEB_SIZE_W7; else if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_W81) pThis->cbPeb = PEB_SIZE_W80; else pThis->cbPeb = PEB_SIZE_W81; SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtChildGatherData: PebBaseAddress=%p cbPeb=%#x\n", pThis->BasicInfo.PebBaseAddress, pThis->cbPeb)); SIZE_T cbActualMem; RT_ZERO(pThis->Peb); rcNt = NtReadVirtualMemory(pThis->hProcess, pThis->BasicInfo.PebBaseAddress, &pThis->Peb, sizeof(pThis->Peb), &cbActualMem); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(pThis, "supR3HardNtChildGatherData", rcNt, "NtReadVirtualMemory/Peb failed: %#x", rcNt); /* * Locate NtDll. */ supR3HardNtChildFindNtdll(pThis); } /** * Does the actually respawning. * * @returns Never, will call exit or raise fatal error. * @param iWhich Which respawn we're to check for, 1 being the * first one, and 2 the second and final. */ static void supR3HardenedWinDoReSpawn(int iWhich) { NTSTATUS rcNt; PPEB pPeb = NtCurrentPeb(); PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS pParentProcParams = pPeb->ProcessParameters; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(g_cSuplibHardenedWindowsMainCalls == 1); /* * Init the child process data structure, creating the child communication * event sempahores. */ SUPR3HARDNTCHILD This; RT_ZERO(This); This.iWhich = iWhich; OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttrs; This.hEvtChild = NULL; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttrs, NULL /*pName*/, OBJ_INHERIT, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(NtCreateEvent(&This.hEvtChild, EVENT_ALL_ACCESS, &ObjAttrs, SynchronizationEvent, FALSE)); This.hEvtParent = NULL; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttrs, NULL /*pName*/, OBJ_INHERIT, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(NtCreateEvent(&This.hEvtParent, EVENT_ALL_ACCESS, &ObjAttrs, SynchronizationEvent, FALSE)); /* * Set up security descriptors. */ SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES ProcessSecAttrs; MYSECURITYCLEANUP ProcessSecAttrsCleanup; supR3HardNtChildInitSecAttrs(&ProcessSecAttrs, &ProcessSecAttrsCleanup, true /*fProcess*/); SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES ThreadSecAttrs; MYSECURITYCLEANUP ThreadSecAttrsCleanup; supR3HardNtChildInitSecAttrs(&ThreadSecAttrs, &ThreadSecAttrsCleanup, false /*fProcess*/); #if 1 /* * Configure the startup info and creation flags. */ DWORD dwCreationFlags = CREATE_SUSPENDED; STARTUPINFOEXW SiEx; suplibHardenedMemSet(&SiEx, 0, sizeof(SiEx)); if (1) SiEx.StartupInfo.cb = sizeof(SiEx.StartupInfo); else { SiEx.StartupInfo.cb = sizeof(SiEx); dwCreationFlags |= EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT; /** @todo experiment with protected process stuff later on. */ } SiEx.StartupInfo.dwFlags |= pParentProcParams->WindowFlags & STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW; SiEx.StartupInfo.wShowWindow = (WORD)pParentProcParams->ShowWindowFlags; SiEx.StartupInfo.dwFlags |= STARTF_USESTDHANDLES; SiEx.StartupInfo.hStdInput = pParentProcParams->StandardInput; SiEx.StartupInfo.hStdOutput = pParentProcParams->StandardOutput; SiEx.StartupInfo.hStdError = pParentProcParams->StandardError; /* * Construct the command line and launch the process. */ PRTUTF16 pwszCmdLine = supR3HardNtChildConstructCmdLine(NULL, iWhich); supR3HardenedWinEnableThreadCreation(); PROCESS_INFORMATION ProcessInfoW32; if (!CreateProcessW(g_wszSupLibHardenedExePath, pwszCmdLine, &ProcessSecAttrs, &ThreadSecAttrs, TRUE /*fInheritHandles*/, dwCreationFlags, NULL /*pwszzEnvironment*/, NULL /*pwszCurDir*/, &SiEx.StartupInfo, &ProcessInfoW32)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", kSupInitOp_Misc, VERR_INVALID_NAME, "Error relaunching VirtualBox VM process: %u\n" "Command line: '%ls'", RtlGetLastWin32Error(), pwszCmdLine); supR3HardenedWinDisableThreadCreation(); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinDoReSpawn(%d): New child %x.%x [kernel32].\n", iWhich, ProcessInfoW32.dwProcessId, ProcessInfoW32.dwThreadId)); This.hProcess = ProcessInfoW32.hProcess; This.hThread = ProcessInfoW32.hThread; #else /* * Construct the process parameters. */ UNICODE_STRING W32ImageName; W32ImageName.Buffer = g_wszSupLibHardenedExePath; /* Yes the windows name for the process parameters. */ W32ImageName.Length = (USHORT)RTUtf16Len(g_wszSupLibHardenedExePath) * sizeof(WCHAR); W32ImageName.MaximumLength = W32ImageName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); UNICODE_STRING CmdLine; supR3HardNtChildConstructCmdLine(&CmdLine, iWhich); PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS pProcParams = NULL; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(RtlCreateProcessParameters(&pProcParams, &W32ImageName, NULL /* DllPath - inherit from this process */, NULL /* CurrentDirectory - inherit from this process */, &CmdLine, NULL /* Environment - inherit from this process */, NULL /* WindowsTitle - none */, NULL /* DesktopTitle - none. */, NULL /* ShellInfo - none. */, NULL /* RuntimeInfo - none (byte array for MSVCRT file info) */) ); /** @todo this doesn't work. :-( */ pProcParams->ConsoleHandle = pParentProcParams->ConsoleHandle; pProcParams->ConsoleFlags = pParentProcParams->ConsoleFlags; pProcParams->StandardInput = pParentProcParams->StandardInput; pProcParams->StandardOutput = pParentProcParams->StandardOutput; pProcParams->StandardError = pParentProcParams->StandardError; RTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION ProcessInfoNt = { sizeof(ProcessInfoNt) }; rcNt = RtlCreateUserProcess(&g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr, OBJ_INHERIT | OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE /*Attributes*/, pProcParams, NULL, //&ProcessSecAttrs, NULL, //&ThreadSecAttrs, NtCurrentProcess() /* ParentProcess */, FALSE /*fInheritHandles*/, NULL /* DebugPort */, NULL /* ExceptionPort */, &ProcessInfoNt); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", kSupInitOp_Misc, VERR_INVALID_NAME, "Error relaunching VirtualBox VM process: %#x\n" "Command line: '%ls'", rcNt, CmdLine.Buffer); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinDoReSpawn(%d): New child %x.%x [ntdll].\n", iWhich, ProcessInfo.ClientId.UniqueProcess, ProcessInfo.ClientId.UniqueThread)); RtlDestroyProcessParameters(pProcParams); This.hProcess = ProcessInfoNt.ProcessHandle; This.hThread = ProcessInfoNt.ThreadHandle; #endif #ifndef VBOX_WITHOUT_DEBUGGER_CHECKS /* * Apply anti debugger notification trick to the thread. (Also done in * supR3HardenedWinInit.) This may fail with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED and * maybe other errors. (Unfortunately, recent (SEP 12.1) of symantec's * sysplant.sys driver will cause process deadlocks and a shutdown/reboot * denial of service problem if we hide the initial thread, so we postpone * this action if we've detected SEP.) */ if (!(g_fSupAdversaries & (SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_SYSPLANT | SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360))) { rcNt = NtSetInformationThread(This.hThread, ThreadHideFromDebugger, NULL, 0); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinReSpawn: NtSetInformationThread/ThreadHideFromDebugger failed: %#x (harmless)\n", rcNt)); } #endif /* * Perform very early child initialization. */ supR3HardNtChildGatherData(&This); supR3HardNtChildScrewUpPebForInitialImageEvents(&This); supR3HardNtChildSetUpChildInit(&This); ULONG cSuspendCount = 0; rcNt = NtResumeThread(This.hThread, &cSuspendCount); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(&This, "supR3HardenedWinDoReSpawn", rcNt, "NtResumeThread failed: %#x", rcNt); /* * Santizie the pre-NTDLL child when it's ready. * * AV software and other things injecting themselves into the embryonic * and budding process to intercept API calls and what not. Unfortunately * this is also the behavior of viruses, malware and other unfriendly * software, so we won't stand for it. AV software can scan our image * as they are loaded via kernel hooks, that's sufficient. No need for * patching half of NTDLL or messing with the import table of the * process executable. */ supR3HardNtChildWaitFor(&This, kSupR3WinChildReq_PurifyChildAndCloseHandles, 2000 /*ms*/, "PurifyChildAndCloseHandles"); supR3HardNtChildPurify(&This); supR3HardNtChildSanitizePeb(&This); /* * Close the unrestricted access handles. Since we need to wait on the * child process, we'll reopen the process with limited access before doing * away with the process handle returned by CreateProcess. */ supR3HardNtChildCloseFullAccessHandles(&This); /* * Signal the child that we've closed the unrestricted handles and it can * safely try open the driver. */ rcNt = NtSetEvent(This.hEvtChild, NULL); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedWinKillChild(&This, "supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", VERR_INVALID_NAME, "NtSetEvent failed on child process handle: %#x\n", rcNt); /* * Ditch the loader cache so we don't sit on too much memory while waiting. */ supR3HardenedWinFlushLoaderCache(); supR3HardenedWinCompactHeaps(); /* * Enable thread creation at this point so Ctrl-C and Ctrl-Break can be processed. */ supR3HardenedWinEnableThreadCreation(); /* * Wait for the child to get to suplibHardenedWindowsMain so we can close the handles. */ supR3HardNtChildWaitFor(&This, kSupR3WinChildReq_CloseEvents, 60000 /*ms*/, "CloseEvents"); NtClose(This.hEvtChild); NtClose(This.hEvtParent); This.hEvtChild = NULL; This.hEvtParent = NULL; /* * Wait for the process to terminate. */ supR3HardNtChildWaitFor(&This, kSupR3WinChildReq_End, RT_INDEFINITE_WAIT, "the end"); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(false); /* We're not supposed to get here! */ } /** * Logs the content of the given object directory. * * @returns true if it exists, false if not. * @param pszDir The path of the directory to log (ASCII). */ static void supR3HardenedWinLogObjDir(const char *pszDir) { /* * Open the driver object directory. */ RTUTF16 wszDir[128]; int rc = RTUtf16CopyAscii(wszDir, RT_ELEMENTS(wszDir), pszDir); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinLogObjDir: RTUtf16CopyAscii -> %Rrc on '%s'\n", rc, pszDir)); return; } UNICODE_STRING NtDirName; NtDirName.Buffer = (WCHAR *)wszDir; NtDirName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(wszDir) * sizeof(WCHAR)); NtDirName.MaximumLength = NtDirName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtDirName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); HANDLE hDir; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtOpenDirectoryObject(&hDir, DIRECTORY_QUERY | FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY, &ObjAttr); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinLogObjDir: %ls => %#x\n", wszDir, rcNt)); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) return; /* * Enumerate it, looking for the driver. */ ULONG uObjDirCtx = 0; for (;;) { uint32_t abBuffer[_64K + _1K]; ULONG cbActual; rcNt = NtQueryDirectoryObject(hDir, abBuffer, sizeof(abBuffer) - 4, /* minus four for string terminator space. */ FALSE /*ReturnSingleEntry */, FALSE /*RestartScan*/, &uObjDirCtx, &cbActual); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) || cbActual < sizeof(OBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION)) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinLogObjDir: NtQueryDirectoryObject => rcNt=%#x cbActual=%#x\n", rcNt, cbActual)); break; } POBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION pObjDir = (POBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION)abBuffer; while (pObjDir->Name.Length != 0) { WCHAR wcSaved = pObjDir->Name.Buffer[pObjDir->Name.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)]; SUP_DPRINTF((" %.*ls %.*ls\n", pObjDir->TypeName.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pObjDir->TypeName.Buffer, pObjDir->Name.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), pObjDir->Name.Buffer)); /* Next directory entry. */ pObjDir++; } } /* * Clean up and return. */ NtClose(hDir); } /** * Tries to open VBoxDrvErrorInfo and read extra error info from it. * * @returns pszErrorInfo. * @param pszErrorInfo The destination buffer. Will always be * terminated. * @param cbErrorInfo The size of the destination buffer. * @param pszPrefix What to prefix the error info with, if we got * anything. */ DECLHIDDEN(char *) supR3HardenedWinReadErrorInfoDevice(char *pszErrorInfo, size_t cbErrorInfo, const char *pszPrefix) { RT_BZERO(pszErrorInfo, cbErrorInfo); /* * Try open the device. */ HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; UNICODE_STRING NtName = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(SUPDRV_NT_DEVICE_NAME_ERROR_INFO); OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, GENERIC_READ, /* No SYNCHRONIZE. */ &ObjAttr, &Ios, NULL /* Allocation Size*/, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_OPEN, FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE, /* No FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT. */ NULL /*EaBuffer*/, 0 /*EaLength*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) rcNt = Ios.Status; if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { /* * Try read error info. */ size_t cchPrefix = strlen(pszPrefix); if (cchPrefix + 3 < cbErrorInfo) { LARGE_INTEGER offRead; offRead.QuadPart = 0; rcNt = NtReadFile(hFile, NULL /*hEvent*/, NULL /*ApcRoutine*/, NULL /*ApcContext*/, &Ios, &pszErrorInfo[cchPrefix], (ULONG)(cbErrorInfo - cchPrefix - 1), &offRead, NULL); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { memcpy(pszErrorInfo, pszPrefix, cchPrefix); pszErrorInfo[cbErrorInfo - 1] = '\0'; SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinReadErrorInfoDevice: '%s'", &pszErrorInfo[cchPrefix])); } else { *pszErrorInfo = '\0'; if (rcNt != STATUS_END_OF_FILE) SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinReadErrorInfoDevice: NtReadFile -> %#x\n", rcNt)); } } else RTStrCopy(pszErrorInfo, cbErrorInfo, "error info buffer too small"); NtClose(hFile); } else SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinReadErrorInfoDevice: NtCreateFile -> %#x\n", rcNt)); return pszErrorInfo; } /** * Checks if the driver exists. * * This checks whether the driver is present in the /Driver object directory. * Drivers being initialized or terminated will have an object there * before/after their devices nodes are created/deleted. * * @returns true if it exists, false if not. * @param pszDriver The driver name. */ static bool supR3HardenedWinDriverExists(const char *pszDriver) { /* * Open the driver object directory. */ UNICODE_STRING NtDirName = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L"\\Driver"); OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtDirName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); HANDLE hDir; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtOpenDirectoryObject(&hDir, DIRECTORY_QUERY | FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY, &ObjAttr); #ifdef VBOX_STRICT SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(rcNt); #endif if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) return true; /* * Enumerate it, looking for the driver. */ bool fFound = true; ULONG uObjDirCtx = 0; do { uint32_t abBuffer[_64K + _1K]; ULONG cbActual; rcNt = NtQueryDirectoryObject(hDir, abBuffer, sizeof(abBuffer) - 4, /* minus four for string terminator space. */ FALSE /*ReturnSingleEntry */, FALSE /*RestartScan*/, &uObjDirCtx, &cbActual); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) || cbActual < sizeof(OBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION)) break; POBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION pObjDir = (POBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION)abBuffer; while (pObjDir->Name.Length != 0) { WCHAR wcSaved = pObjDir->Name.Buffer[pObjDir->Name.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)]; pObjDir->Name.Buffer[pObjDir->Name.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0'; if ( pObjDir->Name.Length > 1 && RTUtf16ICmpAscii(pObjDir->Name.Buffer, pszDriver) == 0) { fFound = true; break; } pObjDir->Name.Buffer[pObjDir->Name.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = wcSaved; /* Next directory entry. */ pObjDir++; } } while (!fFound); /* * Clean up and return. */ NtClose(hDir); return fFound; } /** * Open the stub device before the 2nd respawn. */ static void supR3HardenedWinOpenStubDevice(void) { if (g_fSupStubOpened) return; /* * Retry if we think driver might still be initializing (STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE + \Drivers\VBoxDrv). */ static const WCHAR s_wszName[] = SUPDRV_NT_DEVICE_NAME_STUB; uint64_t const uMsTsStart = supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS(); NTSTATUS rcNt; uint32_t iTry; for (iTry = 0;; iTry++) { HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; UNICODE_STRING NtName; NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszName; NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszName) - sizeof(WCHAR); NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszName); OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, /* No SYNCHRONIZE. */ &ObjAttr, &Ios, NULL /* Allocation Size*/, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_OPEN, FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE, /* No FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT. */ NULL /*EaBuffer*/, 0 /*EaLength*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) rcNt = Ios.Status; /* The STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE might be returned if the device is not completely initialized. Delay a little bit and try again. */ if (rcNt != STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE) break; if (iTry > 0 && supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS() - uMsTsStart > 5000) /* 5 sec, at least two tries */ break; if (!supR3HardenedWinDriverExists("VBoxDrv")) { /** @todo Consider starting the VBoxdrv.sys service. Requires 2nd process * though, rather complicated actually as CreateProcess causes all * kind of things to happen to this process which would make it hard to * pass the process verification tests... :-/ */ break; } LARGE_INTEGER Time; if (iTry < 8) Time.QuadPart = -1000000 / 100; /* 1ms in 100ns units, relative time. */ else Time.QuadPart = -32000000 / 100; /* 32ms in 100ns units, relative time. */ NtDelayExecution(TRUE, &Time); } if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) g_fSupStubOpened = true; else { /* * Report trouble (fatal). For some errors codes we try gather some * extra information that goes into VBoxStartup.log so that we stand a * better chance resolving the issue. */ char szErrorInfo[_4K]; int rc = VERR_OPEN_FAILED; if (SUP_NT_STATUS_IS_VBOX(rcNt)) /* See VBoxDrvNtErr2NtStatus. */ { rc = SUP_NT_STATUS_TO_VBOX(rcNt); /* * \Windows\ApiPort open trouble. So far only * STATUS_OBJECT_TYPE_MISMATCH has been observed. */ if (rc == VERR_SUPDRV_APIPORT_OPEN_ERROR) { SUP_DPRINTF(("Error opening VBoxDrvStub: VERR_SUPDRV_APIPORT_OPEN_ERROR\n")); uint32_t uSessionId = NtCurrentPeb()->SessionId; SUP_DPRINTF((" SessionID=%#x\n", uSessionId)); char szDir[64]; if (uSessionId == 0) RTStrCopy(szDir, sizeof(szDir), "\\Windows"); else { RTStrPrintf(szDir, sizeof(szDir), "\\Sessions\\%u\\Windows", uSessionId); supR3HardenedWinLogObjDir(szDir); } supR3HardenedWinLogObjDir("\\Windows"); supR3HardenedWinLogObjDir("\\Sessions"); supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", kSupInitOp_Misc, rc, "NtCreateFile(%ls) failed: VERR_SUPDRV_APIPORT_OPEN_ERROR\n" "\n" "Error getting %s\\ApiPort in the driver from vboxdrv.\n" "\n" "Could be due to security software is redirecting access to it, so please include full " "details of such software in a bug report. VBoxStartup.log may contain details important " "to resolving the issue.%s" , s_wszName, szDir, supR3HardenedWinReadErrorInfoDevice(szErrorInfo, sizeof(szErrorInfo), "\n\nVBoxDrvStub error: ")); } /* * Generic VBox failure message. */ supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", kSupInitOp_Driver, rc, "NtCreateFile(%ls) failed: %Rrc (rcNt=%#x)%s", s_wszName, rc, rcNt, supR3HardenedWinReadErrorInfoDevice(szErrorInfo, sizeof(szErrorInfo), "\nVBoxDrvStub error: ")); } else { const char *pszDefine; switch (rcNt) { case STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE: pszDefine = " STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE"; break; case STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND: pszDefine = " STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND"; break; case STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED: pszDefine = " STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED"; break; case STATUS_TRUST_FAILURE: pszDefine = " STATUS_TRUST_FAILURE"; break; default: pszDefine = ""; break; } /* * Problems opening the device is generally due to driver load/ * unload issues. Check whether the driver is loaded and make * suggestions accordingly. */ /** @todo don't fail during early init, wait till later and try load the driver if missing or at least query the service manager for additional information. */ if ( rcNt == STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE || rcNt == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND) { SUP_DPRINTF(("Error opening VBoxDrvStub: %s\n", pszDefine)); if (supR3HardenedWinDriverExists("VBoxDrv")) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", kSupInitOp_Driver, VERR_OPEN_FAILED, "NtCreateFile(%ls) failed: %#x%s (%u retries)\n" "\n" "Driver is probably stuck stopping/starting. Try 'sc.exe query vboxdrv' to get more " "information about its state. Rebooting may actually help.%s" , s_wszName, rcNt, pszDefine, iTry, supR3HardenedWinReadErrorInfoDevice(szErrorInfo, sizeof(szErrorInfo), "\nVBoxDrvStub error: ")); else supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", kSupInitOp_Driver, VERR_OPEN_FAILED, "NtCreateFile(%ls) failed: %#x%s (%u retries)\n" "\n" "Driver is does not appear to be loaded. Try 'sc.exe start vboxdrv', reinstall " "VirtualBox or reboot.%s" , s_wszName, rcNt, pszDefine, iTry, supR3HardenedWinReadErrorInfoDevice(szErrorInfo, sizeof(szErrorInfo), "\nVBoxDrvStub error: ")); } /* Generic NT failure message. */ supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", kSupInitOp_Driver, VERR_OPEN_FAILED, "NtCreateFile(%ls) failed: %#x%s (%u retries)%s", s_wszName, rcNt, pszDefine, iTry, supR3HardenedWinReadErrorInfoDevice(szErrorInfo, sizeof(szErrorInfo), "\nVBoxDrvStub error: ")); } } } /** * Called by the main code if supR3HardenedWinIsReSpawnNeeded returns @c true. * * @returns Program exit code. */ DECLHIDDEN(int) supR3HardenedWinReSpawn(int iWhich) { /* * Before the 2nd respawn we set up a child protection deal with the * support driver via /Devices/VBoxDrvStub. (We tried to do this * during the early init, but in case we had trouble accessing vboxdrv we * retry it here where we have kernel32.dll and others to pull in for * better diagnostics.) */ if (iWhich == 2) supR3HardenedWinOpenStubDevice(); /* * Make sure we're alone in the stub process before creating the VM process * and that there isn't any debuggers attached. */ if (iWhich == 2) { int rc = supHardNtVpDebugger(NtCurrentProcess(), RTErrInfoInitStatic(&g_ErrInfoStatic)); if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) rc = supHardNtVpThread(NtCurrentProcess(), NtCurrentThread(), RTErrInfoInitStatic(&g_ErrInfoStatic)); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinReSpawn", kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc, "%s", g_ErrInfoStatic.szMsg); } /* * Respawn the process with kernel protection for the new process. */ supR3HardenedWinDoReSpawn(iWhich); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(false); /* We're not supposed to get here! */ return RTEXITCODE_FAILURE; } /** * Checks if re-spawning is required, replacing the respawn argument if not. * * @returns true if required, false if not. In the latter case, the first * argument in the vector is replaced. * @param iWhich Which respawn we're to check for, 1 being the * first one, and 2 the second and final. * @param cArgs The number of arguments. * @param papszArgs Pointer to the argument vector. */ DECLHIDDEN(bool) supR3HardenedWinIsReSpawnNeeded(int iWhich, int cArgs, char **papszArgs) { SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(g_cSuplibHardenedWindowsMainCalls == 1); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(iWhich == 1 || iWhich == 2); if (cArgs < 1) return true; if (suplibHardenedStrCmp(papszArgs[0], SUPR3_RESPAWN_1_ARG0) == 0) { if (iWhich > 1) return true; } else if (suplibHardenedStrCmp(papszArgs[0], SUPR3_RESPAWN_2_ARG0) == 0) { if (iWhich < 2) return false; } else return true; /* Replace the argument. */ papszArgs[0] = g_szSupLibHardenedExePath; return false; } /** * Initializes the windows verficiation bits and other things we're better off * doing after main() has passed on it's data. * * @param fFlags The main flags. * @param fAvastKludge Whether to apply the avast kludge. */ DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinInit(uint32_t fFlags, bool fAvastKludge) { NTSTATUS rcNt; #ifndef VBOX_WITHOUT_DEBUGGER_CHECKS /* * Install a anti debugging hack before we continue. This prevents most * notifications from ending up in the debugger. (Also applied to the * child process when respawning.) */ rcNt = NtSetInformationThread(NtCurrentThread(), ThreadHideFromDebugger, NULL, 0); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinInit", kSupInitOp_Misc, VERR_GENERAL_FAILURE, "NtSetInformationThread/ThreadHideFromDebugger failed: %#x\n", rcNt); #endif /* * Init the verifier. */ RTErrInfoInitStatic(&g_ErrInfoStatic); int rc = supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier(&g_ErrInfoStatic.Core); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinInit", kSupInitOp_Misc, rc, "supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier failed: %s", g_ErrInfoStatic.szMsg); /* * Get the windows system directory from the KnownDlls dir. */ HANDLE hSymlink = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; UNICODE_STRING UniStr = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L"\\KnownDlls\\KnownDllPath"); OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttrs; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttrs, &UniStr, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); rcNt = NtOpenSymbolicLinkObject(&hSymlink, SYMBOLIC_LINK_QUERY, &ObjAttrs); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinInit", kSupInitOp_Misc, rcNt, "Error opening '%ls': %#x", UniStr.Buffer, rcNt); g_System32WinPath.UniStr.Buffer = g_System32WinPath.awcBuffer; g_System32WinPath.UniStr.Length = 0; g_System32WinPath.UniStr.MaximumLength = sizeof(g_System32WinPath.awcBuffer) - sizeof(RTUTF16); rcNt = NtQuerySymbolicLinkObject(hSymlink, &g_System32WinPath.UniStr, NULL); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinInit", kSupInitOp_Misc, rcNt, "Error querying '%ls': %#x", UniStr.Buffer, rcNt); g_System32WinPath.UniStr.Buffer[g_System32WinPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(RTUTF16)] = '\0'; SUP_DPRINTF(("KnownDllPath: %ls\n", g_System32WinPath.UniStr.Buffer)); NtClose(hSymlink); if (!(fFlags & SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_DONT_OPEN_DEV)) { if (fAvastKludge) { /* * Do a self purification to cure avast's weird NtOpenFile write-thru * change in GetBinaryTypeW change in kernel32. Unfortunately, avast * uses a system thread to perform the process modifications, which * means it's hard to make sure it had the chance to make them... * * We have to resort to kludge doing yield and sleep fudging for a * number of milliseconds and schedulings before we can hope that avast * and similar products have done what they need to do. If we do any * fixes, we wait for a while again and redo it until we're clean. * * This is unfortunately kind of fragile. */ uint32_t cMsFudge = g_fSupAdversaries ? 512 : 128; uint32_t cFixes; for (uint32_t iLoop = 0; iLoop < 16; iLoop++) { uint32_t cSleeps = 0; uint64_t uMsTsStart = supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS(); do { NtYieldExecution(); LARGE_INTEGER Time; Time.QuadPart = -8000000 / 100; /* 8ms in 100ns units, relative time. */ NtDelayExecution(FALSE, &Time); cSleeps++; } while ( supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS() - uMsTsStart <= cMsFudge || cSleeps < 8); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinInit: Startup delay kludge #2/%u: %u ms, %u sleeps\n", iLoop, supR3HardenedWinGetMilliTS() - uMsTsStart, cSleeps)); cFixes = 0; rc = supHardenedWinVerifyProcess(NtCurrentProcess(), NtCurrentThread(), SUPHARDNTVPKIND_SELF_PURIFICATION, 0 /*fFlags*/, &cFixes, NULL /*pErrInfo*/); if (RT_FAILURE(rc) || cFixes == 0) break; if (!g_fSupAdversaries) g_fSupAdversaries |= SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_UNKNOWN; cMsFudge = 512; /* Log the KiOpPrefetchPatchCount value if available, hoping it might sched some light on spider38's case. */ ULONG cPatchCount = 0; rcNt = NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemInformation_KiOpPrefetchPatchCount, &cPatchCount, sizeof(cPatchCount), NULL); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinInit: cFixes=%u g_fSupAdversaries=%#x cPatchCount=%#u\n", cFixes, g_fSupAdversaries, cPatchCount)); else SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinInit: cFixes=%u g_fSupAdversaries=%#x\n", cFixes, g_fSupAdversaries)); } } /* * Install the hooks. */ supR3HardenedWinInstallHooks(); } #ifndef VBOX_WITH_VISTA_NO_SP /* * Complain about Vista w/o service pack if we're launching a VM. */ if ( !(fFlags & SUPSECMAIN_FLAGS_DONT_OPEN_DEV) && g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_NT_VER_VISTA && g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED(6, 0, 6001, 0, 0)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("supR3HardenedWinInit", kSupInitOp_Misc, VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "Window Vista without any service pack installed is not supported. Please install the latest service pack."); #endif } /** * Converts the Windows command line string (UTF-16) to an array of UTF-8 * arguments suitable for passing to main(). * * @returns Pointer to the argument array. * @param pawcCmdLine The UTF-16 windows command line to parse. * @param cwcCmdLine The length of the command line. * @param pcArgs Where to return the number of arguments. */ static char **suplibCommandLineToArgvWStub(PCRTUTF16 pawcCmdLine, size_t cwcCmdLine, int *pcArgs) { /* * Convert the command line string to UTF-8. */ char *pszCmdLine = NULL; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(RT_SUCCESS(RTUtf16ToUtf8Ex(pawcCmdLine, cwcCmdLine, &pszCmdLine, 0, NULL))); /* * Parse the command line, carving argument strings out of it. */ int cArgs = 0; int cArgsAllocated = 4; char **papszArgs = (char **)RTMemAllocZ(sizeof(char *) * cArgsAllocated); char *pszSrc = pszCmdLine; for (;;) { /* skip leading blanks. */ char ch = *pszSrc; while (suplibCommandLineIsArgSeparator(ch)) ch = *++pszSrc; if (!ch) break; /* Add argument to the vector. */ if (cArgs + 2 >= cArgsAllocated) { cArgsAllocated *= 2; papszArgs = (char **)RTMemRealloc(papszArgs, sizeof(char *) * cArgsAllocated); } papszArgs[cArgs++] = pszSrc; papszArgs[cArgs] = NULL; /* Unquote and unescape the string. */ char *pszDst = pszSrc++; bool fQuoted = false; do { if (ch == '"') fQuoted = !fQuoted; else if (ch != '\\' || (*pszSrc != '\\' && *pszSrc != '"')) *pszDst++ = ch; else { unsigned cSlashes = 0; while ((ch = *pszSrc++) == '\\') cSlashes++; if (ch == '"') { while (cSlashes >= 2) { cSlashes -= 2; *pszDst++ = '\\'; } if (cSlashes) *pszDst++ = '"'; else fQuoted = !fQuoted; } else { pszSrc--; while (cSlashes-- > 0) *pszDst++ = '\\'; } } ch = *pszSrc++; } while (ch != '\0' && (fQuoted || !suplibCommandLineIsArgSeparator(ch))); /* Terminate the argument. */ *pszDst = '\0'; if (!ch) break; } *pcArgs = cArgs; return papszArgs; } /** * Logs information about a file from a protection product or from Windows. * * The purpose here is to better see which version of the product is installed * and not needing to depend on the user supplying the correct information. * * @param pwszFile The NT path to the file. * @param fAdversarial Set if from a protection product, false if * system file. */ static void supR3HardenedLogFileInfo(PCRTUTF16 pwszFile, bool fAdversarial) { /* * Open the file. */ HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; UNICODE_STRING UniStrName; UniStrName.Buffer = (WCHAR *)pwszFile; UniStrName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(pwszFile) * sizeof(WCHAR)); UniStrName.MaximumLength = UniStrName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &UniStrName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, GENERIC_READ | SYNCHRONIZE, &ObjAttr, &Ios, NULL /* Allocation Size*/, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ, FILE_OPEN, FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL /*EaBuffer*/, 0 /*EaLength*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) rcNt = Ios.Status; if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls:\n", pwszFile)); union { uint64_t u64AlignmentInsurance; FILE_BASIC_INFORMATION BasicInfo; FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION StdInfo; uint8_t abBuf[32768]; RTUTF16 awcBuf[16384]; IMAGE_DOS_HEADER MzHdr; } u; RTTIMESPEC TimeSpec; char szTmp[64]; /* * Print basic file information available via NtQueryInformationFile. */ IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &u.BasicInfo, sizeof(u.BasicInfo), FileBasicInformation); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) && NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status)) { SUP_DPRINTF((" CreationTime: %s\n", RTTimeSpecToString(RTTimeSpecSetNtTime(&TimeSpec, u.BasicInfo.CreationTime.QuadPart), szTmp, sizeof(szTmp)))); /*SUP_DPRINTF((" LastAccessTime: %s\n", RTTimeSpecToString(RTTimeSpecSetNtTime(&TimeSpec, u.BasicInfo.LastAccessTime.QuadPart), szTmp, sizeof(szTmp))));*/ SUP_DPRINTF((" LastWriteTime: %s\n", RTTimeSpecToString(RTTimeSpecSetNtTime(&TimeSpec, u.BasicInfo.LastWriteTime.QuadPart), szTmp, sizeof(szTmp)))); SUP_DPRINTF((" ChangeTime: %s\n", RTTimeSpecToString(RTTimeSpecSetNtTime(&TimeSpec, u.BasicInfo.ChangeTime.QuadPart), szTmp, sizeof(szTmp)))); SUP_DPRINTF((" FileAttributes: %#x\n", u.BasicInfo.FileAttributes)); } else SUP_DPRINTF((" FileBasicInformation -> %#x %#x\n", rcNt, Ios.Status)); rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &u.StdInfo, sizeof(u.StdInfo), FileStandardInformation); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) && NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status)) SUP_DPRINTF((" Size: %#llx\n", u.StdInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart)); else SUP_DPRINTF((" FileStandardInformation -> %#x %#x\n", rcNt, Ios.Status)); /* * Read the image header and extract the timestamp and other useful info. */ RT_ZERO(u); LARGE_INTEGER offRead; offRead.QuadPart = 0; rcNt = NtReadFile(hFile, NULL /*hEvent*/, NULL /*ApcRoutine*/, NULL /*ApcContext*/, &Ios, &u, (ULONG)sizeof(u), &offRead, NULL); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) && NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status)) { uint32_t offNtHdrs = 0; if (u.MzHdr.e_magic == IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) offNtHdrs = u.MzHdr.e_lfanew; if (offNtHdrs < sizeof(u) - sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS)) { PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 pNtHdrs64 = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS64)&u.abBuf[offNtHdrs]; PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 pNtHdrs32 = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS32)&u.abBuf[offNtHdrs]; if (pNtHdrs64->Signature == IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) { SUP_DPRINTF((" NT Headers: %#x\n", offNtHdrs)); SUP_DPRINTF((" Timestamp: %#x\n", pNtHdrs64->FileHeader.TimeDateStamp)); SUP_DPRINTF((" Machine: %#x%s\n", pNtHdrs64->FileHeader.Machine, pNtHdrs64->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 ? " - i386" : pNtHdrs64->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64 ? " - amd64" : "")); SUP_DPRINTF((" Timestamp: %#x\n", pNtHdrs64->FileHeader.TimeDateStamp)); SUP_DPRINTF((" Image Version: %u.%u\n", pNtHdrs64->OptionalHeader.MajorImageVersion, pNtHdrs64->OptionalHeader.MinorImageVersion)); SUP_DPRINTF((" SizeOfImage: %#x (%u)\n", pNtHdrs64->OptionalHeader.SizeOfImage, pNtHdrs64->OptionalHeader.SizeOfImage)); /* * Very crude way to extract info from the file version resource. */ PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER paSectHdrs = (PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)( (uintptr_t)&pNtHdrs64->OptionalHeader + pNtHdrs64->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader); IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY RsrcDir = { 0, 0 }; if ( pNtHdrs64->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader == sizeof(IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64) && pNtHdrs64->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes > IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE) RsrcDir = pNtHdrs64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE]; else if ( pNtHdrs64->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader == sizeof(IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32) && pNtHdrs32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes > IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE) RsrcDir = pNtHdrs32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE]; SUP_DPRINTF((" Resource Dir: %#x LB %#x\n", RsrcDir.VirtualAddress, RsrcDir.Size)); if ( RsrcDir.VirtualAddress > offNtHdrs && RsrcDir.Size > 0 && (uintptr_t)&u + sizeof(u) - (uintptr_t)paSectHdrs >= pNtHdrs64->FileHeader.NumberOfSections * sizeof(IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) ) { offRead.QuadPart = 0; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < pNtHdrs64->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; i++) if ( paSectHdrs[i].VirtualAddress - RsrcDir.VirtualAddress < paSectHdrs[i].SizeOfRawData && paSectHdrs[i].PointerToRawData > offNtHdrs) { offRead.QuadPart = paSectHdrs[i].PointerToRawData + (paSectHdrs[i].VirtualAddress - RsrcDir.VirtualAddress); break; } if (offRead.QuadPart > 0) { RT_ZERO(u); rcNt = NtReadFile(hFile, NULL /*hEvent*/, NULL /*ApcRoutine*/, NULL /*ApcContext*/, &Ios, &u, (ULONG)sizeof(u), &offRead, NULL); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) && NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status)) { static const struct { PCRTUTF16 pwsz; size_t cb; } s_abFields[] = { #define MY_WIDE_STR_TUPLE(a_sz) { L ## a_sz, sizeof(L ## a_sz) - sizeof(RTUTF16) } MY_WIDE_STR_TUPLE("ProductName"), MY_WIDE_STR_TUPLE("ProductVersion"), MY_WIDE_STR_TUPLE("FileVersion"), MY_WIDE_STR_TUPLE("SpecialBuild"), MY_WIDE_STR_TUPLE("PrivateBuild"), MY_WIDE_STR_TUPLE("FileDescription"), #undef MY_WIDE_STR_TUPLE }; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_abFields); i++) { size_t cwcLeft = (sizeof(u) - s_abFields[i].cb - 10) / sizeof(RTUTF16); PCRTUTF16 pwc = u.awcBuf; RTUTF16 const wcFirst = *s_abFields[i].pwsz; while (cwcLeft-- > 0) { if ( pwc[0] == 1 /* wType == text */ && pwc[1] == wcFirst) { if (memcmp(pwc + 1, s_abFields[i].pwsz, s_abFields[i].cb + sizeof(RTUTF16)) == 0) { size_t cwcField = s_abFields[i].cb / sizeof(RTUTF16); pwc += cwcField + 2; cwcLeft -= cwcField + 2; for (uint32_t iPadding = 0; iPadding < 3; iPadding++, pwc++, cwcLeft--) if (*pwc) break; int rc = RTUtf16ValidateEncodingEx(pwc, cwcLeft, RTSTR_VALIDATE_ENCODING_ZERO_TERMINATED); if (RT_SUCCESS(rc)) SUP_DPRINTF((" %ls:%*s %ls", s_abFields[i].pwsz, cwcField < 15 ? 15 - cwcField : 0, "", pwc)); else SUP_DPRINTF((" %ls:%*s rc=%Rrc", s_abFields[i].pwsz, cwcField < 15 ? 15 - cwcField : 0, "", rc)); break; } } pwc++; } } } else SUP_DPRINTF((" NtReadFile @%#llx -> %#x %#x\n", offRead.QuadPart, rcNt, Ios.Status)); } else SUP_DPRINTF((" Resource section not found.\n")); } } else SUP_DPRINTF((" Nt Headers @%#x: Invalid signature\n", offNtHdrs)); } else SUP_DPRINTF((" Nt Headers @%#x: out side buffer\n", offNtHdrs)); } else SUP_DPRINTF((" NtReadFile @0 -> %#x %#x\n", rcNt, Ios.Status)); NtClose(hFile); } } /** * Scans the Driver directory for drivers which may invade our processes. * * @returns Mask of SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_XXX flags. * * @remarks The enumeration of \Driver normally requires administrator * privileges. So, the detection we're doing here isn't always gonna * work just based on that. * * @todo Find drivers in \FileSystems as well, then we could detect VrNsdDrv * from ViRobot APT Shield 2.0. */ static uint32_t supR3HardenedWinFindAdversaries(void) { static const struct { uint32_t fAdversary; const char *pszDriver; } s_aDrivers[] = { { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_SYSPLANT, "SysPlant" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, "SRTSPX" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, "SymDS" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, "SymEvent" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, "SymIRON" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, "SymNetS" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, "aswHwid" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, "aswMonFlt" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, "aswRdr2" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, "aswRvrt" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, "aswSnx" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, "aswsp" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, "aswStm" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, "aswVmm" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, "tmcomm" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, "tmactmon" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, "tmevtmgr" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, "tmtdi" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, "tmebc64" }, /* Titanium internet security, not officescan. */ { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, "tmeevw" }, /* Titanium internet security, not officescan. */ { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, "tmciesc" }, /* Titanium internet security, not officescan. */ { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, "cfwids" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, "McPvDrv" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, "mfeapfk" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, "mfeavfk" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, "mfefirek" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, "mfehidk" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, "mfencbdc" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, "mfewfpk" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, "kl1" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, "klflt" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, "klif" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, "KLIM6" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, "klkbdflt" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, "klmouflt" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, "kltdi" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, "kneps" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MBAM, "MBAMWebAccessControl" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MBAM, "mbam" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MBAM, "mbamchameleon" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MBAM, "mwav" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MBAM, "mbamswissarmy" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVG, "avgfwfd" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVG, "avgtdia" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "PSINAflt" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "PSINFile" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "PSINKNC" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "PSINProc" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "PSINProt" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "PSINReg" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "PSKMAD" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNSAlpc" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNSHttp" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNShttps" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNSIds" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNSNAHSL" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNSpicc" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNSPihsw" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNSPop3" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNSProt" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNSPrv" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNSSmtp" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNSStrm" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, "NNStlsc" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MSE, "NisDrv" }, /*{ SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, "cmdguard" }, file system */ { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, "inspect" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, "cmdHlp" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_DIGITAL_GUARDIAN, "dgmaster" }, /* Not verified. */ }; static const struct { uint32_t fAdversary; PCRTUTF16 pwszFile; } s_aFiles[] = { { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_SYSPLANT, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\SysPlant.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_SYSPLANT, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\sysfer.dll" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_SYSPLANT, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\sysferThunk.dll" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\N360x64\\1505000.013\\ccsetx64.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\N360x64\\1505000.013\\ironx64.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\N360x64\\1505000.013\\srtsp64.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\N360x64\\1505000.013\\srtspx64.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\N360x64\\1505000.013\\symds64.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\N360x64\\1505000.013\\symefa64.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\N360x64\\1505000.013\\symelam.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\N360x64\\1505000.013\\symnets.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_SYMANTEC_N360, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\symevent64x86.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\aswHwid.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\aswMonFlt.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\aswRdr2.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\aswRvrt.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\aswSnx.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\aswsp.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\aswStm.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVAST, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\aswVmm.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\tmcomm.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\tmactmon.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\tmevtmgr.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\tmtdi.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\tmebc64.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\tmeevw.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\tmciesc.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO_SAKFILE, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\sakfile.sys" }, /* Data Loss Prevention, not officescan. */ { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_TRENDMICRO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\sakcd.sys" }, /* Data Loss Prevention, not officescan. */ { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\cfwids.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\McPvDrv.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\mfeapfk.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\mfeavfk.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\mfefirek.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\mfehidk.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\mfencbdc.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MCAFEE, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\mfewfpk.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\kl1.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\klflt.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\klif.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\klim6.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\klkbdflt.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\klmouflt.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\kltdi.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\kneps.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_KASPERSKY, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\klfphc.dll" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MBAM, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\MBAMSwissArmy.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MBAM, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\mwac.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MBAM, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\mbamchameleon.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MBAM, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\mbam.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVG, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\avgrkx64.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVG, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\avgmfx64.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVG, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\avgidsdrivera.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVG, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\avgidsha.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVG, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\avgtdia.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVG, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\avgloga.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVG, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\avgldx64.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_AVG, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\avgdiska.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\PSINAflt.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\PSINFile.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\PSINKNC.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\PSINProc.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\PSINProt.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\PSINReg.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\PSKMAD.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNSAlpc.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNSHttp.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNShttps.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNSIds.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNSNAHSL.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNSpicc.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNSPihsw.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNSPop3.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNSProt.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNSPrv.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNSSmtp.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNSStrm.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_PANDA, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NNStlsc.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MSE, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\MpFilter.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_MSE, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\NisDrvWFP.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\cmdguard.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\cmderd.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\inspect.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\cmdhlp.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\cfrmd.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\hmd.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\guard64.dll" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\cmdvrt64.dll" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\cmdkbd64.dll" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_COMODO, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\cmdcsr.dll" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_ZONE_ALARM, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\vsdatant.sys" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_ZONE_ALARM, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\AntiTheftCredentialProvider.dll" }, { SUPHARDNT_ADVERSARY_DIGITAL_GUARDIAN, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\dgmaster.sys" }, }; uint32_t fFound = 0; /* * Open the driver object directory. */ UNICODE_STRING NtDirName = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L"\\Driver"); OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr; InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtDirName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); HANDLE hDir; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtOpenDirectoryObject(&hDir, DIRECTORY_QUERY | FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY, &ObjAttr); #ifdef VBOX_STRICT SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(rcNt); #endif if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { /* * Enumerate it, looking for the driver. */ ULONG uObjDirCtx = 0; for (;;) { uint32_t abBuffer[_64K + _1K]; ULONG cbActual; rcNt = NtQueryDirectoryObject(hDir, abBuffer, sizeof(abBuffer) - 4, /* minus four for string terminator space. */ FALSE /*ReturnSingleEntry */, FALSE /*RestartScan*/, &uObjDirCtx, &cbActual); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) || cbActual < sizeof(OBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION)) break; POBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION pObjDir = (POBJECT_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION)abBuffer; while (pObjDir->Name.Length != 0) { WCHAR wcSaved = pObjDir->Name.Buffer[pObjDir->Name.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)]; pObjDir->Name.Buffer[pObjDir->Name.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0'; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aDrivers); i++) if (RTUtf16ICmpAscii(pObjDir->Name.Buffer, s_aDrivers[i].pszDriver) == 0) { fFound |= s_aDrivers[i].fAdversary; SUP_DPRINTF(("Found driver %s (%#x)\n", s_aDrivers[i].pszDriver, s_aDrivers[i].fAdversary)); break; } pObjDir->Name.Buffer[pObjDir->Name.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = wcSaved; /* Next directory entry. */ pObjDir++; } } NtClose(hDir); } else SUP_DPRINTF(("NtOpenDirectoryObject failed on \\Driver: %#x\n", rcNt)); /* * Look for files. */ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aFiles); i++) { HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER; UNICODE_STRING UniStrName; UniStrName.Buffer = (WCHAR *)s_aFiles[i].pwszFile; UniStrName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(s_aFiles[i].pwszFile) * sizeof(WCHAR)); UniStrName.MaximumLength = UniStrName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR); InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &UniStrName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/); rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile, GENERIC_READ | SYNCHRONIZE, &ObjAttr, &Ios, NULL /* Allocation Size*/, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, FILE_SHARE_READ, FILE_OPEN, FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL /*EaBuffer*/, 0 /*EaLength*/); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) && NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status)) { fFound |= s_aFiles[i].fAdversary; NtClose(hFile); } } /* * Log details. */ SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinFindAdversaries: %#x\n", fFound)); for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aFiles); i++) if (fFound & s_aFiles[i].fAdversary) supR3HardenedLogFileInfo(s_aFiles[i].pwszFile, true /* fAdversarial */); return fFound; } extern "C" int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp); /** * The executable entry point. * * This is normally taken care of by the C runtime library, but we don't want to * get involved with anything as complicated like the CRT in this setup. So, we * it everything ourselves, including parameter parsing. */ extern "C" void __stdcall suplibHardenedWindowsMain(void) { RTEXITCODE rcExit = RTEXITCODE_FAILURE; g_cSuplibHardenedWindowsMainCalls++; g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_EP_CALLED; /* * Initialize the NTDLL API wrappers. This aims at bypassing patched NTDLL * in all the processes leading up the VM process. */ supR3HardenedWinInitImports(); g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_IMPORTS_RESOLVED; /* * Notify the parent process that we're probably capable of reporting our * own errors. */ if (g_ProcParams.hEvtParent || g_ProcParams.hEvtChild) { SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(g_fSupEarlyProcessInit); g_ProcParams.enmRequest = kSupR3WinChildReq_CloseEvents; NtSetEvent(g_ProcParams.hEvtParent, NULL); NtClose(g_ProcParams.hEvtParent); NtClose(g_ProcParams.hEvtChild); g_ProcParams.hEvtParent = NULL; g_ProcParams.hEvtChild = NULL; } else SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT(!g_fSupEarlyProcessInit); /* * After having resolved imports we patch the LdrInitializeThunk code so * that it's more difficult to invade our privacy by CreateRemoteThread. * We'll re-enable this after opening the driver or temporarily while respawning. */ supR3HardenedWinDisableThreadCreation(); /* * Init g_uNtVerCombined. (The code is shared with SUPR3.lib and lives in * SUPHardenedVerfiyImage-win.cpp.) */ supR3HardenedWinInitVersion(); g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_VERSION_INITIALIZED; /* * Convert the arguments to UTF-8 and open the log file if specified. * This must be done as early as possible since the code below may fail. */ PUNICODE_STRING pCmdLineStr = &NtCurrentPeb()->ProcessParameters->CommandLine; int cArgs; char **papszArgs = suplibCommandLineToArgvWStub(pCmdLineStr->Buffer, pCmdLineStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), &cArgs); supR3HardenedOpenLog(&cArgs, papszArgs); /* * Log information about important system files. */ supR3HardenedLogFileInfo(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", false /* fAdversarial */); supR3HardenedLogFileInfo(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\kernel32.dll", false /* fAdversarial */); supR3HardenedLogFileInfo(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\KernelBase.dll", false /* fAdversarial */); supR3HardenedLogFileInfo(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\apisetschema.dll", false /* fAdversarial */); /* * Scan the system for adversaries, logging information about them. */ g_fSupAdversaries = supR3HardenedWinFindAdversaries(); /* * Get the executable name. */ DWORD cwcExecName = GetModuleFileNameW(GetModuleHandleW(NULL), g_wszSupLibHardenedExePath, RT_ELEMENTS(g_wszSupLibHardenedExePath)); if (cwcExecName >= RT_ELEMENTS(g_wszSupLibHardenedExePath)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibHardenedWindowsMain", kSupInitOp_Integrity, VERR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW, "The executable path is too long."); /* The NT version. */ HANDLE hFile = CreateFileW(g_wszSupLibHardenedExePath, GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL /*pSecurityAttributes*/, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL /*hTemplateFile*/); if (hFile == NULL || hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibHardenedWindowsMain", kSupInitOp_Integrity, RTErrConvertFromWin32(RtlGetLastWin32Error()), "Error opening the executable: %u (%ls).", RtlGetLastWin32Error()); RT_ZERO(g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath); ULONG cbIgn; NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile, ObjectNameInformation, &g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath, sizeof(g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath) - sizeof(WCHAR), &cbIgn); if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) supR3HardenedFatalMsg("suplibHardenedWindowsMain", kSupInitOp_Integrity, RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt), "NtQueryObject -> %#x (on %ls)\n", rcNt, g_wszSupLibHardenedExePath); NtClose(hFile); /* The NT executable name offset / dir path length. */ g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName = g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); while ( g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName > 1 && g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer[g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName - 1] != '\\' ) g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName--; /* * If we've done early init already, register the DLL load notification * callback and reinstall the NtDll patches. */ if (g_fSupEarlyProcessInit) { supR3HardenedWinRegisterDllNotificationCallback(); supR3HardenedWinReInstallHooks(false /*fFirstCall */); } /* * Call the C/C++ main function. */ SUP_DPRINTF(("Calling main()\n")); rcExit = (RTEXITCODE)main(cArgs, papszArgs, NULL); /* * Exit the process (never return). */ SUP_DPRINTF(("Terminating the normal way: rcExit=%d\n", rcExit)); suplibHardenedExit(rcExit); } /** * Reports an error to the parent process via the process parameter structure. * * @param pszWhere Where this error occured, if fatal message. NULL * if not message. * @param enmWhat Which init operation went wrong if fatal * message. kSupInitOp_Invalid if not message. * @param rc The status code to report. * @param pszFormat The format string. * @param va The format arguments. */ DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinReportErrorToParent(const char *pszWhere, SUPINITOP enmWhat, int rc, const char *pszFormat, va_list va) { if (pszWhere) RTStrCopy(g_ProcParams.szWhere, sizeof(g_ProcParams.szWhere), pszWhere); else g_ProcParams.szWhere[0] = '\0'; RTStrPrintfV(g_ProcParams.szErrorMsg, sizeof(g_ProcParams.szErrorMsg), pszFormat, va); g_ProcParams.enmWhat = enmWhat; g_ProcParams.rc = RT_SUCCESS(rc) ? VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_2 : rc; g_ProcParams.enmRequest = kSupR3WinChildReq_Error; NtClearEvent(g_ProcParams.hEvtChild); NTSTATUS rcNt = NtSetEvent(g_ProcParams.hEvtParent, NULL); if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt)) { LARGE_INTEGER Timeout; Timeout.QuadPart = -300000000; /* 30 second */ NTSTATUS rcNt = NtWaitForSingleObject(g_ProcParams.hEvtChild, FALSE /*Alertable*/, &Timeout); } } /** * Routine called by the supR3HardenedEarlyProcessInitThunk assembly routine * when LdrInitializeThunk is executed in during process initialization. * * This initializes the Stub and VM processes, hooking NTDLL APIs and opening * the device driver before any other DLLs gets loaded into the process. This * greately reduces and controls the trusted code base of the process compared * to opening the driver from SUPR3HardenedMain. It also avoids issues with so * call protection software that is in the habit of patching half of the ntdll * and kernel32 APIs in the process, making it almost indistinguishable from * software that is up to no good. Once we've opened vboxdrv, the process * should be locked down so thighly that only kernel software and csrss can mess * with the process. */ DECLASM(uintptr_t) supR3HardenedEarlyProcessInit(void) { /* * When the first thread gets here we wait for the parent to continue with * the process purifications. The primary thread must execute for image * load notifications to trigger, at least in more recent windows versions. * The old trick of starting a different thread that terminates immediately * thus doesn't work. * * We are not allowed to modify any data at this point because it will be * reset by the child process purification the parent does when we stop. To * sabotage thread creation during purification, and to avoid unnecessary * work for the parent, we reset g_ProcParams before signalling the parent * here. */ if (g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState != SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_NOT_YET_CALLED) { NtTerminateThread(0, 0); return 0x22; /* crash */ } /* Retrieve the data we need. */ uintptr_t uNtDllAddr = ASMAtomicXchgPtrT(&g_ProcParams.uNtDllAddr, 0, uintptr_t); if (!RT_VALID_PTR(uNtDllAddr)) { NtTerminateThread(0, 0); return 0x23; /* crash */ } HANDLE hEvtChild = g_ProcParams.hEvtChild; HANDLE hEvtParent = g_ProcParams.hEvtParent; if ( hEvtChild == NULL || hEvtChild == RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE || hEvtParent == NULL || hEvtParent == RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { NtTerminateThread(0, 0); return 0x24; /* crash */ } /* Resolve the APIs we need. */ PFNNTWAITFORSINGLEOBJECT pfnNtWaitForSingleObject; PFNNTSETEVENT pfnNtSetEvent; supR3HardenedWinGetVeryEarlyImports(uNtDllAddr, &pfnNtWaitForSingleObject, &pfnNtSetEvent); /* Signal the parent that we're ready for purification. */ RT_ZERO(g_ProcParams); g_ProcParams.enmRequest = kSupR3WinChildReq_PurifyChildAndCloseHandles; NTSTATUS rcNt = pfnNtSetEvent(hEvtParent, NULL); if (rcNt != STATUS_SUCCESS) return 0x33; /* crash */ /* Wait up to 2 mins for the parent to exorcise evil. */ LARGE_INTEGER Timeout; Timeout.QuadPart = -1200000000; /* 120 second */ rcNt = pfnNtWaitForSingleObject(hEvtChild, FALSE /*Alertable*/, &Timeout); if (rcNt != STATUS_SUCCESS) return 0x34; /* crash */ /* * We're good to go, work global state and restore process parameters. * Note that we will not restore uNtDllAddr since that is our first defence * against unwanted threads (see above). */ g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_EARLY_INIT_CALLED; g_fSupEarlyProcessInit = true; g_ProcParams.hEvtChild = hEvtChild; g_ProcParams.hEvtParent = hEvtParent; g_ProcParams.enmRequest = kSupR3WinChildReq_Error; g_ProcParams.rc = VINF_SUCCESS; /* * Initialize the NTDLL imports that we consider usable before the * process has been initialized. */ supR3HardenedWinInitImportsEarly(uNtDllAddr); g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_EARLY_IMPORTS_RESOLVED; /* * Init g_uNtVerCombined as well as we can at this point. */ supR3HardenedWinInitVersion(); /* * Convert the arguments to UTF-8 so we can open the log file if specified. * We may have to normalize the pointer on older windows version (not w7/64 +). * Note! This leaks memory at present. */ PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS pUserProcParams = NtCurrentPeb()->ProcessParameters; UNICODE_STRING CmdLineStr = pUserProcParams->CommandLine; if ( CmdLineStr.Buffer != NULL && !(pUserProcParams->Flags & RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMS_FLAG_NORMALIZED) ) CmdLineStr.Buffer = (WCHAR *)((uintptr_t)CmdLineStr.Buffer + (uintptr_t)pUserProcParams); int cArgs; char **papszArgs = suplibCommandLineToArgvWStub(CmdLineStr.Buffer, CmdLineStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR), &cArgs); supR3HardenedOpenLog(&cArgs, papszArgs); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedVmProcessInit: uNtDllAddr=%p\n", uNtDllAddr)); /* * Set up the direct system calls so we can more easily hook NtCreateSection. */ supR3HardenedWinInitSyscalls(true /*fReportErrors*/); /* * Determine the executable path and name. Will NOT determine the windows style * executable path here as we don't need it. */ SIZE_T cbActual = 0; rcNt = NtQueryVirtualMemory(NtCurrentProcess(), &g_ProcParams, MemorySectionName, &g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath, sizeof(g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath) - sizeof(WCHAR), &cbActual); if ( !NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) || g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Length == 0 || g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Length & 1) supR3HardenedFatal("NtQueryVirtualMemory/MemorySectionName failed in supR3HardenedVmProcessInit: %#x\n", rcNt); /* The NT executable name offset / dir path length. */ g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName = g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); while ( g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName > 1 && g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer[g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName - 1] != '\\' ) g_offSupLibHardenedExeNtName--; /* * Initialize the image verification stuff (hooks LdrLoadDll and NtCreateSection). */ supR3HardenedWinInit(0, false /*fAvastKludge*/); /* * Open the driver. */ if (cArgs >= 1 && suplibHardenedStrCmp(papszArgs[0], SUPR3_RESPAWN_1_ARG0) == 0) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedVmProcessInit: Opening vboxdrv stub...\n")); supR3HardenedWinOpenStubDevice(); } else if (cArgs >= 1 && suplibHardenedStrCmp(papszArgs[0], SUPR3_RESPAWN_2_ARG0) == 0) { SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedVmProcessInit: Opening vboxdrv...\n")); supR3HardenedMainOpenDevice(); } else supR3HardenedFatal("Unexpected first argument '%s'!\n", papszArgs[0]); g_enmSupR3HardenedMainState = SUPR3HARDENEDMAINSTATE_WIN_EARLY_DEVICE_OPENED; /* * Reinstall the NtDll patches since there is a slight possibility that * someone undid them while we where busy opening the device. */ supR3HardenedWinReInstallHooks(false /*fFirstCall */); /* * Restore the LdrInitializeThunk code so we can initialize the process * normally when we return. */ SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedVmProcessInit: Restoring LdrInitializeThunk...\n")); PSUPHNTLDRCACHEENTRY pLdrEntry; int rc = supHardNtLdrCacheOpen("ntdll.dll", &pLdrEntry); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedVmProcessInit: supHardNtLdrCacheOpen failed on NTDLL: %Rrc\n", rc); uint8_t *pbBits; rc = supHardNtLdrCacheEntryGetBits(pLdrEntry, &pbBits, uNtDllAddr, NULL, NULL, NULL /*pErrInfo*/); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedVmProcessInit: supHardNtLdrCacheEntryGetBits failed on NTDLL: %Rrc\n", rc); RTLDRADDR uValue; rc = RTLdrGetSymbolEx(pLdrEntry->hLdrMod, pbBits, uNtDllAddr, UINT32_MAX, "LdrInitializeThunk", &uValue); if (RT_FAILURE(rc)) supR3HardenedFatal("supR3HardenedVmProcessInit: Failed to find LdrInitializeThunk (%Rrc).\n", rc); PVOID pvLdrInitThunk = (PVOID)(uintptr_t)uValue; SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(supR3HardenedWinProtectMemory(pvLdrInitThunk, 16, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)); memcpy(pvLdrInitThunk, pbBits + ((uintptr_t)uValue - uNtDllAddr), 16); SUPR3HARDENED_ASSERT_NT_SUCCESS(supR3HardenedWinProtectMemory(pvLdrInitThunk, 16, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ)); SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedVmProcessInit: Returning to LdrInitializeThunk...\n")); return (uintptr_t)pvLdrInitThunk; }